Goins v. Ajax Metal Processing, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 97-40241.,CIV.A. 97-40241. |
| Citation | 984 F.Supp. 1057 |
| Parties | Jeffrey GOINS, Plaintiff, v. AJAX METAL PROCESSING, INC. and Kenneth Poucket, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
David l. Ravid, James M. Brady, Ravid Assoc., Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.
Robert W. Morgan, Kay R. Butler, Clark Hill, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
On or about May 29, 1997, plaintiff Jeffrey Goins filed the instant three-count action in Wayne County Circuit Court after being discharged from his employment with defendant Ajax Metal Processing, Inc. ("Ajax") on January 12, 1996. In Counts I and II, plaintiff sets forth Toussaint-type1 wrongful discharge claims against Ajax, his previous employer, and Kenneth Poucket, the individual who allegedly fired him.2 In Count VI[sic], plaintiff brings a claim for interference "with business and/or contractual relations" against Poucket only.
On or about July 1, 1997, defendants removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In their petition for removal defendants asserted that this court had original subject-matter jurisdiction over all three of plaintiff's purportedly state law claims because each claim was pre-empted by § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
Presently before this court is defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment on all claims in plaintiff's complaint. For the following reasons, defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
On or about August 8, 1995, Ajax hired plaintiff as a "Plating Line Operator." Approximately seven months later, on January 12, 1996, plaintiff received an "Employee Warning/Disciplinary Notice"3 ("Notice") terminating him from his employment at Ajax for carrying a weapon on plant property —a violation of a written work rule proscribing the "[u]nauthorized possession of firearms, knives, or other weapons on company property."
After plaintiff received the Notice, he telephoned Gregory Wronkowicz, Ajax's Vice-President of Operations, and requested a meeting to discuss his termination. A meeting was convened on January 17, 1996.4 At the meeting, plaintiff denied he had a weapon on company property and verbally requested that he be reinstated. His request for reinstatement was denied.
After the January 17, 1996 meeting, plaintiff, who at all relevant times was a member of a bargaining unit represented by the Ajax Metal Processing Employees Committee ("Committee"), allegedly presented the Committee Chairperson, Dan Vanderplancke, with a written grievance concerning his discharge. Plaintiff allegedly requested that Vanderplancke process his grievance in accordance with the procedure delineated in the collective bargaining agreement, (hereinafter the "Management/Labor Agreement").5 Vanderplancke, however, allegedly refused to process plaintiff's grievance.
Ultimately, on May 29, 1997, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking monetary damages from Ajax and Poucket for the alleged wrongful termination of his employment with Ajax. Shortly thereafter, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the district courts to dismiss any claim which fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rule 12(b)(6) affords defendants an opportunity to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief on its claims, even if everything alleged in the counterclaims is true. In applying the standards under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must presume all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the nonmoving party. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir.1995). The court need not, however, accord the presumption of truthfulness to any legal conclusions, opinions or deductions, even if they are couched as factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 629 (9th Cir. 1981); Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir.1956). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is disfavored:
[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to render summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue of material fact when the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court must decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." In re Dollar Corp., 25 F.3d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat the otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all evidence together with all inferences to be drawn therefrom "in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Watkins v. Northwestern Ohio Tractor Pullers Ass'n., Inc., 630 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir.1980).
If the movant meets the standard specified at Rule 56(c), then the opposing party must come forth with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First National Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1583, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party "is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint." Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993); Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986). And, "if the adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 96 S.Ct. 598, 603-04, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826-27 (6th Cir. 1994).
With these two standards in mind, this court will consider defendants' motion as a summary judgment motion since matters outside the pleadings will be taken into account.
In Count I of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the terms of the Management/Labor Agreement, Ajax employees, such as himself, could be terminated only for "just cause." Plaintiff maintains that Ajax and Poucket terminated him without "just cause" and in breach of the Management/Labor Agreement when they fired him for something he allegedly did not do (i.e., possessed a gun on Ajax property). See Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 598, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) ().
Defendants maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on Count I of plaintiff's complaint. Defendants contend that plaintiff is time-barred from bringing Count I and they also argue that plaintiff did not exhaust the collective bargaining agreement's exclusive contractual remedies prior to bringing said Count.
A preliminary issue to be decided is whether Count I of plaintiff's complaint is preempted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. If Count I is not pre-empted, this court lacks jurisdiction over it.
The Supreme Court has held that if a claim is "substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract," it is pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA. Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 2167 n. 3, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987). Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(emphasis added).6
It is plaintiff's position that Count I is not pre-empted by § 3017 because the Committee which negotiated the Management/Labor Agreement upon which Count I is predicated, is not a "labor organization" within the meaning of § 2(5) of the...
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