Goldreyer v. Cronan

• Citation: 76 Conn. 118,55 A. 594
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 24 July 1903
• Parties: GOLDREYER v. CRONAN.

55 A. 594

76 Conn. 118

GOLDREYER

v. CRONAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 24, 1903.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; James Bishop, Judge.

Action by Sussman Goldreyer against Patrick J. Cronan. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

James P. Pigott, for appellant.

Charles S. Hamilton, for appellee.

TORRANCE, C. J. The complaint in this case alleged that the defendant owed the plaintiff divers sums of money, one of the items being in amount $300. The trial court allowed this item and disallowed the others. The case was tried at the November term of the court in 1902, and decided at the January term, 1903; the precise date of judgment being the 26th day of February, 1903. On that day the Judge filed in court a paper called "Memorandum on Which Judgment is Based," which, after reciting the substance of the evidence in the case, stated that the court allowed the $300 item and disallowed the others, and ended with these words: "Judgment for the plaintiff to recover $300 and costs. J. Bishop, Judge." On that same day the following entry was made on the file in said case: "Judgment for the plaintiff to recover $300. New Haven, February 26, 1903. J. Bishop, Judge." It does not appear that any formal judgment in accordance with said memoranda was ever entered up, but on the 11th of March, 1903, the court ordered judgment for $100.50 in favor of the plaintiff to be formally entered up; and this was done under the following circumstances, as stated in the finding: "On March 2, 1903, the plaintiff and defendant appeared in court, and Judge Julius C. Cable, one of the judges of the court, directed the clerk to call in Judge Bishop to hold said court. Said court was duly opened by the sheriff, and thereupon the plaintiff orally moved that the judgment be corrected by adding interest. The defendant objected to such correction on the ground that the January term of said court had ended, and the March term begun; and further that if the court had jurisdiction the plaintiff was not, in law, entitled to such interest; and further that the plaintiff, by his failure to prosecute his suit with diligence, waived whatever right, if any, he had to interest on the Judgment. On March 11, 1903, the court granted said motion of the plaintiff, and corrected said judgment, and added the interest, amounting to $400.50." It will thus be seen that the judge, through said signed memoranda, announced, in effect, that he found the damages to be $300, and that he rendered Judgment for the plaintiff for that amount only, and costs of suit. After tins the case was not continued to the next term, nor was it held for further consideration or advisement, nor was any further action of the court necessary to entitle the plaintiff to the entry of a formal judgment in his favor for $300 damages and costs.

Assuming for the present that the entry of judgment thus made was a true entry of the judgment actually rendered, we must regard the judgment, for the purposes of this case, as one finally disposing of the case, until set aside or annulled by some competent court of review. "The memorandum * * * must be regarded as the final act of the judge—the act which exhausted the residuum of power over the cause after final adjournment." Sturdevant v. Stanton, 47 Coun. 579-581. The case was thus finally disposed of at the January term of the court, 1903. Under these circumstances, we think that what the trial court did in this case in March must be regarded as having been done at the March term of the court, 1903, which by law began on the 2d day of that month, and not as done at, or as of, the preceding January term. The case, then, must be regarded as one in which a final judgment at one term was at a subsequent term set aside, and another judgment substituted therefor; and the ultimate, controlling question in the case is whether the court had the power to do this.

The plaintiff claims that on the 26th of February, 1903, the court did in fact render judgment for $400.50, but that by a clerical mistake a different and a smaller amount was entered up. If the record sustains this claim, it may be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the court had the power to correct the mistake at the succeeding term, or at least that a new trial would not be granted on account of its action in so doing. Mistakes merely clerical, by which the judgment as recorded fails to agree with the judgment in fact...