Gómez-Cruz v. Fernández-PabellóN
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 13-1711 (PAD) |
| Parties | CARLOS GÓMEZ-CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MARTA E. FERNÁNDEZ-PABELLÓN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiffs initiated this action against defendants alleging violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and state law.1 Before the court is defendants' "Motion to Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 61), which plaintiffs opposed (Docket No. 89). Defendants replied (Docket No. 104), and plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket No. 113). For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
In essence, plaintiffs allege that following the November 6, 2012 general elections during which the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") took control of Puerto Rico's Executive Branch and by extension, of the Department of the Family ("DF"), they were dismissed, demoted, transferred and/or deprived of their functions and harassed on account of their political affiliation (Docket No. 4). Defendants request that the action be dismissed by way of summary judgment, for in their view,(1) plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination; and in the alternative, (2) that Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), the Eleventh Amendment, and Qualified Immunity warrant dismissal (Docket No. 61, Exh. 1).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is need for trial. Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it could be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). It is "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the case in light of applicable law. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
As to issues on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof, the movant need to no more than aver absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325; Mottolo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 723, 725 (1st Cir. 1995). All reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Shafmaster v. U.S., 707 F.3d. 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2013).
To establish a prima facie of political discrimination under the First Amendment, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that: (1) plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations, (2) defendant is aware of plaintiff's affiliation, (3) an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Reyes-Orta v. Puerto Rico Highway and Transp. Authority, 811 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2016)(quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)(other internal citations omitted)).
Defendants argue that even assuming plaintiffs proffered enough facts to establish the first and third prongs of the prima facie standard,2 the record is devoid of evidence allowing them to establish the second and fourth factors, to wit: defendants' knowledge of political affiliation, and that such affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment actions here (Docket No. 61, Exh. 1).
Gómez-Cruz began working in the Department of Family in February 2009 as an Assistant Administrator for Finance and Budget. See, Defendants' Statements of Uncontested Material Facts "DSUMF," Docket No. 63, Exh. 1 at ¶ 10.3 On September 4, 2012, he was appointed to a career position as Budget Director of the DF's Administration for the Socioeconomic Developmentof the Family ("ADSEF") and began his probatory period, which was set to conclude on March 3, 2013. See, Plaintiffs' Additional Statements of Uncontested Material Facts "PSUMF," Docket No. 83 at ¶ 107; DSUMF at ¶¶ 12-13. Before his probatory period ended, he was handed a dismissal letter by Carmen Beltrán, and was advised of his right to seek redress from the Appellate Commission. He appealed the dismissal. That case is pending. DSUMF at ¶¶ 1-5.
In turn, Beltrán started working at ADSEF on February 1, 2013. DSUMF at ¶ 8. Prior to handing the termination letter to Gómez-Cruz, he did not know Gómez-Cruz, and had not interacted with him between February 1, 2013, and the day in which he handed the letter. DSUMF at ¶¶ 9 and 11. Beltrán was not involved in the decision-making process to terminate Gómez-Cruz. DSUMF at ¶ 7.4 Moreover, Gómez-Cruz never told Beltrán about his political affiliation, nor has the latter made any such inquiry. In fact, Gómez-Cruz and Beltrán have never talked about politics. DSUMF at ¶¶ 22-24.
Gómez-Cruz never expressed his political affiliation to Fernández-Pabellón. DSUMF at ¶ 15.5 And he never expressed his political affiliation to Pintado-Rodríguez, who likewise, never asked Gómez-Cruz about his political affiliation. DSUMF at ¶¶ 16-17. Gómez-Cruz has never expressed his political affiliation to Colón-Rondón. DSUMF at ¶ 18.
Gómez-Cruz does not know who Rodríguez-Valentín, Santa-Sánchez, or Ramos-Román are. He first heard of them when he read the complaint filed in this action. DSUMF at ¶¶ 19-21.Other than once telling Luciano-Fernández about his previous work as a polling officer, Gómez-Cruz never told Luciano-Fernández about his political affiliation. DSUMF at ¶¶ 29-30; PSUMF at ¶ 274. Fernández-Pabellón does not presently identify herself with any political party, and has not done so since the early 1980's. DSUMF at ¶¶ 31-32.
Plaintiffs contend that, albeit Gómez-Cruz never told Fernández-Pabellón about his political affiliation, she must be so aware because he had occupied a trust position with the preceding administration, and she was present during the transition hearings in which Gómez-Cruz participated. See, Gómez-Cruz' deposition, Docket No. 83, Exh. 15 at pp. 41-42. Also, they aver that Luciano-Fernández knew of Gómez-Cruz' previous work as a polling officer. PSUMF at ¶ 274.
These facts are insufficient to establish that Fernández-Pabellón, Pintado-Rodríguez, Rodríguez-Valentín, Santa-Sánchez, Ramos-Román, Annette Beltrán, and Luciano-Fernández had knowledge of Gómez-Cruz' political affiliation. A plaintiff may not establish knowledge by merely showing that he "held a trust/confidential/policymaking position in the outgoing administration." See, Román v. Delgado Altieri, 390 F.Supp.2d 94, 103 (D.P.R. 2005)(citing González-De-Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 85-86 (1st Cir. 2004). The fact that Gómez-Cruz worked as a polling officer during elections is not enough. See, Marrero-Saez v. Municipality of Aibonito, 756 F.Supp.2d 215, 223-224 (D.P.R. 2010)("Plaintiff cannot prove that defendants had knowledge of [his] political affiliation merely through testimony of having been seen, or, for that matter, met during routine campaign activity participation"). Similarly, that Gómez-Cruz suffered an adverse employment action shortly after a change in administration is not sufficient to show that defendants must have been aware of her political affiliation. Id.
In the end, Gómez-Cruz failed to point out to any evidence on record that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that these defendants were aware of his political affiliation. On this basis, his claims against Fernández-Pabellón, Pintado-Rodríguez, Rodríguez-Valentín, Santa-Sánchez, Ramos-Román, Beltrán, and Luciano-Fernández must be dismissed. See, González de Blasini v. Dept. de la Familia, 377 F.3d 81, 85-86 (1st Cir. 2004)( that "lack of knowledge of plaintiffs' political affiliation must lead to entry of summary judgment"). After evaluating the facts set forth by Gómez-Cruz in support of his claims against Colón-Rondón, however, the court finds a genuine issue exists as to whether that defendant personally knew Gómez-Cruz or was aware of his political affiliation.
According to plaintiffs, Colón-Rondón met Gómez-Cruz after the former was appointed Secretary of the Department of Family, visited Gómez-Cruz' office, and asked him what position he occupied. When Gómez-Cruz told her he used to occupy a trust position but had since been named to a career position, Colón-Rondón allegedly stated: "how many former trust employees in career positions was I left with by the past administration!" PSUMF at ¶ 270. Defendants deny this statement, and posit that Colón-Rondón does not know Gómez-Cruz or his political affiliation (Docket No. 107 at ¶ 270). Both Gómez-Cruz and Colón-Rondón rely on their corresponding depositions in support of their statements. Which of the versions is correct is a matter beyond the scope of summary judgment. See, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110-2011 (). In consequence, Gómez-Cruz' claims against Colón-Rondón will not be dismissed on that ground at this juncture.
On December 18, 2009, then-Governor Luis Fortuño-Burset enacted Law No. 186, also known as the Comprehensive Adoption Proceedings Reform Act. PSUMF at ¶ 10. Under Law No. 186, the former Secretary of the DF issued Administrative...
To continue reading
Request your trial