Gomez v. City of Austin
| Decision Date | 26 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-19-00250-CV,08-19-00250-CV |
| Citation | 626 S.W.3d 67 |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Eric GOMEZ, Appellant, v. CITY OF AUSTIN, Appellee. |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: John F. Melton, The Melton Law Firm, PLLC, 925 South Capital of Texas Highway, Suite, B225, Austin, TX 78746.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: Paul Matula, City Of Austin Law Dept., PO Box 1546, Austin, TX 78767-1546.
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
Appellant, Eric Gomez, appeals the trial court's decision overruling his Batson1 challenge on a peremptory strike exercised by Appellee, City of Austin, at trial.2 Appellant sued for discrimination based on ethnicity and national origin after Appellee terminated his employment.
During voir dire, Appellant objected to Appellee's use of a peremptory strike against one of the only Hispanic prospective jurors in the strike zone. The trial court overruled Appellant's objection following the three-step Batson inquiry. Following trial, in a unanimous verdict, the jury found no discrimination had occurred.
In his sole issue, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his Batson challenge. We disagree.
Appellant sued Appellee for employment discrimination following his termination in January of 2016. At trial, Appellee struck Venire Member 8 using a peremptory strike. Venire Member 8, in her juror information sheet, identified herself as Hispanic-Asian and was raised in Mexico. Appellant objected to Appellee's use of a peremptory strike against Venire Member 8. Appellant claimed that as one of very few Hispanic venire members and having given some answers indicating she was more pro-defense than pro-plaintiff, Appellant believed Appellee struck her because she was Hispanic and from Mexico.
Appellee's counsel responded he was unaware of her country of origin and struck her because she disagreed with a question posed by Appellant's counsel regarding whether some discrimination lawsuits are frivolous. He also stated Venire Member 8 responded she would not require a greater standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence in proving discrimination, Additionally, Appellee maintained she did not agree with the proposition it was hard to believe a Hispanic supervisor would discriminate against a Hispanic employee.
Appellant countered Venire Member 8 had indicated she would require a higher burden of proof to show mental anguish damages and would have difficulty awarding mental anguish damages. He also pointed out, other venire panelists who answered the same as Venire Member 8 on several questions, but were not Hispanic, served on the jury.
The trial court denied Appellant's Batson challenge and the strike against Venire Member 8 was upheld. Following the trial, the jury unanimously returned a verdict in favor of Appellee, answering the liability question on discrimination in the negative.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his Batson challenge as to Venire Member 8. Appellant argues Appellee struck Venire Member 8 based on her Mexican national origin and her race, which she labeled as "Asian-Hispanic" on her information sheet. Appellee counters it provided a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike and Appellant failed to meet his burden of showing intentional discrimination.
We review a trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co. , 268 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. 2008). "A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision ‘is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles.’ " Goode v. Shoukfeh , 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (citing Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne , 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996) ). As the reviewing court, "we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court with respect to resolution of ... matters committed to the trial court's discretion." Lucchese Boot Co. v. Licon , 388 S.W.3d 365, 372 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). The Texas Supreme Court noted the abuse of discretion standard is " ‘demanding but not insatiable,’ " and although we defer to the trial court's discretion, we are not precluded from undertaking a review of alleged Batson errors. Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 515-16 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (" Miller-El II ")).
Generally, parties in civil actions are each allowed to exercise six peremptory strikes to strike potential jurors from the panel without any reason or explanation. TEX.R.CIV.P. 232, 233. However, using peremptory strikes to remove potential jurors based on their race is unconstitutional. See Batson , 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. "Race," in this context, "encompasses notions of ancestral line and ethnicity." Wamget v. State , 67 S.W.3d 851, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ; see also Salazar v. State , 795 S.W.2d 187, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ().
Batson challenges are reviewed and resolved by a three-step inquiry. Batson , 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 514 n.4. The first step requires the challenging party to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Batson , 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 514 n.4. In making its prima facie case, the challenging party may look at "the totality of the relevant facts" and draw an inference showing discriminatory purpose. Batson , 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. To satisfy its initial burden, the challenging party "must show that relevant circumstances raise an inference that the [striking party] made a race-based strike." Jones v. State , 531 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref'd).
If the challenging party makes its prima facie showing, the second step shifts the burden to the striking party to produce a race-neutral explanation for the strike(s). Batson , 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 514 n.4. The reason must be stated as articulately as possible "and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons [the attorney] gives." Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317. However, the race-neutral explanation is merely a burden of production. Murphy v. Arcos , 615 S.W.3d 676, 686 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2020, pet. filed) (). "This means that the reason offered need not be ‘persuasive or even plausible,’ so long as it is clear, reasonably specific, and ‘based on something other than the juror's race.’ " Murphy , 615 S.W.3d at 686 ()). The trial court must only determine whether the explanation provided is facially valid. Purkett , 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769.
If the striking party provides a race-neutral explanation, the final step requires the challenging party to prove "purposeful racial discrimination" in light of " ‘all relevant circumstances[.]’ " Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 514 n.4 ; Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 232, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Only at the third step does the "persuasiveness of the justification for the challenge become[ ] relevant." Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 514 n.4. "[A]t this stage ... implausible justifications for striking potential jurors ‘may (and probably will) be found [by the trial court] to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’ " Id. (citing Goode 943 S.W.2d at 445-46 ). However, " ‘the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the [peremptory] strike.’ " Id. (citing Goode , 943 S.W.2d at 445-46 ).
The Texas Supreme Court in Davis considered the five factors outlined by the United States Supreme Court in its decision Miller-El II to examine " ‘all relevant circumstances.’ " Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 511-512 (citing Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ). They first analyzed the statistical data of the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes; in other words, what percentage of eligible African-American venire persons that were struck peremptorily. Id. at 512 (citing Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ). The second factor involved a comparative juror analysis, in which the Supreme Court conducted a comparison of the Black venire panelists who were excised by peremptory strikes compared to the White panelists that served on the jury. Id. The third factor was the striking-party's decision to use the jury shuffle, which the United States Supreme Court held could " ‘indicate decisions probably based on race.’ " Id. (citing Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 253, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ). Fourth, the Supreme Court considered the number and quality of voir dire questions posed to Black versus Non-Black panel members. Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 513-14 (citing Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 255, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ). Finally, the court examined the striking-party's history, if any, of striking minority venire persons from juries. Id. at 514 (citing Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 263, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ).
In this case, Appellant objected to Appellee striking Venire Member 8, stating 3 Appellant argued Venire Member 8's pro-defense voir dire responses should have made her favorable to Appellee, but instead was peremptorily struck by Appellee. Finally, he pointed out other venire members who responded in similarly to Venire Member 8 were not struck by Appellee. We find Appellant's objection and...
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Preliminaries
...objection to defense counsel’s use of peremptory challenges. PRELIMINARIES §207 Trial Objections 2-26 TEXAS Gomez v. City of Austin , 626 S.W.3d 67, 71-75 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021). In a former employee’s action alleging discrimination based on ethnicity and national origin, the trial court ......