Golden v. City of St. Louis Park

• Decision Date: 28 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 39059,39059
• Citation: 122 N.W.2d 570,266 Minn. 46
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: Morris GOLDEN et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS PARK, Appellant.

Page 570

122 N.W.2d 570

266 Minn. 46

Morris GOLDEN et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS PARK, Appellant.

No. 39059.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 28, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Municipality's action in denying permit to use real property for industrial purposes included within those authorized by zoning ordinance for area in which property is located must bear some relationship to public health, safety, or welfare, and will not be upheld where it is arbitrary or discriminatory as applied to such property; or where its purpose is to make property subservient to other similar property; or where it destroys valuable rights therein solely in adherence to esthetic concepts.

2. In determining whether a municipality's action in denying an application for special permit under zoning ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory all credible evidence may be considered by court. Where such evidence fairly establishes that such an action by municipality bore no relationship to public health, safety, or welfare, and was obviously discriminatory in the light of the evidence as to actual uses of adjacent or nearby property, court should invalidate action and direct issuance of permit.

3. On appeal from district court order invalidating action of municipality in denying property owners' application for special permit under zoning ordinance, functions of this court are the same as in all cases where fact questions have been determined by trial court. Where evidence with reference to the municipality's action discloses nothing which would reasonably support finding that municipality had acted in the interests of public health, safety, or welfare, and adequately supports a finding that municipality's action had been unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory, trial court's determination based upon such evidence that such action was unlawful must be affirmed.

4. Other assignments of error considered and held not to require reversal.

H. Horace Burry, City Atty., Herbert C. Davis, St. Louis Park, for appellant.

William S. Rosen, Dworsky & Rosen, St. Paul, for respondents.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Plaintiffs as owners of certain real estate within defendant city's corporate limits brought this action for a declaratory judgment determining that defendant's action in denying plaintiffs' application for a permit to construct and operate an Automobile reduction yard upon such real estate was discriminatory and invalid; determining that certain provisions of the zoning ordinance of defendant city under which it purported to act were unconstitutional and void; and directing defendant to adopt an appropriate resolution approving such application.

The court determined that the use of plaintiffs' property as an Automobile reduction yard in the manner described in their application would not constitute a nuisance and that defendant's action in denying such application was arbitrary, unreasonable, void, and in contravention of plaintiffs' rights. It directed that defendant and its agents forthwith issue to plaintiffs the special permit described and reserved jurisdiction to implement the rights of the parties pursuant to its decision if necessary.

This is an appeal by defendant from an order of the court denying its subsequent motion for amended findings or a new trial. Defendant contends here that (1) its actions in denying plaintiffs' application for the special permit described were within its legislative authority and hence subject only to limited judicial review; (2) the court's findings are not supported by the evidence; (3) the court erred in its reception of evidence relating to the manner in which plaintiffs intended to operate their property as an Automobile reduction yard and in receiving photographs and descriptions of business enterprises presently operating adjacent to plaintiffs' property; and (4) the court erred in rejecting testimony relating to the mental considerations of members of its counsel in acting upon plaintiffs' application.

The provisions of the St. Louis Park zoning ordinance involved in these proceedings are as follows:

'Section 6:032.7. Auto Reduction Yard: A lot or yard where three (3) or more unlicensed motor vehicles or the remains thereof are kept for the purpose of dismantling, sale of parts, sale as scrap, storage, or abandonment.'

'Section 6:142--Uses by Special Permit--Within any 'I--1' Industrial district, no structure or land shall be used for the following uses except by special permit.'

'Section 6:142.6. Conducting any of the following operations and the sale at wholesale, manufacture, fabrication or processing of any of the following articles or products; provided no special permit shall be granted for such uses within four hundred (400) feet of any 'R' Use District:

'Subd. 4. Automobile reduction yard.'

'Section 6:191--General--The City Council may by resolution grant Special Permits for uses and purposes elsewhere in this ordinance provided, and may impose conditions and safeguards in such Permits to protect the Comprehensive Plan in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan. Applications for Special Permits shall be filed in the office of the Zoning Administrator.

'Section 6:192--Referral to Planning Commission--Before authorization of any Special Permits, the request therefor shall be referred to the Planning Commission for study concerning the effect of the proposed use on the Comprehensive Plan and on the character and development of the neighborhood, and for its recommendation to the City Council for the granting of such Special Permit and the conditions thereof, if, any, or for the denial of such Special Permit.

'Section 6:193--Issuance--In considering applications for Special Permits under this ordinance, the City Council shall consider the advices and recommendations of the Planning Commission and the effect of the proposed use upon the health, safety, and welfare of occupants of surrounding lands, existing and anticipated traffic conditions, including parking facilities on adjacent streets, and the effect on values of property in the surrounding area, and the effect of the proposed use on the Comprehensive Plan. If it shall determine by resolution that the proposed use will not be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of the community nor will cause serious traffic congestion nor hazards, nor will seriously depreciate surrounding property values, and that the same is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan, the Council may grant such permits and may impose conditions and safeguards therein.

'Section 6:194--Denial--Special Permits may be denied by motion of the City Council and such motion shall constitute a finding and determination by the City Council that the conditions required for approval do not exist.'

The findings upon which the court ordered judgment for plaintiffs were in part as follows:

'The property subject to his action * * * is located in the I--1 use classification as described by the Ordinance. The I--1 use classification * * * permits the conduct of an automobile reduction yard only if the Council shall grant a Special Use Permit for its establishment and operation. * * *

'On October 29, 1962, plaintiffs presented to the City an application for a Special Use Permit, under the section noted above (§ 6:190 quoted Supra), for the operation of an automobile reduction yard. Such application was presented by the plaintiffs through their counsel and architect to the Planning Commission for its consideration on November 7 and December 6, 1962. The Planning Commission is charged with the consideration of applications for Special Use Permits and recommendation of considerations and actions to be taken by the Council. (§§ 6:192, 6:19o.) The Planning Commission received reports of the staff planner, a full-time employee of the City, who stated in part:

"From a land use planning standpoint, it must be noted that auto reduction yards are a necessary part of the urban scene, just as cemeteries, dumps, junk yards, etc. are. Since the basic requirements that they be located in a heavy industrial district and that they by located 400 feet away from residential properties have been met, it would seem that the actual locational decision must be based on factors in addition to those encompassed by pure planning standards.'

'It also received reports from various other departments of the city government in addition to the materials presented by the plaintiffs and, after the hearings above described, recommended to the Council that the application be denied. On December 17, 1962, plaintiffs made their presentation to the Council of the City and, after such presentation, the Council voted to deny the request. * * *

'Applicants have made numerous statements and have filed pictures and maps with the Planning Commission and to the City Council stating their intentions as to the operation of their yard; they promise that there will be no burning, crushing, or stacking of dismantled wrecks, that scrap will be removed daily in large buckets; that there will be a solid fence, that they will store their cars on the lot with sufficient area around each wreck to enable the work of dismantling to be carried on without moving one wreck to get at another; that they will not operate at night; that their purchases and dismantling operations will be limited primarily to passenger vehicles; that there will be in the yard storage facilities for body parts on wooden racks and storage for other parts in wooden bins as shown on an architect's drawing instead of on the ground as is customary.

'The Zoning Ordinance provides that no property within an I--1 Industrial District may be used as an automobile reduction yard unless it is at least 400 feet distant from any residential district and unless a special permit granting such use is obtained from the...