Golliday v. Chase Home Fin. LLC
| Decision Date | 23 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:10-cv-532 |
| Parties | LINDSEY GOLLIDAY and NICOLA GOLLIDAY, Plaintiffs, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This civil action was initiated by plaintiffs in the Berrien County Circuit Court and removed to this court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. The pro se plaintiffs, Lindsey and Nicola Golliday, are owners of real property located in Benton Harbor, Michigan. On November 25, 2008, they executed a promissory note in the amount of $189,499.00 in favor of Gateway Mortgage Group, LLC ("Gateway"). The note was secured by a mortgage on plaintiffs' Benton Harbor real estate, given to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for the lender, Gateway, and all its successors and assigns. The debt and security were assigned to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMorgan"), effective January 1, 2009, and payments were to be to JPMorgan's wholly owned servicing subsidiary, defendant Chase Home Finance, LLC ("Chase"). After plaintiffs defaulted on the note, defendant Trott & Trott, P.C. (a law firm) began proceedings on behalf of Chase to foreclose the mortgage by advertisement, pursuant to Michigan statute.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Berrien County Circuit Court on May 6, 2010, naming Chase, Trott & Trott, P.C. ("Trott & Trott"), and Attorney Jeanne M. Kivi as defendants.On June 3, 2010, defendants removed the action to this court. Chase is the only remaining defendant.1 Plaintiffs allege that Chase violated their rights under the Truth-in-Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Further, they allege that Chase violated a forbearance agreement. Plaintiffs seek damages, "dismissal" of the foreclosure sale that had been scheduled for May 13, 2010, and quiet title to the mortgaged property.
After the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. I conducted a hearing on the motions on June 29, 2011 (docket # 70), pursuant to Judge Bell's order of reference (docket # 3). The motions are ready for decision. For the reasons set forth herein, I recommend that plaintiffs' request for an injunction against the May 13, 2010 foreclosure sale be dismissed as moot. I further recommend that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (docket # 57) be denied. I further recommend that defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket # 60) be granted and that a final judgment be entered in Chase's favor on all plaintiffs' claims.
When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must assess each motion on its own merits. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Group, 415 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2005). "'[T]he filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that an award of summary judgment is appropriate.'" Spectrum Health Continuing Care Group v. Anna Marie Bowling Irrevocable Trust, 410 F.3d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 2005)(quoting Beck v. City of Cleveland, 390 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2004)). "The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when a motion is filed by only one party to the litigation." Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 2011).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2010). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether 'the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Moses v. Providence Hosp. Med. Centers, Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2008).
When the party without the burden of proof seeks summary judgment, that party bears the initial burden of pointing out to the district court an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, but need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials "negating" the opponent's claim. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the movant shows that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," the nonmoving party has the burden of coming forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To sustain this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on themere allegations of her pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 496 (6th Cir. 2009). The motion for summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1990). "A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient; 'there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].'" Dominguez v. Correctional Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252); see LaQuinta Corp. v. Heartland Properties LLC, 603 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2010).
A moving party with the burden of proof faces a "substantially higher hurdle." Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002); Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving party without the burden of proof needs only show that the opponent cannot sustain her burden at trial. "But where the moving party has the burden -- the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense -- [her] showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting W. SCHWARZER, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized that the party with the burden of proof faces "a substantially higher hurdle" and "'must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.'" Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting 11 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.13[1], at 56-138 (3d ed. 2000)); Cockrel, 270 F.2d at 1056 (same). Accordingly, a summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion "is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trierof fact." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999). The higher summary judgment standard applies to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
The relevant facts leading up to this dispute are principally established by documentary evidence. The parties have filed numerous, duplicative copies of the relevant documents. (See, e.g., Attachments to docket #s 28, 41, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, and 63). The documentary and other admissible evidence of record discloses the following, with all reasonable inference drawn in favor of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are husband and wife residing in Berrien County, Michigan. In connection with their purchase of real property located at 2320 Revelation Ave., Benton Harbor, Michigan, plaintiffs entered into a loan transaction with lender Gateway on November 25, 2008, signing a promissory note and mortgage agreement. This mortgage was created as security for a loan of $189,499.00, the proceeds of which were used by plaintiffs to buy the real property, a residence. The mortgage was granted in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as nominee for the lender, Gateway, and all of lender's successors and assigns. .3 Plaintiffs signed, before theclosing process was complete, a "Servicing Disclosure Statement" which alerted them to the fact that Gateway did not service mortgage loans and intended to sell or transfer the servicing of the loan to another party. (docket # 60-2, Ex. C, ID# 791).
On December 29, 2008, plaintiffs received notification that the mortgage loan had been sold to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMorgan"), who was the new creditor of their loan4 , and that all payments after January 1, 2009 were to be paid to Chase Home Finance, LLC ("Chase"), a wholly owned servicing subsidiary of JPMorgan. (docket # 1-3, A2, ID# 22). Gateway transferred the original note and mortgage to its bailee and agent, American Southwest Mortgage Company ("ASMC"), pending the conclusion of the loan's purchase. (docket # 60-2, Ex. G, ID# 804). The sale was finalized, and the original note and mortgage were received by Chase from ASMC. (docket # 60-2, Ex. H, Reardon Aff. ¶ 4, ID# 807). An allonge to the note was executed, endorsing the note to JPMorgan. (docket # 57-4, ID# 708). The sale of plaintiffs' note was finalized on or around January 13, 2009. (Reardon Aff. ¶ 3, ID# 807).
Plaintiffs apparently made their payments to Chase for nine months without comment or incident until October 2009, when payments ceased. Instead of making payments, plaintiffs sent Chase a lengthy document labeled "Qualified Written Request, Complaint, Dispute of Debt andValidation of Debt Letter, TILA Request," dated October 19,...
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Samples v. Bank of America, N.A., : 3:12-CV-44
...including those within the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See, e.g., Golliday v. Chase Home Fin., LLC., No. 1:10-cv-532, 2011 WL 4352554, at *7 (W.D. Mich. August 23, 2011) (stating that courts have uniformly approved of the role of MERS in mortgage transactions); see......