Golding v. Brennan

• Decision Date: 21 May 1903
• Citation: 183 Mass. 286,67 N.E. 239
• Parties: GOLDING et al. v. BRENNAN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

183 Mass. 286

67 N.E. 239

GOLDING et al. v. BRENNAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 21, 1903

COUNSEL

Stephen H. Tyng and Thos. J. Kenny, for plaintiffs.

Wm. H Bent, for defendants.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

The plaintiffs' action if for rent, and also for 'incandescent electric lights, steam heating, horse power, and water' furnished by them to the defendants according to the terms of a written lease purporting to be made and entered into January 1, 1898, between Golding & Co. and Miles F. Brennan & Co. If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, the amount does not seem to be disputed. The stipulations as to steam heat, incandescent electric light and 'power for elevator' were not within the terms of the original lease, but in an independent clause, written below the signatures of the parties, unsigned, and not referred to in the body of the instrument. The answer of the defendants denied that they covenanted to pay therefor, but from the agreed statement of facts and evidence at the trial as well as from the defendants' brief, it does not appear that this was insisted upon, and we consider the case as presented by the parties. The superior court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the case is here on the exceptions of the defendants to the refusal of the court to give certain rulings requested by them.

The signing of the lease by Dennison and Brennan for their respective firms appears to have been without any previous authority given them by the copartners of each, and, if the transaction had gone no farther, would not have been sufficient to bind either firm. Cady v. Shephered, 11 Pick. 400-406, 22 Am. Dec. 379. But the evidence shows that, after the signing of the lease in the firm name of each copartnership, the defendant firm entered into occupation and possession of the premises described in the lease, paid the rent therein reserved, and according to its terms, and used the light, heat, power, and water furnished and supplied them by the plaintiffs, while the plaintiff firm opened an account on its books for the rent accruing under the lease, and directed its bookkeeper to make out bills therefor, and collect and receive the same of the defendants. From this evidence it might be found that, by the common course of business and dealing between the parties, each partnership had ratified the execution of, and had accepted and acted under, the lease. Whether the evidence was sufficient to show such ratification and acceptance of the lease and its terms was a question of fact to be determined at the trial, and has been found against the defendants. If the defendants elected to enter into possession and occupation of the demised premises, they became liable to pay the rent to the plaintiffs, who had accepted the lease and claimed under it. Carroll v. St. John Society, 125 Mass. 565, 566; Burkhardt v. Yates, 161 Mass. 591-593, 37 N.E. 759. And it makes no difference that the individual names of the members of each...