Goldin v. Goldin
| Citation | 346 So.2d 107 |
| Decision Date | 24 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-479,76-479 |
| Parties | Rita GOLDIN, Appellant, v. Richard GOLDIN, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
No appearance by counsel for appellant.
A. Jay Cristol and Michael V. Blumenthal, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, HAVERFIELD and HUBBART, JJ.
This is an action by a wife to hold her former husband in contempt for failure to abide by the terms of a separation and property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree and a cross action by the husband to modify the said agreement due to a change in financial circumstances. The trial court abated the agreement to pay future alimony and ordered the payment of past arrearages of alimony. The wife appeals and the husband cross appeals.
On November 14, 1945, the parties were married. On July 30, 1964, the parties entered into a separation and property settlement agreement in which the husband agreed to pay the wife $100 a week alimony and $50 a week child support for their two minor children. The husband further agreed to keep in full force and effect a life insurance policy on his life with the Lincoln Life Insurance Company and to make the wife the irrevocable beneficiary and owner of the policy. There were many other provisions in the agreement pertaining to the wife and children which are not relevant here. On October 12, 1964, a final decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties was entered incorporating the terms of the separation and property settlement agreement and retaining jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.
At the time of the separation and property settlement agreement it is undisputed that the husband was self-employed in the construction industry earning in excess of $50,000 a year. The wife was a homemaker and mother having no independent source of income.
The husband abided by the terms of the separation and property settlement agreement until January 1975, at which time his construction business began to go into serious decline. By this time his children had reached their majority and his obligations to them under the said agreement had been satisfied. Since he could no longer meet his financial obligations to his wife under the above agreement, he delivered to her the Lincoln Life Insurance policy on his life which belonged to her under the said agreement. She cashed the policy in for $4,835. The husband has made no alimony payments since on or about February 4, 1975.
The husband earned approximately $60,000 plus fringe benefits in the year 1974. In January 1975, his business stopped operating due to a recession in the construction industry. He wound up his business affairs from January to July 1975 drawing only $600 a month for living expenses during this time. In July 1975, he filed for and was subsequently discharged in bankruptcy. He has been unemployed ever since drawing only unemployment compensation despite diligent efforts to secure other employment.
At the time of the final hearing in this cause, the husband owned no substantial assets. The wife, on the other hand, owned a savings account in the amount of approximately $25,000 and is employed as a secretary earning $175 a week with secure job prospects.
On June 16, 1975, the wife filed a petition for a rule to show cause against the husband seeking inter alia past arrearages of alimony. On July 30, 1975, the husband filed a petition for modification of the separation and property settlement agreement as incorporated in the divorce decree. On February 4, 1976, these matters came on for a final hearing in the trial court.
The trial court after hearing all the foregoing evidence entered an order abating the separation and property settlement agreement as incorporated in the divorce decree due to the drastic change of circumstances in the financial condition of both parties. The court abated the agreement as of the date of the final hearing in this cause (February 4, 1976). The court further found that the husband was 52 weeks in arrearages in alimony from February 4, 1975 to February 4, 1976. The court, however, ordered the husband to pay the wife only $365 in alimony because it gave him a set-off of $4,835 on the Lincoln Life Insurance policy which was owned and cashed in by the wife as against the $5,200 of alimony due and owing. This appeal follows.
The major issue presented for review is whether the trial judge should have terminated, rather than abated the alimony provisions of the separation and property settlement agreement as incorporated in the divorce decree effective as of the date of the filing of the petition for modification due to the drastic change in the financial circumstances of both parties. We conclude that the trial court should have so terminated the aforesaid alimony provisions and reverse.
Section 61.14(1) Florida Statutes (1975), gives a trial court jurisdiction to enter orders as equity requires upon a petition for modification of a separation and property settlement agreement as incorporated in a divorce decree based on a change in financial circumstances on the part of either party to the marriage dissolution. Contrary to the wife's contention herein, provisions in separation agreements or final decrees fixing alimony may be modified or set aside when any of the grounds specified in the statute are shown to exist. Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). However, if the party receiving alimony under a separation agreement gives up certain special equities in property in consideration for the alimony, only the strongest and most compelling reasons will justify a modification or a setting aside of the alimony provisions of the agreement. Sedell v. Sedell, supra. A complete termination of alimony is both authorized and required under the statute where there has been a sufficiently substantial change in financial circumstances on the part of one or both parties to the marriage dissolution. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So.2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Craig v. Craig, 298 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Schlapik v. Schlapik, 329 So.2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
In the instant case, one would be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Turner v. Turner
...firmly established that a change in the circumstances of either party may require modification of alimony. Thus, in Goldin v. Goldin, 346 So.2d 107, 109 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), the court A complete termination of alimony is both authorized and required under the statute where there has been a su......
-
Adler v. Adler, s. 76-2186
...863 (Fla.1973); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So.2d 223 (Fla.1972); Bowen v. Bowen, 347 So.2d 675 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Goldin v. Goldin, 346 So.2d 107 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 345 So.2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Hawkesworth v. Hawkesworth, 345 So.2d 359 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Long ......
-
Friedman v. Friedman, 78-166
...for the court to deny the husband's petition for modification. Mumm v. Mumm, 353 So.2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Goldin v. Goldin, 346 So.2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So.2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So.2d 629 (Fla.1974); Craig v. Craig, 298 So.2d ......
-
Hogshead v. Hogshead, 83-270
...property held by the husband and accumulated through the joint efforts of the parties during their marriage. See also Goldin v. Goldin, 346 So.2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Because true property settlement agreements cannot be modified and yet all agreements for child and spousal support are s......