Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper

Decision Date31 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 14-95-00626-CV,14-95-00626-CV
Citation905 S.W.2d 804
PartiesGOLDEN RULE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Todd HARPER, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Ann Ryan Robertson, Teresa Letson, Houston, Judy L. Burnthorn, Michael Boleware, New Orleans, LA, for appellant.

John W. Tavormina, John L. Russell, Houston, for appellee.

Before LEE, AMIDEI and EDELMAN, JJ.

MAJORITY OPINION

LEE, Justice.

Appellant, Golden Rule Insurance Company (Golden Rule), appeals a temporary injunction granted in favor of Todd Harper on May 18, 1995. In seven points of error Golden Rule complains that the trial court should not have granted the temporary injunction. We affirm.

Todd and Mary Harper obtained health insurance from Golden Rule in 1991. At the time, and ever since, the Harpers were residents of Illinois. In November 1992, Mary was diagnosed by her Indiana physician as having advanced metastatic melanoma. Her physician referred her to M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas. She was treated by Dr. Plager at M.D. Anderson until her death in December 1993, incurring approximately $300,000 in medical expenses. Golden Rule denied approximately $160,000 of her medical expenses as investigational, experimental or for research purposes.

Harper filed suit in Harris County in November 1994, attempting to recover the denied benefits. Initially, Golden Rule filed a motion to transfer venue from Harris County to Dallas County. After Harper opposed the motion, Golden Rule withdrew its motion to transfer venue. In March 1995, Golden Rule filed a declaratory judgment action in Illinois. In the declaratory judgment action, Golden Rule requested that the court:

1. adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the parties under the insurance contract; and

2. declare that the insurance contract does not apply to or cover the medical expenses which were excluded as investigational, experimental or for research purposes.

In response, Harper amended his original petition and requested an anti-suit injunction against Golden Rule. 1 After a hearing, the trial court granted Harper's request for an anti-suit injunction. In its temporary injunction order, the trial court found that:

1. Harper would probably prevail in a trial of this cause;

2. The declaratory judgment action filed by Golden Rule in Illinois was vexatious and brought for the purpose of harassment 3. The declaratory judgment action consists of the defensive issues presented in Harper's original action and, therefore, is duplicative of the original action;

4. Golden Rule intends to pursue its declaratory judgment action in Illinois and proceed to judgment as soon as possible, before the trial court could render judgment in Harper's original action;

5. If Golden Rule carried out its intention, it would alter the status quo and tend to make a judgment in favor of Harper ineffective;

6. Harper would be deprived of his choice of forum, and inequitably be subjected to res judicata; and

7. Without a temporary injunction, Harper would be without any adequate remedy at law because Harper would not be able to compel unwilling witnesses to testify in Illinois, he would be unfairly burdened in getting willing witnesses to attend a trial in Illinois, and he would be required to incur additional expenses for which there is no good faith reason to incur.

Golden Rule appeals the trial court's order granting the temporary injunction in seven points of error. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp.1995) (allowing an appeal of an interlocutory order that grants a temporary injunction).

There is no question that Texas courts may issue anti-suit injunctions to prevent parties from going forward with litigation in a sister state. Christensen v. Integrity Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex.1986); Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305-06 (Tex.1986); Admiral Ins. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 848 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1993, no writ). When a suit is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, that court is generally entitled to proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a subsequently filed suit in another state. Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 255 (citing Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 306). "The principle of comity, however, requires that courts exercise this equitable power sparingly and only in special circumstances." Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163. Comity has been described as "a principle of mutual convenience whereby one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another." Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 255 (citing Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 306).

Therefore, when suits are pending in two sister states, the trial court is required to balance comity with its inherent power to protect its jurisdiction when determining whether to issue an anti-suit injunction. In determining whether an anti-suit injunction should be issued, the supreme court has indicated:

There are no precise guidelines for determining the appropriateness of an anti-suit injunction or for deciding whether comity should be invoked. The circumstances of each situation must be carefully examined to determine whether the injunction is required to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice.

Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 306-07.

In reviewing a trial court's grant of an anti-suit temporary injunction, we are to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163; Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305. We will not disturb the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 254-55. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Total Minatome Corp. v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 851 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993, no writ). Rather, we are limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by: 1) acting arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles, or 2) misapplying the law to the established facts of the case. Ramsey v. Lewis, 874 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1994, no writ); Long John Silver's Inc. v. Martinez, 850 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). We are to review the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163.

We have reviewed the record and have determined that based on a totality of the circumstances the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We cannot say that the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guilding rules or principals. Nor can we say that the trial court misapplied law to the facts established at the hearing.

In its first three points of error, Golden Rule argues Harper failed to demonstrate the requirements of an anti-suit injunction. Golden Rule contends that the trial court erred in finding its jurisdiction was threatened and in finding the Illinois suit was vexatious and brought to harass.

In order to prevail, a party requesting an anti-suit injunction "must show that a clear equity demands the Texas court's intervention." Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163. Equity generally "exists when a party pleads and proves a probable irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law. But even then, to show an equitable right to injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate a probable right of recovery on the merits of the case." Total Minatome, 851 S.W.2d at 339 (citations omitted). An anti-suit injunction may be justified when the injunction protects a party from vexatious or harassing litigation. See Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163. 2

In support of its argument that the declaratory judgment action in Illinois was not vexatious and harassing, Golden Rule cites Total Minatome Corp. v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 851 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993, no writ). In that case, Santa Fe filed a declaratory judgment action in Texas. Four days later, Total Minatome Corporation (TMC) filed a suit in Montana. The Texas trial court granted Santa Fe an anti-suit temporary injunction which the Dallas Court of Appeals dissolved. Id. at 341. Santa Fe argued that TMC's Montana suit was brought for harassment because it was filed four days after the Texas declaratory judgment action. The court rejected Santa Fe's argument and noted that TMC had previously informed Santa Fe of its intention to file a lawsuit. Id. at 340. The court also noted that the trial court did not find that TMC filed the Montana action for harassment and there was no evidence which indicated that it was brought to harass. Id. Accordingly, based on a review of the record, the court of appeals determined that the suit was not brought for harassment.

To the contrary, there is no indication in the record before us that Golden Rule informed Harper that it was going to file an action. Rather, the record indicates that Golden Rule denied benefits based on an exclusion in its policy and did not begin to act until after Harper filed suit. Also, the trial court in the current case found that the suit was "brought for the purpose of harassment." Thus, the current case is not controlled by Total Minatome.

Because it is always difficult to demonstrate that a party brought a suit to harass, we are forced to review the evidence, direct and circumstantial, which the trial court relied on to determine Golden Rule's motivation for bringing the suit. The time and place where a suit is filed are factors to be considered in determining whether a suit was brought to harass. See Id. (rejecting Santa Fe's argument that the Montana suit was brought to harass because it was brought four days after the Texas suit). Golden Rule brought the declaratory judgment action in Illinois four months after Harper brought this action in Texas....

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