Golden v. State

• Decision Date: 17 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 378-92,378-92
• Citation: 851 S.W.2d 291
• Parties: Sylvester GOLDEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 291

851 S.W.2d 291

Sylvester GOLDEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 378-92.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

March 17, 1993.

Rehearing Denied April 14, 1993.

John H. Hagler, William D. Sheetz, Dallas, for appellant.

John Vance, Dist. Atty. & Sharon Batjer, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

OVERSTREET, Judge.

Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine in an amount of 400 grams or more, alleged to have occurred on or about October 10, 1989. On August 13, 1990, in a trial by jury in the 265th District Court of Dallas County, appellant was found guilty. The jury then assessed a punishment of confinement in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life and a fine of $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Golden v. State, No. 05-90-01080-CR, 1992 WL 1938 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992). We granted appellant's ground for review which stated, "The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the accomplice witness charge was not defective although such charge failed to include a requested instruction regarding mere presence." ¹ In addressing this alleged point of error, the court of appeals held, "Because Golden denied participation in the crime, the trial court did not err when it refused Golden's charge." Golden v. State, supra, slip op., p. 9.

I. SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS

The record reveals that this offense involved a reverse sting operation for the purchase of three kilos of uncut cocaine for $39,000. The police were assisted by an informant. The informant (while being monitored by police) arrived as the sole occupant of a vehicle at a predetermined location. A second vehicle containing the accomplice witness (passenger) and co-actor Williams (driver) soon arrived. The informant made the actual exchange of cocaine for cash with the accomplice witness while both were seated in the vehicle being driven by the informant. After the exchange, the accomplice witness gave the cocaine to co-actor Williams and then returned to the vehicle being driven by the informant in order to get a ride to the airport. The informant stopped at a nearby service station and the accomplice witness was arrested. Co-actor Williams who was returning to a local motel, was arrested upon arriving at the motel and the cocaine recovered. Appellant and co-actor Harrison were arrested at a room in the motel.

The informant testified as to his dealings during the course of this investigation with the accomplice witness. The accomplice witness' testimony specifically implicated himself, appellant, and the two other co-actors in discussing and participating in the agreement of the impending cocaine purchase. ² He also opined that based upon his observations and conversations appellant was the man with the money to buy the cocaine. He added that at a prepurchase meeting, when one of the $1,000 bundles of money was found to be $200 short, appellant provided the money to make up the difference. He also testified that appellant, and the other co-actors, indicated a desire to make future deals if the merchandise was good and the price was right.

Appellant testified at guilt/innocence and explicitly denied any involvement in the cocaine purchase. He testified that he had driven from his home in South Carolina to Chicago with regard to business. He then drove to Los Angeles to visit with a childhood friend, co-actor Harrison. Then on the trip back to South Carolina, they were going to stop in Dallas and visit another childhood friend who worked there. Appellant insisted that he had been asleep in the motel room in Dallas and did not see or hear anyone discussing drug deals or anything else with co-actor Harrison. He claimed that when he woke up, he saw the car that he had been driving on the trip being driven off by an unknown man, co-actor Williams, whom he was then told was the brother-in-law of co-actor Harrison, who informed him that he had allowed Williams to borrow the car to go get something to eat. Appellant adamantly disavowed any knowledge of or involvement in the drug transaction.

II. APPELLANT'S CLAIM

On appeal, appellant claimed that "the accomplice witness charge was defective since it failed to instruct the jury regarding mere presence."

Court's Charge to Jury

You are instructed that an "accomplice", as the term is hereinafter used, means any person connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime, as such parties, by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both. Mere presence alone, however, will not constitute one a party to an offense.

You are instructed that the witness [accomplice witness] is an accomplice, if an offense was committed, and you cannot convict the [d]efendant upon his testimony unless you first believe that his testimony is true and shows that the [d]efendant is guilty as charged, and then you cannot convict the [d]efendant upon said testimony unless you further believe that there is other testimony in the case, outside of the evidence of the said [accomplice witness], tending to connect the [d]efendant with the offense committed, if you find that an offense was committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the [d]efendant with its commission; and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the [d]efendant is guilty of the offense charged against him.

Appellant's Requested Charge

You are further instructed that an accomplice, as the term is here used, means any person connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime, as such parties, by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible or by both. Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.

Under our law a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the jury first believes that the accomplice's testimony is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him, and even then you cannot convict unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission.

A conviction may not be based on accomplice's testimony alone no matter how complete a case may have been made by accomplice witness testimony. [Footnote omitted.]

Mere presence of the [d]efendant with an accomplice shortly before or shortly after the commission of a crime is not sufficient corroboration. [Footnote omitted.]

Appellant averred error in the trial court's refusal to include in the charge of the court that particular portion of his specially requested jury charge that "[m]ere presence of the [d]efendant with an accomplice shortly before or shortly after the commission of a crime is not sufficient corroboration." The court of appeals stated (1) when the alleged defensive theory negates an element of the offense, no affirmative charge must be given and (2) an instruction is only required where the defendant admits participation in the act itself and relies upon a statutory defense. The court held that because appellant denied participation in the crime, there was no error in refusing the requested instruction and overruled the point of error. Golden v. State, supra, slip op. at pp. 8 and 9.

III. MERITS OF APPELLANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION CLAIM

The jury charge instructed the jury that it could not convict based upon the accomplice witness testimony unless it believed there was other testimony in the case, outside of the evidence of the said [accomplice witness] tending to connect appellant with the offense committed, and that such corroboration would not be sufficient if it merely showed the commission of the offense, but rather had to connect appellant with its commission.

It is well-settled that mere presence alone of a defendant at the scene of a crime is insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony. Meyers v. State, 626 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). This Court is not considering in the instant case whether there was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice witness testimony. Our inquiry is limited to whether a proper instruction was given (upon a timely request of appellant) to the jury informing them that the mere presence of the appellant was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness. Thus appellant's requested instruction constituted a correct statement of law. This Court has previously indicated that a defendant is entitled to a requested jury charge instruction on mere presence being insufficient to corroborate an accomplice witness's testimony if such is raised by the evidence. Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801, 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 985, 79 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). This Court has also consistently held that an accused is entitled to an instruction on every defensive issue raised by the evidence. Hayes v. State, 728 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Clearly appellant's testimony raised an issue...