Golden Peanut Co. v. Miller
| Decision Date | 04 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | A21A1269, A21A1270 |
| Citation | 870 S.E.2d 511 |
| Parties | GOLDEN PEANUT COMPANY, LLC et al. v. MILLER et al.; and vice versa. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael Adam Caplan, Atlanta, Timothy Brandon Waddell, Danielle Corin Le Jeune, Atlanta, Tia Ghattas, Amy Doig, Josh M. Greenbaum, for Appellant in A21A1269.
James Lory King II, Tifton, Bree Owens Sullivan, Macon, Leland Hiatt Kynes, for Appellee in A21A1269.
James Lory King II, Tifton, Joseph Shane Hudson, Bree Owens Sullivan, Macon, Leland Hiatt Kynes, for Appellant in A21A1270.
Steven J. Kyle, Atlanta, Michael Adam Caplan, Atlanta, Timothy Brandon Waddell, Danielle Corin Le Jeune, Atlanta, Tia Ghattas, Amy Doig, Josh M. Greenbaum, for Appellee in A21A1270.
This case arises out of a collision between a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Lloy White and a passenger vehicle driven by Kristie Miller ("Miller"), which resulted in the death of Miller and serious injuries to her son. Ross Miller, individually and as Miller's estate administrator, and related parties ("Plaintiffs") filed suit against various defendants, including White, Golden Peanut Company, LLC (the owner of the trailer that White was transporting), and Archer Daniels Midland Company ("ADM") (Golden Peanut's parent company).
We granted Golden Peanut's and ADM's application for interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of their motions for reconsideration and for clarification following the denial of their motions for summary judgment (Case No. A21A1269). Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the denial of their motion to exclude portions of the investigating officer's testimony (Case No. A21A1270). For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm in Case Number A21A1270 and reverse the denial of summary judgment in Case Number A21A1269.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as the non-movants on the motions for summary judgment,1 the record shows the following. At approximately 8:15 p.m. on September 27, 2017, after picking up a load of green peanuts from a farm to take to Golden Peanut's drying facility in Camilla, White made a left turn to head Northbound onto a two-lane road. Miller's vehicle, which was traveling Southbound, collided with the side of the trailer. Sergeant Chad Fallin of the Georgia State Patrol's Specialized Collision Reconstruction Team ("SCRT") did a walk-through of the crash site that night, and was the lead investigator of a SCRT team that performed a number of tests and issued a SCRT report.
The Plaintiffs filed suit against various defendants, asserting, inter alia, that White was negligent and that Golden Peanut and ADM were liable under theories of common-law vicarious liability and as a statutory employer under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ("FMCSRs"). The trial court denied Golden Peanut's and ADM's motions for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude portions of Fallin's testimony and SCRT report. These appeals followed.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.2
We review a trial court's evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion.3 4 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the parties’ claims of error.
1. Golden Peanut and ADM argue that the undisputed evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that neither of them had any right to control White's work. We agree.
"An employer generally is not responsible for torts committed by his employee when the employee exercises an independent business and in it is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer."5 "In the absence of evidence of actual control, the test distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor is whether the employer assumed the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract."6 7
(a) The evidence showed that Lloy White Trucking, White's sole proprietorship, owned the tractor involved in the collision. White paid for his own expenses in maintaining the tractor, including taxes and insurance. Through his sole proprietorship, White contracted with Larry Wood Trucking, which issued White an IRS form 1099 for tax purposes, and paid White a flat rate after taking a commission for its brokerage service.
During the harvest season, Golden Peanut engaged Larry Wood Trucking as a broker. Larry Wood Trucking had White contact Billy Benton at the Golden Peanut facility in Camilla. Benton gave White the contact information for farmers who had loads of peanuts ready for pickup. Each day, Benton "dispatched out" where the drivers needed to go and what they needed to do. White coordinated the pickups directly with the farmers, who gave him directions on where to pick up the peanuts.
According to White, Golden Peanut did not tell him the specific routes to take when driving the peanuts. After picking up the peanuts using the specialty trailer with tarp, White hauled the peanuts to Golden Peanut's facility in Camilla, where he worked with Golden Peanut employees to ensure the trailer was hooked up to a dryer. Golden Peanut did not provide any instruction to White on these tasks. While Golden Peanut occasionally requested that loads be picked up or delivered at specific times, it had no control over White's work schedule.
We conclude that these facts are not enough to create a genuine issue as to the vicarious liability of a manufacturer or distributor of goods.8 "[T]o the extent that the delivery schedule may impose parameters involving the time within which the work must be executed, such is not sufficient to raise an issue as to the nature of the relationship between defendant [the distributor] and [an independent hauler]."9
Golden Peanut employees did give instructions to White on where to park to unload the peanuts when he got to the facility and to hook up to a dryer to ensure the peanuts would not rot, but "merely taking steps to see that the contractor carries out his agreement, ... is not such interference and assumption of control as will render the employer liable."10 Further, although White was hauling a specialized trailer owned by Golden Peanut and he rolled or unrolled a tarp when picking up the peanuts, this did not convert him from an independent contractor to an employee.11
(b) Based on our conclusions in Division 1 (a), supra, and the lack of evidence in the record of any relationship between White and ADM (Golden Peanut's parent company), we need not address ADM's argument that the trial court erred by conflating it with Golden Peanut.
2. Golden Peanut and ADM argue that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment based on the statutory-employer doctrine under the FMCSRs.
However, the record contains no indication that they raised this issue or made this argument before the trial court, and this Court cannot hear arguments raised for the first time on appeal.12
Under the statutory-employment theory, a lessee motor carrier is strictly liable under the FMCSRs for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease.14 The FMCSRs define an "employee" as:
any individual, other than an employer, who is employed by an employer and who in the course of his or her employment directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety. Such term includes a driver of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle)[.]15
An "employer" is "any person engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business, or assigns employees to operate it[.]"16 Thus, "the existence of a lease between the defendant and owner of the vehicle involved in an accident is the defining element in creating a statutory employment relationship under the FMCSRs."17
Here, the evidence showed as a matter of law that no lease existed regarding the tractor.18 Plaintiffs do not argue that Golden Peanut owned or leased the tractor, but they contend that a lease is unnecessary to establish statutory employer liability because Golden Peanut owned the trailer. "Motor vehicle" is defined as "any vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used upon the highways in the transportation of passengers or property, or any combination thereof[.]"19 The FMCSRs specifically exempt "[a]ny type of trailer not drawn by a power unit leased from the same lessor."20 Thus, because the Golden Peanut trailer was not drawn by a Golden Peanut tractor, the FMCSRs do not apply.21
3. Golden Peanut and ADM argue that, because they are not vicariously liable for White's conduct, the trial court should have...
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