Golleher v. Horton
| Decision Date | 11 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-CIV,1 |
| Citation | 119 Ariz. 604,583 P.2d 260 |
| Parties | Margaret Ruth GOLLEHER, Individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Arthur Raymond Hunter, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Mary B. Martin HORTON and Herschel Horton, husband and wife, Joseph William Hunter and Victoria Hunter, husband and wife, Margaret Louise Hunter Haus, a single woman, Jennie Barbara Hunter Sandoz, a single woman, Phylis Mildred Hunter Garner, a single woman, A. R. Hunter, Sr. and Molly Hunter, husband and wife, Hunter Holding Corporation, an Arizona Corporation and Correne Hunter Kelly, a married woman, Appellees. 3662. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This matter is before the court as the result of an appeal taken by the plaintiff below, Margaret Ruth Golleher (Golleher) from the dismissal of her complaint for failure to comply with the trial court's order to produce a certain savings account passbook during the discovery phase of this lawsuit. See Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.
This was a suit by Golleher against her father's sister, Mary B. Martin Horton (Horton), alleging that Horton obtained a power of attorney from her now deceased father, Arthur Raymond Hunter, Jr., at a time when he was incompetent and thereafter wrongfully and fraudulently administered that power of attorney. Golleher, suing both in her individual capacity and as the personal representative of the estate of her father, sought to regain for the estate certain property and for general damages in the amount of $5,000,000.
The complaint was filed on April 1, 1974. Thereafter an answer, a third party complaint (seeking essentially indemnification from Golleher's mother, Correne Hunter Kelly), an answer thereto and a counterclaim were also filed. Vigorous discovery was undertaken, including interrogatories, depositions, and at least two sets of requests for admissions.
As a result of a deposition taken of Golleher in February of 1976, the appellees sought Golleher's production of a savings account passbook. The passbook was initially sought informally. Golleher's attorney furnished one page. On March 31, 1976, a motion to produce the document was filed. When no response was forthcoming, a motion to dismiss or compel discovery was filed on May 4, 1976. In a minute entry order dated May 17, 1976, the trial court, among other things, denied the motion to dismiss and indicated that he would be disposed to grant appellees' request for production of the passbook if the appellees would be more specific.
On June 7, appellees filed an additional motion to dismiss, urging that there was in fact no confusion, that Golleher's counsel knew what document was desired and simply refused to produce it. Golleher's counsel responded with a pleading dated June 14, 1976, indicating that appellees' counsel had not been specific as required by the trial court and that as soon as he was, the passbook, or the relevant portions thereof, would be forthcoming. In the alternative, counsel suggested that if the request was specific as required by the court, proper objection could be made if the matter was not discoverable.
On June 23, 1976, appellees' counsel filed a reply to Golleher's attorneys' response, urging no lack of specificity existed and that counsel was simply avoiding the order and making belated objections he should have made months earlier.
On June 28, 1976, oral argument was heard before the trial court. The judge denied the motion to dismiss and entered the following order:
On July 1, 1976, a "passbook" was delivered to the attorney for the appellees. The passbook covered a time period up to October of 1970 and indicated a transfer to another book. The record is clear that a time period after October of 1970 was in question. On July 9, 1976, one day after the expiration of the ten days set by the court in its June 28th order, a second passbook was delivered. On July 12, 1976, as a result of another petition for dismissal filed by appellees' counsel, the trial court entered a minute order dismissing the cause with leave to refile. The final written order of dismissal was filed July 20, 1976. A motion to set aside was thereafter denied, and, after additional procedural problems were resolved, the matter was brought here on appeal.
While this court is in complete agreement with the trial court concerning the conduct of R. Kelly Hocker, the principal attorney for Golleher, particularly following the June 28, 1976 order to produce, we nonetheless view the sanction imposed, as it impacts upon the client, an abuse of discretion in light of the Arizona decisions on this subject.
The trial court has, of course, a broad discretion in imposing sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2), Supra. Fleitz v. Van Westrienen, 114 Ariz. 246, 560 P.2d 430 (App.1977). This discretion, however, as to the ultimate sanctions of dismissal and/or entry of default judgment, has been rather severely limited by the decisions of this state as well as courts of other jurisdictions....
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Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc., 2
... ... v. Walker, 127 Ariz. 432, 437, 621 P.2d 938, 943 (App.1980) ("[T]he range of discretion for dismissal is narrow."); Golleher v. Horton, 119 Ariz. 604, 606, 583 P.2d 260, 262 (App.1978) (a trial court's discretion "as to the ultimate sanctions ... of dismissal and/or entry ... ...
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Golleher v. Horton, 1
...property. The suit was dismissed in 1976 for discovery violations but the dismissal was reversed by this court in Golleher v. Horton, 119 Ariz. 604, 583 P.2d 260 (App.1978). Following remand, a jury trial was held and at the close of the plaintiff's case the court directed a verdict in favo......
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Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Walker
... ... g., Furrh v. Rothschild, 118 Ariz. 251, 575 P.2d 1277 (App.1978), the range of discretion for dismissal is narrow. Golleher v. Horton, 119 Ariz. 604, 583 P.2d 260 (App.1978) ... Regarding the duty of a party to answer interrogatories we quote from Dollar ... ...
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Poleo v. Grandview Equities, Ltd.
...is more limited, however, where the ultimate sanctions of dismissal or entry of default judgment are involved. Golleher v. Horton, 119 Ariz. 604, 583 P.2d 260 (App.1978). The trial court is to make "such orders in regard to the failure as are just" under Rule 37(b). Interpreting this langua......