Goldsmith v. Snohomish County
Decision Date | 15 February 2008 |
Docket Number | No. C07-0203-MJP.,C07-0203-MJP. |
Citation | 558 F.Supp.2d 1140 |
Parties | Richard Scott GOLDSMITH, Plaintiff, v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
William Franklin Tri, Jelsing Tri West & Andrus, Everett, WA, for Plaintiff.
Bridget E. Casey, Hillary J. Evans, Everett, WA, for Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 27) Having considered Defendants' motion and reply (Dkt. No. 38), the declarations attached to Defendants' motion and reply (Dkt.Nos.28-33, 39-40), Plaintiffs response and declarations (Dkt. No. 37), the complaint (Dkt. No. 6-2), and the balance of the record, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On April 7, 2006, Richard Scott Goldsmith ("Plaintiff) was entertaining a friend, Michael Wilson, at his apartment, when Plaintiff began to feel anxious and upset. Plaintiff told Wilson that he thought he was going to have a panic attack. (Goldsmith Decl., Dkt. No. 37-7, at 2) He feared the prescription medication he had taken earlier for his anxiety disorder was not working. Plaintiff told Wilson that he thought his medication was causing him to have a heart attack or stroke. (Kahler Decl., Dkt. No. 29, at ¶ 14). Plaintiff went to the bathroom. Wilson heard a loud "bang from inside the bathroom" and found Plaintiff on his back lying against the tub. (Wilson Decl., Dkt. No. 37-9, at 2). Wilson unsuccessfully tried to raise Plaintiff up, and noted that he had "blood coming out of his nose" and that "a lot of blood was coming out of his mouth." Id. Plaintiff became combative with Wilson and attempted to fight him. Id. Wilson called 911 for emergency medical assistance.
A Snohomish County Firefighter Paramedic and Emergency Medical arrived at Plaintiffs residence. Paramedic, Jason Isotalo, located Plaintiff in the small bathroom and noted that he was "moaning and groaning on the floor with his eyes closed and blood coming from his mouth." (Isotalo Deck, Dkt. No. 32, at ¶ 8) Isotalo asked Plaintiff to consent to treatment, but Plaintiff did not respond, became "very agitated," and would not allow the medical team to touch him. (Id.) He "exhibited bizarre behavior." (Id.) Isotalo could not identify a specific medical problem. (Id. at ¶ 9)1
Isotalo became fearful for his "safety and the safety of [his] partner" when Plaintiff, a large man with blood around his nose and mouth, jumped to his feet in the small bathroom. (Isotalo Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 8) Plaintiff lunged at Isotalo with his shoulder. (Id. at ¶ 10) Isotalo then radioed a "Code" request for assistance from the Snohomish County Sheriffs Office, the first time he has had to do so in his 15-year career. (Id.) It is the policy of the Snohomish County Fire District to request "Code" backup from the Sheriff to subdue a violent patient. (Id. at 12) Plaintiff then "fell backwards into the [bath]tub and quickly jumped back onto his feet a second time." (Id. at ¶ 11) Isotalo was unable to provide medical assistance.
Snohomish County Sheriffs Deputy William Dawson was the first to respond to the Code call. (Dawson Deck, Dkt. No. 31, at ¶¶, 5-7) Dawson heard loud yelling from the apartment and followed the medical personnel to the bathroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8) Dawson noted that Plaintiff was "wide-eyed, screaming incoherently, profusely sweating, with blood on his face." (Id. at ¶ 9) Plaintiff would not respond to questions. (Id.) Dawson's attempts to calm Plaintiff down were useless. (Id. at ¶ 10) In response to Dawson's presence, Plaintiff "assumed a fighting stance" and "reached out to grab the metal towel bar mounted on the wall of the bathroom" in an apparent attempt to "arm himself with the metal bar." (Id. at ¶ 11) Dawson tried to stop Plaintiff from grabbing the bar. Deputy Andrew Kahler arrived on scene and observed Dawson's attempt to calm Plaintiff and to stop Plaintiff from using the towel bar. (Kahler Deck at ¶¶ 6-7)2 Kahler also attempted to grab Plaintiffs arm. (Id.) Dawson radioed for assistance. (Id. at ¶ 12)
Dawson next tried to take hold of Plaintiffs left forearm and remove him from the small bathroom. (Dawson Deck at ¶ 13) Plaintiff struggled against Dawson. Dawson believed he and Plaintiff could get hurt. (Id.) Dawson, who is trained to use a Taser, shot two barbs from his Taser into Plaintiffs abdomen. (Id.) The Taser had "little to no effect" on Plaintiff, who "immediately pulled the barbs out of his abdomen." (Id.)
Together, Dawson and Kahler attempted to move Plaintiff out of the bathroom and into the hallway where there was more room. (Dawson Deck at ¶ 15) Dawson again deployed two barbs from his Taser into Plaintiff, this time striking Plaintiffs back. (Id.) This was "momentarily effective" and Kahler used a "two-hand hair hold" to move Plaintiff into the hallway. (Id.; Kahler Deck at ¶ 10) Kahler placed Plaintiff on his stomach. (Kahler Deck at ¶ 11) However, Plaintiff quickly resumed fighting the deputies.
Dawson applied the Taser a third time to Plaintiff, this time using the "Drive Stun" mode, which "directs the immobilization operation of the Taser directly onto the muscle group on which it is applied." (Dawson Deck at ¶ 16) This had no effect on Plaintiff and Dawson threw the Taser out of reach.
The two deputies struggled to subdue Plaintiff who was lying face down on top of his arms. (Dawson Deck at ¶ 16) Kahler and Dawson were unable to handcuff him. Kahler then punched Plaintiffs arm several times "in an attempt to get him to relent" and to handcuff him. (Kahler Deck at ¶ 11) This had no effect. (Id.) Deputy Michael Vafeados arrived during this struggle and helped restrain Plaintiff by using his left knee and body to force Plaintiff onto the ground. (Vafeados Deck, Dkt. No. 28, at ¶ 7) Vafeados employed a "pain compliance technique to [Plaintiffs] wrist" and helped Dawson place Plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id.; Kahler Deck at ¶ 11) All three deputies state that they never placed Plaintiff under arrest.
Kahler placed his knee between Plaintiffs shoulder blades in order to keep him face down and to permit Dawson to place a hobble restraint on Plaintiffs legs. (Kahler Decl. at ¶ 12) It appears both Kahler and Vafeados used their bodies to keep Plaintiff down on the ground. Kahler noticed that Plaintiff ceased struggling as Dawson worked to place the leg hobbles on Plaintiff. Kahler states that Plaintiff "was pale, his eyes were closed and it appeared he was no longer breathing." (Id.) Plaintiff suffered a heart attack. The medical crew at the apartment took over care immediately. When Plaintiff stopped breathing there were six members of the Fire District present. (Isotalo Decl. at ¶ 17) The medical team intubated the Plaintiff and noted that his heart returned to beating spontaneously. He was then taken to the emergency room. (Id. at ¶ 18)
Plaintiff filed suit against the three Snohomish County Sheriffs Deputies and Snohomish County (collectively, "Defendants") for harm he allegedly suffered related to the emergency medical request on April 7, 2006. Plaintiff originally filed suit in Snohomish County Superior Court, alleging fourteen causes of action under state tort law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No. 6-2) He alleged several violations of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleged several state tort law claims: negligence, assault and battery, outrage, negligent infliction of emotional distress, failure to train, supervise, or instruct, false arrest, and false imprisonment. (Compl.) On February 7, 2007, Defendants filed a notice of removal in light of Plaintiffs constitutional and civil rights claims. (Defs. Not. of Removal, Dkt. No. 1). This Court has removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, with original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs § 1983 claims and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1367(a).
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims on November 16, 2007.
At summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden to "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by violating: (1) the Fourth Amendment's protection against excessive force, (2) the Fourth Amendment's protection against unlawful arrest, and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Defendants respond that the deputies and County are entitled to qualified immunity from all of Plaintiffs § 1983 claims. In the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity exempts government officers from liability when their actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ( ). Saucier established a two-step analysis of qualified immunity. First, the Court must determine whether "the officer's conduct violate[d] a constitutional right." Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Saucie...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ciampi v. City of Palo Alto
...of force involved and reasonableness of applying that force to subdue an unrestrained suspect. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Snohomish County, 558 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1150–51 (W.D.Wash.2008) (use of Taser to subdue suspect was reasonable); McDonald v. Pon, No. C05–1832JLR, 2007 WL 4420936 at *2 & n. ......
-
State v. Dunn
...in the bedroom with a gun. United States v. Uscanga–Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir.2007). Finally, in Goldsmith v. Snohomish Cty., 558 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1152 (W.D.Wash.2008), the court held that the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applied to officers' temporary arre......
-
Flores v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
...Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of state law assault and battery claims where force was not excessive); Goldsmith v. Snohomish Cnty., 558 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1156 n.8 (W.D.Wash. 2008) (finding officers entitled to state law qualified immunity on assault and battery claims where the use of force......
-
Ames v. King Cnty.
...have also held that the "community caretaking" function applies to arrests as well as searches. See Goldsmith v. Snohomish County, 558 F. Supp.2d 1140, 1151-52 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2008); Graham v. County of L.A., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100470 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2012); see also Stricker v. ......