Goldston v. Randolph

• Decision Date: 29 January 1936
• Parties: GOLDSTON v. RANDOLPH et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

293 Mass. 253

199 N.E. 896

GOLDSTON

v.RANDOLPH et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Jan. 29, 1936.

Suit in equity by George L. Goldston against Albert Lee Randolph and others. From a final decree for the plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Decree affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Morton, Judge.

W. M. Blatt, M. Anapolsky, and H. M. Lewin, all of Boston, for appellants.

E. P. Benjamin and G. M. Yaghjian, both of Boston, for appellee.

FIELD, Justice.

This is a bill in equity brought by the plaintiff against Albert Lee Randolph and Vera Randolph (herein referred to as the defendants) as individuals and as executors under the will of Rosa Lee Randolph, deceased, and the First National Bank of Malden to compel the defendants to transfer to the plaintiff an account in said bank formerly standing in the name of the deceased.

The trial judge filed a document entitled ‘Findings and Rulings' which was as follows: ‘I find that the account in the bank book in question was opened by the deceased in 1927. That on September 22, 1928, she took said book to the bank, requested that it be changed into a joint account with the plaintiff, who was present and assented to the changes. Both the deceased and the plaintiff signed the necessary papers,-a transfer and identifying signature card, as requested and approved by the bank. The bank book itself was not changed to correspond to transfer, and was kept thereafter by the deceased in her possession and control and all deposits and payments were made by her thereafter until her death, the account, however, still remaining on the books of the bank as a joint account.

‘On August 14th, 1934, the plaintiff at the request of counsel for the defendants transferred said account to the estate of the deceased. The evidence did not satisfy me that said transfer was due to any fraud on the part of the defendants or their attorney. I do find, however, that the plaintiff, who had no knowledge of the law or procedure necessary to obtain his interest in the joint account, was led innocently to believe that such transfer was necessary in order at some time to assert his rights, and did not intend to transfer them permanently or to waive or surrender his rights to the account. No consideration was given for said transfer.

‘I rule that under these circumstances there was a completed contract by the deceased with the bank, assented to by the plaintiff, by which upon the death of the depositor the plaintiff became the owner of the balance of the deposit, which amounted to $3,912.90. * * *

‘The defendants have withdrawn from said account a substantial amount and used it in improving the real estate left to them by the will, to wit, $669.26. I am not satisfied that such expenditure was with fraudulent intent or imposed a trust upon the property. But I do rule that they must transfer said account as it stood at the time it was transferred to them or the estate, to the plaintiff. A decree is to be drawn accordingly.’

At the request of the defendants the judge made the following additional findings: ‘At the time of the filing of the transfer and identifying signature card by the deceased she told an official of the bank that she did not wish the name of the plaintiff to appear on the bank book. * * * Unless the name of the plaintiff appeared on the bank book the plaintiff, under the rules of the bank would not have been allowed to draw from the account during the life of the deceased.’

Thereafter a decree was entered whereby, after reciting certain facts found by the trial judge as set forth in his ‘Findings and Rulings,’ it was ‘ordered, adjudged and decreed that said defendants, Albert Lee Randolph and Vera Randolph, re-transfer to the plaintiff said account as it stood at the time it was transferred to them by the plaintiff.’ The defendants appealed. The printing of the testimony was waived by them.

The decree was right.

No question of the adequacy of legal remedy is raised by the pleadings. See Pothier v. Doucette, 276 Mass. 326, 332, 177 N.E. 84. Nor is it contended that the decree is not within the scope of the bill. Furthermore, the evidence is not before us. And there is no report of material facts under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 31. But we treat the document entitled ‘Findings and Rulings,’ filed by the judge, together with the additional findings of fact made by him-which appear to state his conclusions fully-as a voluntary report of material facts having the same effect as a report under the statute. Cohen v. Nagle, 190 Mass. 4, 5, 76 N.E. 276,2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 964,5 Ann.Cas. 553;Romanausky v. Skutulas, 258 Mass. 190, 192, 154 N.E. 856. The decree, therefore, must be affirmed if the conclusions of fact of the trial judge are consistent with the specific facts found by him (Good-year Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bagg [Mass.] 197 N.E. 481) and these conclusions, in connection with the specific facts found, support the decree (Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 476, 192 N.E. 52;Wyness v. Crowley (Mass.) 196 N.E. 924).

Two questions are presented for decision: (a) Did the plaintiff on the facts found become the owner of the balance of the deposit on the death of the deceased? (b) If the plaintiff bacame such owner at that time was he entitled on the facts found to a decree ordering the re-transfer of the account to him by the defendants?

1. The plaintiff on the facts found became the owner of the balance of the deposit on the death of the deceased.

The judge, as a conclusion on this branch of the case, made a ruling, which was in substance a finding of fact involving a ruling of law (see Medford Trust Co. v. Priggen Steel Garage Co., 273 Mass. 349, 353, 354, 174 N.E. 126), that on the death of the deceased the plaintiff become the owner of the balance of the deposit by reason of ‘a completed contract by the deceased with the bank, assented to by the plaintiff.’ This finding was substantially in the language used in Perry v. Leveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 393, 147 N.E. 826. This conclusion is consistent with the specific facts found with reference to the transaction between the deceased, the bank and the plaintiff whereby the deposit belonging to the deceased was ‘changed into a joint account with the plaintiff.’ And this conclusion, in connection with the specific facts found, imports that at the time of this transaction a present interest in the plaintiff in the deposit was created by a completed contract and that this interest ripened into full ownership of the balance of the deposit at the death of the deceased.

The deceased could legally have changed the deposit to the joint account of herself and the plaintiff ‘which deposit would operate as a present and complete gift in joint ownership if she clearly intended such a result.’ Coolidge v. Brown, 286 Mass. 504, 507, 190 N.E. 723, 724. See, also, Battles v. Millbury Savings Bank, 250 Mass. 180, 187, 145 N.E. 55;McKenna v. McKenna, 260 Mass. 481, 485, 157 N.E. 517. Such a present gift could be made even though the donor retained the exclusive right to the income of the deposit during her life. Robinson v. Pero, 272 Mass. 482, 485, 172 N.E. 599;Coolidge v. Brown, 286 Mass. 504, 507, 190 N.E. 723. See, also, Buteau v. Lavalle, 284 Mass. 276, 278, 187 N.E. 628. A present gift of an interest in the deposit would be effected on the principle of Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N.E. 371, and cases following it, by a contract to which the bank, the deceased and the plaintiff were parties if the requisite intention on the part of the deceased existed. Delivery of the bank book would not be...