Gomez v. State Bar of Texas

• Decision Date: 09 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 3-92-154-CV,3-92-154-CV
• Citation: 856 S.W.2d 804
• Parties: Maria GOMEZ, Alicia Naveja, and Leonardo Chavez, Appellants, v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, James Parsons III, and Karen Johnson, Appellees. . Austin
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 804

856 S.W.2d 804

Maria GOMEZ, Alicia Naveja, and Leonardo Chavez, Appellants, v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, James Parsons III, and Karen Johnson, Appellees.

No. 3-92-154-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Austin.

June 9, 1993.

Rehearing Overruled Aug. 11, 1993.

James C. Harrington, TX Civ. Rights Project, Ginny Agnew, Austin, for appellants.

James M. McCormack, Gen. Counsel, Linda A. Acevedo, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Austin, for appellees.

Before CARROLL, C.J., and JONES and KIDD, JJ.

JONES, Justice.

Maria Gomez, Alicia Naveja, and Leonardo Chavez, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), appellants, filed a class-action suit in the district court against the State Bar of Texas and two of its officials, James Parsons III and Karen Johnson, individually and in their capacity as State Bar officials (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs alleged constitutional, statutory, and other violations arising from Defendants' actions and inaction in connection with providing pro bono legal services. After Plaintiffs filed suit, six individual lawyers intervened, three as plaintiffs and three as defendants. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' cause for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. On appeal, Plaintiffs assert six points of error complaining that the trial court erred in dismissing the cause for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and in failing to grant Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. ¹ We will reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs alleged that approximately ninety percent of the serious legal needs of indigent Texas citizens are unmet and that approximately eighty percent of lawyers licensed to practice in Texas fail to participate in organized programs delivering free legal services to the indigent. On behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, as indigent citizens of Texas, alleged they are entitled to free legal services, have sought such services, but have been denied them.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have a legal duty to provide free legal services to indigent citizens of Texas. Plaintiffs first assert that this duty has been affirmatively imposed on Defendants through rules promulgated and orders issued by the Texas Supreme Court. Plaintiffs allege that the supreme court imposes this duty through the following "directives":

(1) the preamble to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in part:

"Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in or otherwise support the provision of legal services to the disadvantaged. The provision of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees is a moral obligation of each lawyer as well as the profession generally."

Tex. Disciplinary R.Prof. Conduct preamble p 6 (State Bar Rules art. X, § 9).

(2) Comment 3 to Tex. Disciplinary R.Prof. Conduct 6.01 (State Bar Rules art. X, § 9), which provides in part: "[E]ach lawyer engaged in the practice of law should render public interest legal service."

(3) Article I, sections 2 and 3 of the Texas Lawyer's Creed, which sets forth the following affirmations for all lawyers licensed in Texas: "2. I am responsible to assure that all persons have access to competent representation regardless of wealth or position in life. 3. I commit myself to an adequate and effective pro bono program."

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are violating the legal duties these directives allegedly impose.

Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants' failure to provide free legal services deprives them and other indigent citizens of Texas of fundamental rights guaranteed to them by various state constitutional and statutory provisions. Specifically, appellants allege that inability to obtain free legal services deprives them of their fundamental rights guaranteed in the Texas Constitution pursuant to: (1) the open courts provision, Tex.Const. art. I, § 13; (2) the equal protection provision, Tex.Const. art. I, § 3; (3) the equal rights amendment, Tex.Const. art. I, § 3a; (4) the due course of law provision, Tex.Const. art. I, § 19; and (5) the general rights provision, Tex.Const. art. I, § 29. Further, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' failure to provide them free legal services has deprived them of fundamental rights guaranteed to them by Texas statutory law. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 106.001 (West 1986 & Supp.1993) (prohibition against discrimination).

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs requested the district court to grant them both declaratory and injunctive relief. First, Plaintiffs requested that, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 1986 & Supp.1993), the district court declare their rights and legal relations under the supreme court's directives and various constitutional and statutory provisions. Second, Plaintiffs requested that the district court issue a prohibitory injunction enjoining Defendants from violating the relevant supreme court directives and from violating Plaintiffs' fundamental rights guaranteed by Texas constitutional and statutory law. Finally, Plaintiffs requested that the district court issue a mandatory injunction requiring Defendants to implement an adequate and effective pro bono program to provide free legal services to indigent citizens of Texas.

In response, Defendants filed separate pleas to the jurisdiction asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In a letter to the parties, the district court announced its decision to grant Defendants' pleas to the jurisdiction and stated its rationale for doing so. The district court subsequently signed a written order dismissing Plaintiffs' cause for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also denied Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions that arose out of a discovery dispute.

SCOPE OF APPEAL

In the present case, the district court decided that, for reasons we will discuss, it did not have "jurisdiction," (i.e., judicial authority), to determine the "merits" of Plaintiffs' claims (i.e., whether or not Plaintiffs are legally entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief they seek). Having come to that conclusion, the district court appropriately refrained from addressing the merits of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. The district court's decision narrows the scope of this appeal. Our task is only to decide whether the district court was correct in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction. Our decision, like the district court's, should not be considered as any indication of our opinion about the merits of Plaintiffs' claims.

At various places in their brief to this Court, Defendants advance arguments why Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek. Such arguments go beyond the issue of the district court's jurisdiction to hear and decide this cause and are, therefore, arguments on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. Because such arguments are outside the scope of this appeal, we will not address them.

JURISDICTION

In points of error one through five, Plaintiffs complain that the district court erred in dismissing their cause for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issues presented are unique and complex. The district court based its decision on article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. In this appeal, however, we must affirm the district court's judgment if it can be supported on any basis, even if it is not the basis identified by the trial court for its decision. See Guaranty County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 709 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex.1986). Accordingly, we will address not only the legal basis relied on by the district court, but also two other legal bases asserted by Defendants that could potentially be grounds for upholding the district court's judgment of dismissal. We will address the following possible legal bases for upholding the district court's dismissal: (1) article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which defines the scope of district courts' jurisdiction; (2) determination of standing and justiciable controversy under the facts of the present case; and (3) determination of the district court's authority to grant the types of relief requested.

1. ARTICLE V, SECTION 8

In concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' case, the district court focused on article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution and section 81.011 of the State Bar Act. Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution defines the general scope of the jurisdiction of district courts in Texas:

District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body....

The District Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court....

Tex.Const. art. V, § 8 (emphasis added). Section 81.011 of the State Bar Act provides: "The Supreme Court of Texas, on behalf of the judicial department, shall exercise administrative control over the state bar under this chapter." Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 81.011(c) (West 1988) (emphasis added). Based on this provision and actions taken by the supreme court pursuant to its authority to supervise the practice of law, the district court concluded that exclusive "jurisdiction" over the subject matter of the present cause had been conferred on the Texas Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court concluded that the "exception" clause in the first paragraph of article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution precluded it from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims.

In point of error five, Plaintiffs complain that the granting to the supreme court of administrative control over...