Marrero–saez v. Municipality of Aibonito

• Decision Date: 27 December 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09–1499 (SEC).
• Parties: Gladys MARRERO–SAEZ, Plaintiffv.MUNICIPALITY OF AIBONITO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

756 F.Supp.2d 215

Gladys MARRERO–SAEZ, Plaintiff

v.MUNICIPALITY OF AIBONITO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 09–1499 (SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Dec. 27, 2010.Opinion Denying Reconsideration March 4, 2011.

Eduardo A. Vera–Ramirez, Luis A. Rodriguez–Munoz, Eileen Landron–Guardiola, Landron & Vera LLP, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiff.Eddie G. Malave–Colon, Eddie G. Malave Law Office, Aibonito, PR, Idza Diaz–Rivera, P.R. Department of Justice–Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants William Alicea–Perez (“Alicea”), Sandra E. Rivera–Santos (“Rivera”), Jorge Santos–Ortiz (“Santos”) and Lisandra Maldonado's ¹ (“Maldonado”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 39), and Plaintiff Gladys Marrero–Saez's (“Plaintiff” or “Marrero”) opposition thereto (Docket # 43 & 44). After carefully considering the filings and the applicable law, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

Procedural Background

On June 3, 2009, Plaintiff filed the present suit against Defendants in their personal and official capacities, and the Municipality of Aibonito, pursuant to Section 1983, alleging violations of her rights under the First Amendment, due process and equal protection ² clauses of the Constitution of the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Commonwealth's Public Service Personnel Law, Law 184 of August 3, 2004. Docket # 1. According to Plaintiff, Defendants discriminated against her because of her political affiliations. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she was subjected to intolerable work conditions which eventually led to her constructive discharge.

On July 12, 2010, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination insofar as she did not suffer an adverse employment action. Defendants further contend that they have properly asserted a Mt. Healthy defense, to wit, that Plaintiff's transfer was due to an urgent service need. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she was transferred and deprived of her duties solely because of her political affiliation. As to Defendants' alleged Mt. Healthy defense, Plaintiff avers that there is no evidence that her transfer was due to an urgent service need.

Standard of Review

The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir.2005). In reaching such a determination, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.1994). At this stage, the court examines the record in the “light most favorable to the nonmovant,” and indulges all “reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). “A factual issue is ‘genuine’ if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make “a choice between the parties” differing versions of the truth at trial.’ ” DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir.1990)); see also SEC v. Ficken, 546 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir.2008).

In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). Nor will “effusive rhetoric” and “optimistic surmise” suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir.1997). Once the party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the “party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Méndez–Laboy v. Abbott Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994)).

“The non-movant must ‘produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form’ sufficient to limn a trial-worthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle.” Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that “the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence.”); Medina–Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8 (citing Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that “[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.”).

Applicable Law and Analysis

The relevant uncontested facts are as follows.³ Plaintiff is a member of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) since she was sixteen years old. Plaintiffs' Additional Uncontested Facts (“AUF”), ¶ 33.⁴ From that time, she attended PDP meetings and assemblies. AUF at 34. Plaintiff further participated in the opening of the PDP club, in the motorcades and other activities. AUF at 35. She was also part of the advance team for the 2008 election campaign for the PDP candidate for mayor of the municipality of Aibonito. AUF at 36. Moreover, Plaintiff was a poll watcher in both primaries and general elections since she was sixteen. AUF at 37 & 38.

Plaintiff started working for the Municipality of Aibonito on February 15, 1997. Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Facts (“SUF”), ¶ 1. ⁵ On March 1, 2009, co-defendant Santos, Director of Public Works for the Municipality of Aibonito, requested that the Honorable Mayor of Aibonito assign an Administrative Assistant to perform duties in the cemetery. Id. at 13.⁶ On April 2, 2009, Maldonado, Director of Human Resources of the Municipality of Aibonito, contacted Plaintiff and informed her that she was being transferred to the cemetery. Id. at 10. Maldonado gave Plaintiff a letter of transfer stating that Santos had requested an Administrative Assistant II for the cemetery and told Plaintiff that the transfer was due to an urgent need of services at the cemetery. Id. at 10 & 11. Plaintiff was transferred from the Federal Programs Office to the cemetery effective April 6, 2009. Id. at 4. She continued to work as an Administrative Assistant II at the Municipality until June 5, 2009. Id. at 5.⁷

Section 1983

The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive rights, but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In the instant case, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims are based on alleged violations of the First Amendment. Personal capacity suits against governmental officials seek to impose personal liability for actions taken by the government official under color of state law. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). In order to prove liability under Section 1983, “plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Velez–Rivera v. Agosto–Alicea, 437 F.3d 145, 151–52 (1st Cir.2006). “While plaintiffs are not held to higher pleading standards in section 1983 actions, they must plead enough for a necessary inference to be reasonably drawn.” Marrero v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2007). Moreover, when alleging political discrimination under Section 1983, plaintiffs must produce evidence that partisanship was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. See Maymi v. P.R. Ports Authority, 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.2008).

Political Discrimination

The First Circuit has held that “[t]he right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of the basic constitutional freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas protected by the First Amendment.” Carrasquillo v. Puerto Rico, 494 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57, 94 S.Ct. 303, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973)). As a general rule, “the First Amendment protects associational rights ... [and] the right to be free from discrimination on account of one's political opinions or beliefs.” Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.2004). Since public employees “generally enjoy protection from adverse employment actions based on their political affiliations,” this Circuit has held that “a government employer cannot discharge public employees merely because they are not sponsored by or affiliated with a particular political party.” Id.; see also Maymi, 515 F.3d at 25; Carrasquillo, 494 F.3d at 4 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–19, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)). This protection extends to career employees, trust employees, transitory employees, and independent contractors. Martinez–Baez v. Rey–Hernandez, 394 F.Supp.2d 428,...