Goldstein v. State

• Citation: 664 A.2d 375,339 Md. 563
• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94,94
• Parties: David Ellis GOLDSTEIN v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Page 563

339 Md. 563

664 A.2d 375

David Ellis GOLDSTEIN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 94, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 7, 1995.

Bruce C. Bereano (Kevin Reynolds, on brief), Annapolis, for petitioner.

Gwynn X. Kinsey, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

The issue in this criminal case is the admissibility of readings from a device that uses lasers to measure the speed of motor vehicles. We shall affirm the trial court's rulings and the petitioner's conviction.

I.

Petitioner David Ellis Goldstein was issued a citation on July 17, 1992, charging him with traveling seventy-four miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone, in violation of Maryland Code (1977, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.) § 21-801.1 of the Transportation Article. An officer of the Howard County Police Department clocked petitioner's vehicle with the LTI 20-20, a device that uses lasers to measure velocity.

Goldstein was convicted in the District Court of Maryland in Howard County. Pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.) § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"), he appealed to the Circuit Court for Howard County. In circuit court, Goldstein filed a motion to exclude all laser evidence on the grounds that (1) the General Assembly implicitly rejected the admissibility of laser technology by refusing to enact proposed legislation that would specifically permit laser evidence, and (2) the LTI 20-20 does not satisfy the standard for the admission of scientific evidence under Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). The trial judge reserved ruling on these issues until after the presentation of evidence.

At trial, each side called a scientific expert to testify concerning the reliability and acceptance of the LTI 20-20 in the particular scientific community. The State's expert testified that the LTI 20-20 is generally accepted as reliable and capable of measuring the speed of a motor vehicle accurately within one mile per hour. In opposition, Goldstein's expert testified that the LTI 20-20 is not generally accepted, due primarily to flaws in the particular device. Both experts agreed, however, that in theory laser technology could be used to measure the speed of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge found Goldstein guilty of exceeding the speed limit. The court found that the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the LTI 20-20 is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and that measurements from the LTI 20-20 are therefore admissible to prove the speed of a motor vehicle. Goldstein was fined $40 and costs.

We granted Goldstein's petition for a writ of certiorari to answer the following questions:

"1. Did the trial court commit error by denying the Defendant's motion to exclude all evidence derived from the use of infra-red light (LASER) to measure the speed of a motor vehicle because the Maryland General Assembly rejected this scientific technique when they in 1992 and 1993 refused to amend the statute (Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc. § 10-301) which exclusively authorizes the use of radio-microwaves (RADAR) to prove the speed of a motor vehicle to also authorize the use of LASER?

"2. Did the trial judge commit error by determining that the LASER speed detection device (the LTI 20-20) used to measure the speed of Defendant's motor vehicle is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community thus satisfying the criteria for admissibility of a new scientific technique set forth in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978)?

"3. Did the trial judge commit error by ruling that as the proponent of the new scientific technique in a criminal case the State's burden of proving general acceptance in the relevant scientific community was only by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt or some other standard?"

We shall answer the first of these questions in the negative. We shall also conclude that there was no error in admitting the LTI 20-20 evidence and that it is not necessary for us to reach the third question presented.

II.

Evidence based on new scientific techniques may become admissible in judicial proceedings by statute, or by satisfaction of the "general acceptance" test adopted in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978). General acceptance may be proven through expert testimony or judicial notice or a combination of the two. Id. at 380- 81, 391 A.2d at 367-68; 5 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 401.4(b), at 270 (1987).

Goldstein's first argument is that, far from being statutorily admissible, laser evidence in speeding cases has in fact been found inadmissible by the General Assembly. This argument is based on CJ § 10-301 and the consideration of and rejection by the General Assembly of bills to amend § 10-301 to expressly authorize laser evidence.

A.

In 1953, the Maryland General Assembly enacted legislation providing that readings from devices made to measure velocity using radio-micro waves are admissible in legal proceedings to prove the speed of a motor vehicle. 1953 Maryland Laws ch. 583, § 1, at 1085. The statute, as amended, now reads as follows:

The speed of a motor vehicle may be proved by evidence of a test made upon it with a device designed to measure and indicate the speed of a moving object by means of radio-micro waves.

CJ § 10-301. Goldstein asserts that this statute implicitly bars the admission of speed measurements derived from scientific tools other than radio-micro wave technology.

"When the language of a statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, no further analysis of legislative intent is ordinarily required." Rose v. Fox Pool, 335 Md. 351, 359, 643 A.2d 906 910 (1994). In this case, the statute states that speed "may" be proven with radio-micro waves technology. The use of the word may indicates that the use of radio-micro waves is neither mandatory nor exclusive, and that other methods of proving speed are therefore not precluded. See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 46, 622 A.2d 121, 125 (1993).

This reading of the plain language is consistent with the statute's apparent purpose. The statute focuses exclusively on radio-micro waves, suggesting that the General Assembly was merely facilitating the admission of such evidence without intending to address, favorably or unfavorably, the admission of any other method of proving speed. Moreover, laser technology did not become available until the 1970s, well after CJ § 10-301 was enacted; it is surely beyond dispute that the Legislature did not intend, in 1953, to exclude a form of evidence that did not even exist for another two decades. Accordingly, based on the plain language of the statute and the context of its enactment, we find no merit in this argument.

B.

The heart of Goldstein's statutory argument, however, is not that CJ § 10-301 excludes laser evidence by negative implication, but rather that the General Assembly affirmatively rejected the use of laser technology by declining to amend the statute to permit such evidence.

In 1992 and 1993, legislative committees of the General Assembly rejected proposed legislation that would have amended § 10-301 to specifically authorize the use of laser speed determinations as evidence in legal proceedings. ¹ Goldstein contends that the failure of these bills reflects the General Assembly's conclusion that measurements from the LTI 20-20 are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible and that this conclusion is binding on the courts. We disagree.

Petitioner relies on the concept of legislative inaction to support his argument that a laser speed determination is inadmissible. For analytical purposes, legislative inaction cases may be divided into three categories: the "acquiescence cases," the "reenactment cases," and the "rejected proposal cases." W. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich.L.Rev. 67, 71 (1988). Goldstein relies on the third category, the rejected proposal cases, "in which the Court infers from the rejection of a bill or amendment by Congress, or by a chamber or committee of Congress, that an interpretation similar to the rejected proposal is excluded from the statute." Id.

Our goal in interpreting a statute is always to discern the intent of the Legislature. Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995). When ascertaining legislative intent, this Court may take into consideration the "legislative history of a statute, including amendments that were considered and/or enacted as the statute passed through the Legislature, and the statute's relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation." Rose, 335 Md. at 360, 643 A.2d at 910.

Nonetheless, Maryland generally adheres to the majority view on legislative inaction, which is that ordinarily "the fact that a bill on a specific subject fails of passage in the General Assembly is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent." Automobile Trade Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r, 292 Md. 15, 24, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (1981); accord T.H.E. Ins. v. P.T.P. Inc., 331 Md. 406, 422, 628 A.2d 223, 231 (1993); see also Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 420-21, 379 A.2d 1007, 1012 (1977); Harden v. Mass Transit Adm., 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817, 820-21 (1976). Thus, the mere fact that the General Assembly has declined to adopt a particular proposal does not preclude this Court from incorporating the substance of that proposal into the common law or our interpretation of a statute.

Furthermore, the legislative inaction in this case is particularly ambiguous because more than one purpose can be attributed to the defeat of the legislation. The committees' rejection of the proposals may have reflected a judgment...