State v. Dunn

Decision Date15 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2011–0213.,2011–0213.
Citation964 N.E.2d 1037,131 Ohio St.3d 325,2012 -Ohio- 1008
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. DUNN, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

[Ohio St.3d 325] Syllabus of the Court

The community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an immediate need for their assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury.

Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carley J. Ingram and Timothy J. Cole, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Gary C. Schaengold, Dayton, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Thaddeus H. Driscoll, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.Timothy Young, Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender.LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

{¶ 1} Today this court must decide whether the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows the police to stop a driver based on a dispatch that the driver is armed and plans to kill himself. Because we answer in the affirmative, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

[Ohio St.3d 326] I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 27, 2008, Vandalia Police Officer Robert Brazel received a dispatch that there was a suicidal male driving a tow truck and that he was planning to kill himself when he arrived at 114 Helke Road in Vandalia. The dispatcher gave the name of the driver, Richard Dunn, defendant-appellee, and indicated that he had a weapon. The dispatcher also noted that the vehicle was a “big rig” tow truck displaying the name Sandy's towing company.

{¶ 3} Officer Brazel was familiar with the Helke Road address because he had seen a tow truck parked in front of the residence several times during his patrol route. Less than two minutes after he heard the dispatch, Brazel saw the tow truck, and it was approximately two miles from the Helke address. Brazel followed it until another officer arrived to assist him, and then the two officers signaled for Dunn to pull over.

{¶ 4} After stopping the truck, Dunn, who was crying, got out of the vehicle and put his hands up. The officers saw that Dunn was holding a cell phone, but they did not see any weapon. Because they were dealing with an allegedly suicidal person, they handcuffed Dunn for their safety and his. The officers did not find any weapons on Dunn other than a small pocketknife. Dunn was placed in Brazel's cruiser.

{¶ 5} Brazel testified that as he was walking Dunn to his police cruiser, Dunn stated: [I]t's in the glove box.” Brazel asked him if he was referring to a gun, and Dunn said yes. The other officer checked the glove compartment and found a loaded gun.

{¶ 6} After the weapon was secured, Brazel spoke with Dunn about the events leading up to the stop. Dunn told the officer that the week before, he had had problems with his soon-to-be ex-wife and had been taken to a hospital for a mental-health evaluation. Dunn informed the officer that he had intended to shoot himself when he got to the place where he was to drop off the semi that he was towing. Brazel explained to Dunn that he could be involuntary committed or he could go to the hospital voluntarily. Ultimately, Brazel drove Dunn to the hospital in his patrol car.

{¶ 7} On August 10, 2009, Dunn was indicted on one count of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, R.C. 2923.16(B). On October 2, 2009, Dunn filed a motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers had improperly interrogated him without informing him of his Miranda rights. Therefore, Dunn asked that all evidence resulting from the stop and his statements be suppressed, including the gun found in the glove compartment. Brazel was the only witness called at the suppression hearing, and the testimony focused on the facts surrounding the stop. Brazel testified that he had not observed Dunn commit any traffic violations or [Ohio St.3d 327] violations of any other laws while he followed him, and he admitted that the officers had not provided Dunn with Miranda warnings.

{¶ 8} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress, holding that the stop was a ‘legitimate response to an emergency situation,’ quoting State v. Stubbs, 2d Dist. No. CA 16907, 1998 WL 677510, *3 (Oct. 2, 1998), and was therefore not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that Dunn's statements and the evidence obtained from them should not be suppressed, because the police officers had not engaged in custodial interrogation but rather, Dunn's statements were spontaneous and unsolicited.

{¶ 9} On December 30, 2009, the court held a change-of-plea hearing at which Dunn pleaded no contest to the single count in the indictment. Dunn was sentenced to five years of supervised probation and was ordered to attend counseling and pay court costs. The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County reversed the judgment of the trial court, vacated the conviction, deemed Dunn's plea of no contest withdrawn, and granted the motion to suppress.

{¶ 10} The case is now before this court upon our acceptance of the state's discretionary appeal. State v. Dunn, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2011-Ohio-1829, 945 N.E.2d 522.

II. Analysis

{¶ 11} We begin by noting the irony that Dunn, who was suicidal when he was stopped by the police, now contends that the police should not have stopped his vehicle to render aid. If the police had not stopped Dunn, he may have harmed himself. And if the police had not acted and Dunn had harmed or killed himself, Dunn or his estate could have filed a civil lawsuit against the police for failure to respond to an emergency. Such is the balancing act of Fourth Amendment law.

{¶ 12} In analyzing the validity of the stop, the court of appeals relied on Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999), and held that the state had not demonstrated that the dispatcher had a reasonable basis for issuing the dispatch that caused the officers to stop Dunn's truck. The court of appeals appears to have determined that the officers were not authorized to stop Dunn unless there was evidence from which the dispatcher could have concluded that the information supplied to him or her had sufficient indicia of reliability. This was not the proper analysis to employ. As noted by the dissenting judge below, the evidentiary requirement that Weisner imposes on the state in a suppression hearing applies only to an “investigative stop” authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which entails seizure of a person to investigate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Since this was not a Terry stop, the court of appeals erred in using this analysis.

[Ohio St.3d 328] A. Fourth Amendment

{¶ 13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

{¶ 14} “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

{¶ 15} There are a number of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including the one applicable to this case, the community-caretaking exception, which courts sometimes refer to as the “emergency-aid exception” or “exigent-circumstance exception.”

{¶ 16} The community-caretaking exception was first addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Dombrowski, an off-duty Chicago police officer, was arrested by police in Wisconsin on a charge of drunk driving following a one-car accident in which Dombrowski's rental car was heavily damaged. Id. at 435–436, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. The car was towed from the scene to a privately owned garage, and a few hours later, one of the arresting officers searched Dombrowski's vehicle without a warrant, looking for his service revolver, which the officer believed to be in his vehicle. Id. at 436–437, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. In the trunk of Dombrowski's vehicle, the officer found evidence linking him to a murder, a crime for which he was eventually convicted. Id. at 437, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the trunk of the vehicle was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals and the officer reasonably believed that the trunk contained a gun, the search was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706.

{¶ 17} The court explained that local law-enforcement officers “frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. As the court noted in Dombrowski, [t]he ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Id. at 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706. Thus, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from only unreasonable government searches and seizures. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

{¶ 18} The United States Supreme Court further elaborated on the community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). We do not [Ohio St.3d 329] question the right of the...

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