Goldberg v. Faber Industries, Inc., 13238.
| Decision Date | 08 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 13238.,13238. |
| Citation | 291 F.2d 232 |
| Parties | Arthur J. GOLDBERG, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FABER INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Charles Donahue, Solicitor, Robert E. Nagle, Attorney, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., Herman Grant, U. S. Department of Labor, Chicago, Ill., Harold C. Nystrom, Bessie Margolin, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
E. V. Champion, Peoria, Ill., Willard B. Gaskins, Peoria, Ill., for appellee.
Robert W. Ginnane, General Counsel, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae.
Before DUFFY and KNOCH, Circuit Judges, and GRUBB, District Judge.
This suit was brought by the Secretary of Labor under section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (as amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.) to restrain defendant from violating the Act's overtime provisions with respect to certain truck drivers in its employ (29 U.S.C.A. § 207).
The case was submitted upon a stipulation of facts. The District Court held the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power, under section 204 (a) (3) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 U.S.C.A. § 304(a) (3), to fix qualifications and maximum hours of employment for all of defendant's scrap drivers, and that the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act do not apply to any such employees.
Defendant is engaged in the business of purchasing, collecting and rendering meat scraps and dead animals for the production of grease, animal foods and other products. With its central office in Peoria, Illinois, defendant operates ten plants of various types including four rendering plants located in Illinois.
In order to obtain the necessary supply of meat scraps, defendant employs at each of the rendering plants, one or more "scrap drivers" who drive their trucks over specially assigned and designated routes, and purchase scraps from butchers, restaurants, packing plants and others. Twenty drivers are so employed.
Each driver delivers the scrap collected to the rendering plant which he serves. In some instances, where the rendering plant is at a distance from the route, deliveries are made to mobile trailers (called loading platforms) which are sent out from a rendering plant to a more convenient location.
When a scrap driver is absent due to illness or other cause, his route may be handled by a supervisor or other personnel. Occasionally, another scrap driver may handle the route. The stipulated facts do not show any instance where a scrap driver who is regularly assigned to an intrastate route, ever handled an interstate route.
There is no dispute that these drivers are engaged in the production of goods for commerce; nor is there any dispute that the drivers are all employed for workweeks in excess of forty hours without receiving extra wages for such overtime work. Defendant claims, however, that it is exempt from such overtime provisions by reason of section 13(b) (1) of the Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b) (1), which so exempts employees with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935.
Five of the scrap drivers are assigned to routes lying partly outside of Illinois. All concerned agree that these five drivers are subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission and are, therefore, within the exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Thus, the sole question is whether the other fifteen drivers who have routes solely within Illinois, are also exempt.
The question of the Commission's power to prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service for the fifteen scrap drivers employed by defendant, turns upon the issue whether they are engaged in transporting property in interstate commerce. This can be done in one of two ways, 1) by the motor vehicle being driven across state lines; or 2) where the motor vehicle is operated wholly upon the highways of a single state, but the transportation performed is part of a through movement originating in or destined to a point in another state.
As none of the fifteen drivers crossed state lines on their respective routes, in order to be in interstate commerce, the transportation must be part of...
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...on interstate routes were subject to the jurisdiction of the Motor Carrier Act...." 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(c)(2); see Goldberg v. Faber Industries, 291 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.1961). Thus, employees of private carriers who are engaged in "intrastate," as opposed to "interstate," commerce are not exemp......
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...on this Court and which is materially distinguishable from the facts of this case. For example, Plaintiffs rely on Goldberg v. Faber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1961), which held that the rationale in Morris did not apply to "scrap drivers," who drove specified routes, where the ev......
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...also finds that Bilyou does not conflict with Baird v. Wagoner Transportation Co., 425 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1970), Goldberg v. Faber Industries, 291 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1961), Marshall v. Aksland, 631 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1980), or Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Yeates, 584 F.3d 868 (10th Ci......
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...is subject to the exemption. Masson, 2005 WL 2000133, at *6, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18022, at *17-18, (quoting Goldberg v. Faber Indus., Inc., 291 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir.1961)). For employees whose "continuing duties ... have no substantial direct effect on ... safety of operations or [whose......
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Chapter § 2-57 29 CFR § 782.2. Requirements for Exemption in General
...not only upon the class to which the employer belongs but also the activities of the individual employee. Goldberg v. Faber Industries, 291 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1961). (d) The limitations, mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, on the regulatory power of the Secretary of Transportation (......