Gold v. Exxon Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 14-96-01138-CV,14-96-01138-CV
• Citation: 960 S.W.2d 378
• Parties: Gerald R. GOLD, Appellant, v. EXXON CORPORATION, d/b/a Exxon Company, U.S.A., Appellee. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 378

960 S.W.2d 378

Gerald R. GOLD, Appellant, v. EXXON CORPORATION, d/b/a Exxon Company, U.S.A., Appellee.

No. 14-96-01138-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (14th Dist.).

Jan. 15, 1998.

Rehearing Overruled Feb. 26, 1998.

G. Scott Fiddler, Bellaire, for appellant.

Douglas B. Neagli, Taylor French Snelling, Houston, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C.J., and HUDSON and FOWLER, JJ.

OPINION

MURPHY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Appellant, Gerald R. Gold ("Gold"), brought suit against appellee, Exxon Corporation ("Exxon"), alleging age discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon. In his sole point of error, Gold contends the trial court erred in granting Exxon's Motion for Summary Judgment. We affirm.

I. Background

Exxon terminated Gold's employment as a staff tax agent in May 1992 amidst a year-long reduction in its workforce. Exxon's reduction in force targeted two distinct groups: 1) employees who voluntarily chose to resign or retire and 2) employees involuntarily terminated or retired due to low-ranking performance evaluations. Exxon protected from inclusion in the second group those employees with over twenty-five years of service or those with over fifteen years of service and within three years of attaining annuitant status at age fifty five. Gold, who was not in either of the protected categories, fell into the low-ranking performance group and was terminated as part of the involuntary group.

Gold filed suit, claiming his low rankings on the performance evaluations were due to prejudice towards him by the supervisors who made the assessments. He contended his immediate supervisor continuously harassed him and made biased statements indicating a preference for the younger employees within Gold's department. He also claimed the younger employees were not subjected to similar abusive treatment.

Exxon filed a motion for summary judgment. Exxon argued Gold failed to create a genuine issue of material fact because he neither (1) established a prima facie case of age discrimination nor (2) demonstrated Exxon's declared, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination was a mere pretext for age discrimination. The trial court granted Exxon's motion without specifying the grounds for its decision.

In his point of error to this court, Gold claims the trial court committed error in granting Exxon's Motion for Summary Judgment because he established a prima facie case of employment discrimination and the summary judgment proof demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact existed on whether Exxon's proffered reason for his termination was pretextual.

II. Discussion

In asserting his age discrimination claim, Gold alleged a violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 1.01, et seq. ¹ The legislature drafted the TCHRA to "correlat[e] state law with federal law in the area of discrimination in employment." See Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex.1991); see also TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 1.02(1) (Vernon 1987) (noting a general purpose of the TCHRA is "to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964"). In adhering to the legislative intent, Texas courts have looked to the pertinent federal law in interpreting the relevant provisions of the TCHRA. See Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.1996); Trico Technologies Corp. v. Rodriguez, 907 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Stinnett v. Williamson County Sheriff's Dept., 858 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex.App.--Austin 1993, writ denied).

Federal courts have developed a burden-shifting analysis for determining whether a plaintiff states an actionable employment discrimination claim. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746-47, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). In addressing age discrimination claims under the TCHRA, Texas courts have applied this analysis. ² See Stanley Stores, Inc. v. Chavana, 909 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 251. We adopt this approach for the purpose of addressing Gold's claim.

Under the burden-shifting analysis, a plaintiff has the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. at 2746-47; Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 251. Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the defendant-employer has the burden of producing evidence showing a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment actions. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. at 2746-47. If the employer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption of unlawful discrimination, created by the plaintiff's prima facie case, disappears. See id. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747. The plaintiff must then "demonstrate that the defendant's articulated rationale is merely a pretext for discrimination." See Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir.1996); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 251.

Because Exxon claimed two grounds for summary judgment, either of which were sufficient, under the burden-shifting analysis, to provide a basis for the trial court's decision, Gold must raise an issue with regard to both to prevail in his appeal. See Kovar v. Krampitz, 941 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) ("[w]hen a trial court does not specify the grounds upon which it grants a summary judgment, the appellate court will affirm the judgment if any one of the theories advanced in the motion is meritorious") (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S. S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex.1993)).

A. Gold's prima facie case

Where the employer claims the termination was part of a reduction in force, the employee makes out a prima facie case by showing: (1) he is within the protected age group; (2) he has been adversely affected by the employer's decision; (3) he was qualified to assume another position at the time of the discharge; and (4) evidence, circumstantial or direct, exists from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude the employer intended to discriminate in reaching its decision. See Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d at 41; see also Stanley Stores, Inc. v. Chavana, 909 S.W.2d at 559 (stating the necessary showing on the fourth prong is whether the employee "was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or by someone younger or otherwise show[s] that he was discharged because of age").

Exxon concedes that Gold satisfies the first and second prongs for a prima facie case, but it contends he does meet the remaining prongs. Exxon argues Gold does not satisfy the third prong because he presents no proof showing he was qualified to assume another position and asserts Gold failed to demonstrate satisfactory performance in his tax agent position. Exxon claims Gold fails to satisfy the fourth prong because he does not present proof showing Exxon consciously refused to retain him due to his age or regarded age as a negative factor. Exxon argues Gold's subjective belief that his termination was based on age is insufficient to establish the necessary showing on the fourth prong.

Gold need only make a minimal showing in order to establish a prima facie case. See Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d at 41. The fact a prima facie case is fairly easily made out serves the essential purpose of "sharpen[ing] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." See Texas Dep't Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95, n. 8, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

1. Gold's qualification element

Where an employer retains an employee's job after a reduction in force, as Exxon did in the instant case, the employee can meet his burden of showing he is qualified to assume another position at the time of discharge by demonstrating his qualifications to perform the job from which he was terminated. See Adams v. Valley Federal Credit Union, 848 S.W.2d 182, 188-89 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (citing Bienkowski v. American Airlines, 851 F.2d 1503, 1506 (5th Cir.1988)); see also Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that a plaintiff had successfully met its burden by showing "[o]ther engineers ... were also retained and [plaintiff's] evidence compared his qualifications favorably with theirs"). The proper showing generally entails demonstrating "the plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired." See Adams v. Valley Federal Credit Union, 848 S.W.2d at 188.

Gold presented uncontroverted proof showing he had worked for Exxon as a staff tax agent for almost ten years and had not suffered a physical disability rendering him unfit for the position. Furthermore, Gold avers in an affidavit that he was more experienced than other staff tax agents who were retained. See Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d at 407-08 (noting superior experience as a factor in establishing an employee's qualifications to continue his prior duties in a reduction in force case where his position is retained by the employer).

Exxon argues Gold's poor performance ranking made him unqualified for the position of staff tax agent. In making this argument, Exxon breaks down the distinction between the first and second phases of the employment discrimination burden-shifting analysis by attempting to use its "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for Gold's termination, usually presented in...