Griffin v. Hardrick

• Decision Date: 13 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-5757.,09-5757.
• Citation: 604 F.3d 949
• Parties: Trudy GRIFFIN, Plaintif-Appellant,v.Darrell HARDRICK, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

604 F.3d 949

Trudy GRIFFIN, Plaintif-Appellant,v.Darrell HARDRICK, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 09-5757.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 10, 2010.

Decided and Filed: May 13, 2010.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 16, 2010.^*

ARGUED: Phillip L. Davidson, Law Offices, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Keli J. Oliver, Metropolitan Nashville Department of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Phillip L. Davidson, Law Offices, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Keli J. Oliver, Metropolitan Nashville Department of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: COLE, GILMAN, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which COLE, J., joined. WHITE, J. (pp. 957-58), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

Trudy Griffin was brought to the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center after she was arrested for disorderly conduct. When Griffin created a disturbance while speaking with a nurse at the Center, two corrections officers, Darrell Hardrick and Pamela Rutledge, each took one of her arms and attempted to guide Griffin away from the nurse's station. Griffin at that point began struggling with the officers, causing Hardrick to perform a “leg-sweep maneuver” to bring Griffin to the floor so that she could be handcuffed and taken back to her holding cell. As Griffin fell to the floor, however, Rutledge tumbled with her. Rutledge accidentally landed on one of Griffin's legs, breaking Griffin's tibia.

Griffin sued Hardrick over the incident, alleging an excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a state-law claim for battery. The district court granted Hardrick's motion for summary judgment, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Hardrick had intended the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain when he tripped Griffin. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

Griffin was arrested on August 20, 2005 for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. She was transported to the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center (Center) for booking. While she was in a holding cell at the Center, Griffin asked permission to go to the nurse's station. After permission was granted, she walked down the hall to speak with a nurse about bruises on her back and arms. Griffin repeatedly demanded that she be transported to a local hospital so that she could be treated for these injuries. When the nurse told Griffin that she would not be taken to a hospital, Griffin refused to take “no” for an answer and began raising her voice with the nurse. At this point, Hardrick, a corrections officer with the Davidson County Sheriff's Office who was in charge of the booking area, approached Griffin.

Both parties agree that “Hardrick observed [Griffin] acting in a non-compliant manner with regard to the instructions she received from the nurse,” and that Griffin “walked away from Hardrick when he attempted to speak with her about the situation.” Griffin claims that as she walked away, Hardrick threatened her by saying that “she was going to live in his hell” and that she “was his bitch.” Hardrick then took hold of one of Griffin's arms, but Griffin attempted to pull away. Griffin claims that she told Hardrick to “watch her arms” because they were sore from being bruised earlier.

At that point, Hardrick asked Rutledge, another corrections officer at the Center, to assist with the situation. When Rutledge reached for Griffin's other arm, Griffin pulled her arm away (although she contends that she pulled away only “a little bit”). Hardrick and Rutledge then began leading Griffin down the hall toward her holding cell. Griffin claims that she was not struggling, resisting, or acting aggressively. She asserts that Hardrick nevertheless suddenly tripped her, causing her to fall to the floor. This in turn caused Rutledge to accidentally fall on top of her, which fractured Griffin's tibia.

Hardrick, on the other hand, contends that Griffin was jerking and attempting to get away. This prompted him to perform a “leg-sweep maneuver,” typically used by officers to bring a noncompliant individual to the ground with the least amount of force necessary. He does not dispute, however, that Rutledge accidentally fell on Griffin's leg as a result of the leg sweep. After Griffin was handcuffed on the ground, other Center employees carried her into the holding-cell area. An ambulance was then called to the Center for the purpose of taking Griffin to the hospital, where she required surgery, eight screws, and a metal plate to fix her broken tibia.

A security camera caught the incident on videotape. The video establishes that Griffin approached the nurse's station and remained there for just under 10 minutes, alternating between standing at the window and sitting in a chair placed by the station. She can be seen motioning and waiving her arms at various points throughout her conversation with the nurse. Hardrick walked toward Griffin and spoke with her for approximately 20 seconds before Rutledge approached the nurse's station and stood a few feet away from Hardrick and Griffin.

After another 10 seconds, Griffin began to walk away from Hardrick, who then reached out to take her right arm. Griffin attempted to jerk her arm away, but Hardrick maintained his grip, and Rutledge stepped in to take Griffin's left arm. After a second or two of struggling with Griffin outside the nurse's station, Hardrick and Rutledge began to escort her down the hallway, which she resisted. Hardrick then stuck out his leg to trip Griffin. At this point, Griffin fell to the floor, and Rutledge tumbled on top of her.

B. Procedural history

In May 2006, Griffin filed a lawsuit in a Tennessee state court against Hardrick and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (Metro), alleging a claim of battery under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101 to -408. Griffin later dismissed her claim against Metro, but added an excessive-force claim against Hardrick pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against those who violate a person's constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. This caused Hardrick to timely remove the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

Hardrick subsequently moved for summary judgment. In response to Griffin's § 1983 claim, he argued that not only was he entitled to qualified immunity, but that Griffin's claim could not succeed on the merits because Hardrick's use of force did not constitute the wanton infliction of pain. Hardrick further contended that he used only the amount of force necessary to subdue Griffin, so that her battery claim was likewise without merit.

The district court granted Hardrick's motion for summary judgment in June 2009. Because the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Hardrick's conduct constituted the wanton infliction of pain, it did not address Hardrick's qualified-immunity argument. The court also decided that where the identical use of force leads to both a § 1983 claim and a state-law battery claim, the same standard applies to both causes of action. It therefore granted summary judgment to Hardrick on Griffin's state-law battery claim as well. Griffin has timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson County, 591 F.3d 837, 843 (6th Cir.2010). Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

B. Griffin's § 1983 claim

Section 1983 prohibits a person “acting under color of state law” from depriving an individual “of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States.” Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1992). Griffin's complaint alleged that Hardrick violated § 1983 by using excessive force against her in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court, however, interpreted her claim as alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Griffin does not dispute this characterization on appeal.

Prisoners are protected from the use of excessive force by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). As a pretrial detainee, however, Griffin's rights stem from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The law is unsettled as to whether the analysis for a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim and an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim is the same. See Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]here is room for debate over whether the Due Process Clause grants pretrial detainees more protections than the Eighth Amendment does....”). Compare Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir.2008) (applying the Eighth Amendment standard to a pretrial detainee's excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment) with Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir.1996) (“Since [the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment] extends beyond the prohibition of merely ‘cruel and...