Gomez v. City of Eagle Pass

• Citation: 91 F.Supp.2d 1000
• Decision Date: 20 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. DR-95-CA-85.,DR-95-CA-85.
• Parties: Susana GOMEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EAGLE PASS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

91 F.Supp.2d 1000

Susana GOMEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EAGLE PASS, Defendant.

No. DR-95-CA-85.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Del Rio Division.

March 20, 2000.

Tracey Whitely, Edinburg, TX, Jose Garza, Edinburg, TX, for Susana Gomez, plaintiff.

Albert Lopez, Law Offices of Albert Lopez, San Antonio, TX, for City of Eagle Pass, The City of Eagle Pass, Texas, Raul Trevino, Mayor, Jose. Mora, City Council Member, City of Eagle Pass, defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTICE, Senior District Judge.

At the trial of this civil action, the defendant, City of Eagle Pass, moved at the close of plaintiff's case in chief for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a). A ruling on the motion was deferred, and the defendant renewed the motion after the close of all evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion will be denied and judgment for the plaintiff will be issued in accordance with the jury's verdict in this case.

Background

Plaintiff, Susana Gomez, filed this action on November 29, 1995, alleging that she had been illegally discharged from her employment by defendant because of her political affiliation and her gender. Gomez was initially hired as city manager for the City of Eagle Pass in November of 1993, at an annual salary of $50,000. At the time she was hired, a political majority favorable to the plaintiff had recently been elected to the city council. This majority consisted of David Riojas, Romelia Cardona and Oscar Rodriguez. But, Cardona was defeated at the next election by Jose Mora in May of 1994. Also in the 1994 elections, Riojas ran for mayor and was defeated by Raul Trevino, a political ally of Mora. Franscisco "Paco" Farias, plaintiff's predecessor as city manager, was elected to the city council at the time Cardona lost her seat and Riojas lost his mayoral election. Thus, as a result of the 1994 city elections, a new political majority was elected to govern the City of Eagle Pass. The first official action of the new majority of the city council was to dismiss plaintiff and to hire John Ruiz, Jr., a city employee and godfather to one of Trevino's children, as city manager. Plaintiff then filed the instant action, alleging discrimination on the basis of political affiliation and sex.

Sex Discrimination Claim

The defendant, City of Eagle Pass, presents three arguments in support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination. First, defendant maintains that plaintiff was a "policy-making" employee and is consequently excepted from the statutory definitions of employee under Title VII and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Second, defendant argues that plaintiff was a member of the city council's "personal staff" and, consequently, is excepted from the Title VII and TCHRA definitions of employee. Third, defendant asserts that the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient for the jury to have concluded that the plaintiff's termination from her employment was motivated by gender.

As a preliminary matter, it is noted that the first two of these three arguments concerning the policy-making and personal staff exceptions to the Title VII definition of employee were presented to the Honorable Fred Biery, United States District Judge, who presided over this action prior to its transfer. Judge Biery rejected these arguments, and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment without elaboration. The defendant's burden on motion for summary judgment was, of course, greater than its present burden in arguing for judgment as a matter of law on an issue which did not go to the jury. However, evidence produced at trial strongly buttresses the conclusion that defendant may not avail itself of either exception to the definitions of employee. After an independent review of the evidence, it is found that the plaintiff falls squarely within the definitions of employee under both Title VII and TCHRA.

The Definition of Employee Under TCHRA

Plaintiff brought this action under the Texas Labor Code and amendments to Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 5221k, alleging that she was discriminatorily terminated from the position of city manager of Eagle Pass, Texas, because of her sex. Defendant asserts that plaintiff is not an employee within the definition of the Texas Labor Code because it exempts both policymakers and members of an elected office-holder's personal staff. Plaintiff responds that both exceptions to the definition were repealed by an amendment to the code which became effective September 1, 1993. Defendant insists, however, that the deletion of the exceptions did not occur until 1995, after the plaintiff's termination. The report and recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge concerning the applicability of these exceptions to the plaintiff resolved the confusion surrounding the date of the amendment in favor of the defendant. That recommendation was subsequently rejected without elaboration by Judge Biery, who denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's TCHRA claim.

A prior ruling in this case by another district court judge on an issue of law may not be set aside in the absence of changed circumstances. See, e.g., Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912). However, even upon independent consideration of the issue, it is concluded that the plaintiff's interpretation regarding the date of applicability of the amendment is correct. It is concluded, moreover, that the legal staff of the legislative council became aware that the text of the definition of employee in the labor code as enacted in 1993 did not accurately reflect the substance of the law, as altered by an amendment deleting the exceptions from the definition of employee, which was passed as House Bill 860 (Chapter 276, Actions of the 73rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1993). Accordingly, as part of its duty to revise statutes, the staff proposed to the legislature in 1995 a bill that became Senate Bill 959, which was simply a "code update bill," aimed at conforming the code to prior legislative changes. As such, the code update bill was intended to reflect current law and was not intended to change its substance. The substantive deletion of the exceptions having occurred in 1993, plaintiff's suit, based on her termination in 1994, is governed by the amended version of the law. Plaintiff, therefore, falls squarely within the amended statute's definition of employee, which did not contain the relevant exceptions at the time of her firing.

In addition, it is noted that even if the former exceptions to the definition of employee were applicable to this case, the plaintiff is neither a policymaker nor a member of an elected official's personal staff. As was noted by the Magistrate Judge in his report and recommendation to the district court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, neither the Texas Labor Code nor Texas case law defines what constitutes a policymaking or personal staff position. However, Texas courts have often noted that the TCHRA has among its express purposes the implementation of the policies of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which targets discrimination in employment. Austin State Hosp. v. Kitchen, 903 S.W.2d 83, 87-88 (Tex.App. — Austin 1995, no writ) (citing the TCHRA). Because the TCHRA seeks to promote federal civil rights policy, and because Texas has little case law interpreting it, analogous federal precedent will be examined. Id. See also Holt v. Lone Star Gas Co., 921 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1996, no writ); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st. Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (opinion on rehearing).

The Definition of Employee Under Title VII

Title VII specifically excludes from protection of the statute "[a]ny person elected to public office in any state or political subdivision of any state ... or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). In Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.1981), the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff's status as an employee for purposes of Title VII must be determined on a case-by-case basis through careful evaluation of the facts. In reversing the district court's holding that a deputy sheriff was excluded from the definition of employee, the Calderon court stated that the scope of the exceptions to the definition is to be ascertained through examination of the statutory language of Title VII, its legislative history, existing federal case law, and the particular circumstances of the case at hand. Calderon, 639 F.2d at 273.

I. Policymaking Exception

The legislative history of the exceptions make clear that Congress intended that they be narrowly construed. Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2137, 2179, 2180; Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1981). In addition, as was noted by the Fifth Circuit in Calderon, "Congress amended Title VII specifically to bring governments and government agencies [and] political subdivisions under the Act's requirements." Calderon, 639 F.2d at 273 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Public Law No. 92-261, 86 Statute 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976))).

Although there are no cases in the Fifth Circuit interpreting the Title VII exception for policymakers, the Eighth Circuit, in Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1988), articulated three factors relevant to the determination of whether an employee falls within the policymaking level exception: "(1) whether the employee has discretionary, rather than solely administrative powers ... (2) whether the employee serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority ... (3) whether the employee formulates policy...." Stillians, 843 F.2d...