Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. EP-01-CA-253-DB.,EP-01-CA-253-DB.
• Citation: 182 F.Supp.2d 590
• Parties: Jose GONSALEZ MORENO, Jacinto Ortega, Plaintiffs, v. MILK TRAIN, INC., Armando Alvarez, dba AG-Labor Services, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

182 F.Supp.2d 590

Jose GONSALEZ MORENO, Jacinto Ortega, Plaintiffs, v. MILK TRAIN, INC., Armando Alvarez, dba AG-Labor Services, Inc., Defendants.

No. EP-01-CA-253-DB.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

January 24, 2002.

Constance Russell Wannamaker, Texas Rural Legal Aid, El Paso, TX, for plaintiffs.

Charles E. Woods, Short, How, Frels & Heitz, P.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BRIONES, District Judge.

On this day, the Court considered Defendant Milk Train, Inc.'s ("Milk Train") "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, or in the Alternative Motion to Transfer Venue," filed in the above-captioned cause on September 7, 2001. Plaintiff Jose Gonsalez Moreno and Plaintiff Jacinto Ortega (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed a Response on September 21, 2001.

After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Milk Train's Motion should be denied for the reasons that follow.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, residents of Texas, brought this action pursuant to the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872, against Defendants Milk Train and Armando Alvarez, doing business as AG-Labor Services, Inc., ("AG-Labor Services"). Plaintiffs are migrant farm workers whose permanent place of residence is El Paso County, Texas. Milk Train is a dairy located in Sprakers, New York. AG-Labor Services is a farm-labor contracting agency based in Texas. In 1999 and 2000, Milk Train recruited and hired Plaintiffs, through AG-Labor Services, to work for Milk Train in New York. Prior to leaving for New York, Plaintiffs signed an employment contract with Defendants.

Plaintiffs raise five claims under the AWPA, alleging that Defendants violated (1) 29 C.F.R. § 500.75(b)(6) by failing to disclose in writing the availability of workman's compensation insurance; (2) 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f) by knowingly providing false and misleading information regarding the conditions of employment; (3) 29 U.S.C. § 1822(c) by failing to comply with the terms of the working arrangement; (4) 29 U.S.C. § 1822(a) by failing to pay each Plaintiff the wages owed; and (5) 29 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2) by not providing wage receipts to Plaintiff Ortega. Plaintiffs also raise the state law claims of breach of contract, fraud, including fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation to enter into the contract, negligent misrepresentation, and retaliatory discharge.

DISCUSSION

Milk Train filed the instant "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, or in the Alternative Motion to Transfer Venue," ("Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction," "Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue," and "Motion to Transfer Venue"), to which Plaintiffs filed a Response. Therein, Milk Train asks the Court to dismiss this cause for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Milk Train also contends that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) or 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a), venue is not proper in this District. Milk Train urges the Court, therefore, to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or transfer this action to the Northern District of New York. Alternatively, Milk Train asks the Court to transfer this cause to the Northern District of New York for the convenience of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Milk Train asks the Court to dismiss this cause for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In support, Milk Train argues that Plaintiffs have neither established that Milk Train has "minimum contacts" with Texas sufficient to confer on this Court personal jurisdiction over it, nor that this Court's exercise of jurisdiction over Milk Train comports with traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice."

In general, a plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir.1990). Where a court rules on such motion a without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court must accept as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all factual conflicts presented by the parties' affidavits in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 217. Thus, absent a hearing, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. Id.

Because AWPA is silent with regard to personal jurisdiction, this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over only those defendants who are subject to the jurisdiction of Texas courts. Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201, 203-4 (5th Cir.1992)(per curiam). To determine whether a nonresident defendant is subject to jurisdiction, the Court must first determine whether the Texas long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over that Defendant. Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir.1993). The Court must then determine whether such exercise comports with due process. Id. The Texas long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.1990)) (interpreting the Texas long-arm statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-17.045 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.2002)); see also Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 854 (5th Cir.2000). Thus, the Court need only determine the latter inquiry, whether exercising jurisdiction over Milk Train is consistent with the Due Process Clause.

Due process requires (1) the defendant to have established "minimum contacts" with the forum state; and (2) that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Ham, 4 F.3d at 415 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). To establish "minimum contacts" with a forum state, a nonresident defendant "must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state...." Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994)). The defendant's connection with the forum state should be such that he or she reasonably should anticipate being haled into court there. Marathon Oil Co., 182 F.3d at 295. "The `minimum contacts' prong can be subdivided into contacts that give rise to `specific' personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to `general' personal jurisdiction." Id. (citing Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201 (5th Cir.1996)). Specific jurisdiction requires some direct relationship — a nexus — between the purposeful contacts and the litigation. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). General jurisdiction, on the other hand, relates to contacts, even if unrelated to the cause of action, which "are continuous, systematic, and substantial." Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415, 104 S.Ct. at 1868 and Wilson, 20 F.3d at 649).

Plaintiffs do not suggest that the Court can exercise general jurisdiction over Milk Train. Hence, the applicable inquiry is whether the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction. In order to demonstrate specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must show that Milk Train has "purposefully directed" its activities at the residents of the forum. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S at 472, 105 S.Ct. at 2182. Secondly, Plaintiffs must show the litigation resulted from the alleged injuries that "arise out of or relate to" Milk Train's activities directed at the forum. Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. at 1872). Finally, the Court must examine the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to determine whether maintaining the suit offends "traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 464, 476-77, 105 S.Ct. at 2177, 2184 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 160, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

Plaintiffs argue that Milk Train purposefully directed its activity at the residents of Texas and purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Texas. The Court agrees. Milk Train contacted AG-Labor Services to recruit Texas residents for employment in New York and paid AG-Labor Services a contracting fee for each laborer it provided. Milk Train hired Plaintiffs as a result of the recruitment activity of its agent, AG-Labor Services. Finally, Plaintiffs signed their employment contracts in Texas. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Milk Trains's actions are defined as acts constituting business in this state by the Texas long arm statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1997). A nonresident does business in Texas if the nonresident "recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state." Id. § 17.042(3). In addition to recruiting Plaintiffs, Milk Train provided AG-Labor Services with the terms and conditions of employment for Plaintiffs. Milk Train also paid Plaintiffs bus fare to New York and supplied Plaintiffs with a sixty-dollar travel loan.

The Court notes the Fifth Circuit's decision in Aviles v. Kunkle. In Aviles, families of migrant farm workers filed suit in the federal district court in Texas against employees of an Ohio farm, raising claims based on federal employment laws. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants because the "[d]efendants' only contact with Texas was one telephone call and one letter...