Golds v. Golds, No. COA03-472 (N.C. App. 5/4/2004), COA03-472
| Decision Date | 04 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. COA03-472,COA03-472 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | WILLIAM FRANKLIN GOLDS, Plaintiff, v. MARLENE MILLER GOLDS, Defendant. |
Michael D. Duncan and Daniel S. Johnson, for plaintiff appellee.
James N. Freeman, Jr., and Dennis G. Martin, for defendant appellant.
This case arises out of a complaint seeking rescission of a deed based upon fraud and the return of separate personal property. The relevant facts are as follows: Plaintiff William Franklin Golds and defendant Marlene Miller Golds were married on 20 September 1985. The couple separated on 14 September 1991 and divorced on 16 October 1992. Plaintiff brought numerous items of separate personal property into the marriage. After the parties separated, plaintiff sought his separate personal property in the former marital home. Although plaintiff demanded the return of his property, defendant refused to comply. The parties maintained a close relationship following the separation. Defendant picked up plaintiff's employment check on a regular basis and either cashed or deposited it in her bank account. Plaintiff, a long-distance truck driver, believed that there might be a chance of reconciliation because defendant visited with plaintiff after plaintiff returned from long trips for his employer.
The parties held title to the marital home as tenants by the entirety. In May of 1992, defendant came to plaintiff's place of employment and asked plaintiff to sign documents which defendant claimed were necessary to refinance the former marital home. Plaintiff had just returned from a long trip and was preparing to leave for another one for his employer. Defendant directed plaintiff to sign the back page without showing him the front page. Plaintiff testified that he relied on defendant's representations that the documents were to refinance the marital residence. Later, plaintiff learned that the document he signed was a general warranty deed conveying his interest in the former marital home to defendant.
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking rescission of the deed based upon fraud and the return of items of his separate personal property. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on 10 August 1998, but that motion was denied. This matter was heard on 30 September 1998, 6 October 1998, 5 November 1998, and 11 March 1999. On 15 August 2002, the trial court ordered the return of several pieces of plaintiff's separate property and rescinded thewarranty deed. The court further determined that plaintiff and defendant were owners of the real property as tenants in common.
Defendant appeals. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (I) denying her motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, (II) applying the incorrect burden of proof, (III) finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove fraud, (IV) making findings of fact that were not supported by competent evidence, and (V) failing to issue a judgment in a timely manner. We disagree and affirm the decision of the trial court.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion to dismiss and her motion for summary judgment. Defendant's contention is that plaintiff's action should have been barred because it was an equitable distribution action that was brought five years after a divorce judgment had been entered. We disagree.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(e) (2003), "[a]n absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution under G.S. 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce . . . ." However, "equitable distribution is not the sole means of property division available to former spouses, nor is every action between former spouses regarding property rights an equitable distribution action." Sparks v. Peacock, 129 N.C. App. 640, 642, 500 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1998). Equitable distribution "does not displace the traditional principles of property ownership." Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 290, 354 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1987). Thus, where there is not an equitable distribution, "the state of the title of property owned by either spouse or by both spouses is unaffected." Id.
In this case, the parties were divorced. However, plaintiff never filed a claim for equitable distribution. Instead, he sued for fraud and asked for the return of several items of his separate property. Accordingly, defendant's assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof. We do not agree. Our Supreme Court has determined that in an action to set aside a deed, plaintiff's burden of proof is "the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence." Walters v. Bridgers, 251 N.C. 289, 296, 111 S.E.2d 176, 180 (1959). In the case at bar, plaintiff sought to set aside a deed based on fraud, and the trial court correctly utilized the preponderance of the evidence standard. Therefore, this assignment of error is rejected.
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish a claim for fraud. To establish a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must prove: "(1) [a] [f]alse representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) result[s] in damage to the injured party." Ragsdalev. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974) (citations omitted).
Here, plaintiff presented competent evidence showing that defendant brought him a document at his place of employment in May of 1992. Defendant told plaintiff that the document was to refinance the marital home, when in fact she knew that the document was a general warranty deed that would transfer plaintiff's interest in the property to her. This evidence indicates that there was a false statement, reasonably calculated to deceive, and made with the intent to deceive.
The final two elements were also met. Plaintiff was deceived by these representations because he was induced into signing the deed. Finally, plaintiff was damaged because he conveyed all of his right, title, and interest in the marital home to defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged and proved fraud.
Defendant also objects to the trial court's findings of fact. In a civil trial before a judge, the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by competent evidence, even if there might be evidence to the contrary. Lyerly v. Malpass, 82 N.C. App. 224, 225, 346 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1986), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 695, 351 S.E.2d 748 (1987). "The trial judge weighs the evidence, passes upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and draws the reasonable inferences therefrom." Id. at 225-26, 346 S.E.2d at256. "If different inferences may be drawn from the evidence, he determines which inferences shall be drawn and which shall be rejected." Williams v. Insurance Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975). The trial court sometimes makes findings of fact which resolve conflicts in the evidence; these findings are binding on appellate courts. Id.
In her brief, defendant makes a general objection to the trial court's findings of fact. She suggests that the findings "came directly from [p]laintiff's evidence" and failed "to even mention [d]efendant's evidence." We are not persuaded by this argument. The trial court was presented with conflicting evidence and ultimately had to make some credibility determinations. The fact that the court found pl...
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