Gomillion v. State

• Decision Date: 03 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 43467,43467
• Citation: 274 N.Y.S.2d 381,51 Misc.2d 952
• Parties: Clarence GOMILLION, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 381

274 N.Y.S.2d 381

51 Misc.2d 952

Clarence GOMILLION, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York.

Claim No. 43467.

Court of Claims of New York.

Nov. 3, 1966.

David N. Fields, by Morton A. Schwab, Trial Counsel, New York City, for claimant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Kent L. Mardon, asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for the State.

MEMORANDUM--DECISION

DOROTHEA E. DONALDSON, Judge.

The above entitled claim, filed February 26, 1964, is predicated upon the alleged false imprisonment of claimant in Matteawan State Hospital from April 1, 1954 to June 10, 1961. Claimant was admitted to Hudson River State Hospital by County Court of Westchester order dated September 14, 1949. Approximately one year after his release in 1950 he was arrested and charged with a felony. He was then returned to Hudson River State Hospital on May 22, 1951 after a brief stay at Bellevue Hospital. The claimant was transferred to Matteawan on April 1, 1954 and returned to Hudson River State Hospital on June 10, 1961 from which he was released on March 18, 1963 under out-patient care.

The State moved to dismiss the claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter and the claimant fails to state a cause of action. Claimant has cross-moved for summary judgment.

The question must be considered whether the claimant has met the requirements of Section 10, subdivision 3 of the Court of Claims Act in view of the fact that more than ninety days had elapsed from the time the claim accrued to the date of filing. A claim for false imprisonment accrues upon release or discharge. The discharge from Matteawan occurred in 1961 but claimant continued under a disability. Section 208 of the CPLR mentions three disabilities. Claimant was not imprisoned for a crime nor was he an infant at the time of the accrual of the claim. The third disability is applicable to claimant even though he was never adjudicated incompetent nor was a committee ever appointed on his behalf. Hammer v. Rosen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 165 N.E.2d 756. Also, the Court must consider whether the time toll continues during out-patient care. If answered in the negative, claimant is time barred, and if affirmative, the claim is timely filed.

It has been held the discharge from a mental institution is not conclusive of cure. Petition of Reilly, 17 Misc.2d 1077, 156 N.Y.S.2d 478. Release is prima facie a belief by the attending physicians the individual is capable of civilized conduct and a presumption of that self-sufficiency even though doctors place such person in the care of family. Nor can the Court hold that out-patient care automatically continues in effect the rule of time suspension. Claimant obtained legal counsel and filed his claim during the period of out-patient care. Out-patient care as a part of psychiatric treatment is a progressive and relatively new technique which requires a review of procedural law in determining when the provisions of CPLR 208 are no longer applicable.

The Court recognizes that the toll of the statute of limitations continues where there was 'continuing treatment', particularly in the cases where medical malpractice is alleged. The doctrine of 'continuing treatment' is to be distinguished from the facts in the instant case and is not applicable. Hammer v. Rosen, supra; Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777.

The purpose of CPLR 208 is to protect those incapable of asserting and perfecting their legal rights because of the listed disabilities. To rule that discharge from a mental institution is ipso facto the end to the disability of insanity is to ignore the advances of medical science. Being aware of these advances and attempting to maintain the spirit of the statute requires the Court to await a fuller exposition of the facts. The Court does not have before it sufficient evidence to determine whether or not claimant would fall within the tolling provisions of Section 208 CPLR after his release on out-patient care. Questions of this nature can only be determined on the trial of an action.

Correction Law Section 412 gave the Commissioner of Mental Hygience authority to transfer inmates to Matteawan in two instances--when the inmate is confined for criminal process upon order of a Judge Or any present inmate who had previously been sentenced to 'any correctional institution'. Previous to September 1949 claimant had twice been incarcerated at Matteawan State Hospital. The authority of ...