Gonzales v. International Ass'n of Machinists

• Decision Date: 13 March 1963
• Citation: 29 Cal.Rptr. 190,213 Cal.App.2d 817
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 53 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2046, 47 Lab.Cas. P 50,784 Marcos GONZALES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, an unincorporated association, et al., Respondents and Appellants. Civ. 20383.

Page 190

29 Cal.Rptr. 190

213 Cal.App.2d 817, 53 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2046,

47 Lab.Cas. P 50,784

Marcos GONZALES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, an unincorporated association, et al., Respondents and Appellants.

Civ. 20383.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

March 13, 1963.

Rehearing Denied April 2, 1963.

Hearing Denied May 8, 1963.

Johnson, Thorne, Speed & Bamford, San Jose, for appellants.

McMurray, Walker & Tepper, Lloyd E. McMurray, San Francisco, for respondents.

SALSMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment based upon a jury verdict awarding respondent $18,000 damages for failure of appellants to restore respondent to union membership, and for mental pain, suffering and humiliation, and from an order denying appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The litigation between the parties has a considerable history. The relevant facts are here briefly summarized. In the trial court, Gonzales was petitioner for the writ of mandate, and appellant unions were respondents there; on this appeal the unions are appellants and are hereafter referred to as such, and Gonzales is hereafter designated as respondent.

Respondent is a marine machinist and has worked at the trade since 1921. He is a member of appellant unions. In 1948 respondent began to have trouble with some of the union officials, and in November, 1952 he was expelled from membership in the unions. In December, 1952 respondent sought a writ of mandate, asking for restoration of his union membership, together with damages for his expulsion. After trial, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, directing appellants to restore respondent to his rights and privileges as a member of the union, awarding damages in the sum of $6,800 for loss of wages, and $2,500 damages for physical and mental pain, suffering and humiliation because of appellants' conduct. In its judgment the trial court reserved jurisdiction to award additional damages and to make further orders until such time as the judgment and peremptory writ was fully obeyed by appellants. In September, 1954 appellants took an appeal to the District Court of Appeal. On June 1, 1956, the appellants complied with that portion of the peremptory writ directing that respondent be restored to union membership. On June 12, 1956 the District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court (Gonzales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 142 Cal.App.2d 207, 298 P.2d 92). Our Supreme Court denied a hearing. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court, and on May 26, 1958 judgment was affirmed. (International Ass'n of Machinists, et al. v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S.Ct. 923, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018.) Thereafter, in March, 1959 respondent moved for additional damages pursuant to the reservation of jurisdiction made by the trial court when the peremptory writ was granted. The period for which additional damages was demanded is the time between the date of the court's order requiring appellants to restore respondent to union membership and the date upon which respondent was readmitted to the union, namely, between September, 1954 and June, 1956. Appellants demanded a jury trial which resulted in the $18,000 judgment which gives rise to this appeal.

The appellants object that the trial court had no power to reserve jurisdiction to make any further award of damages because upon the issuance of the peremptory writ the court exhausted its authority. If correct, this would terminate this second phase of the litigation between the parties in appellants' favor. But the contention is not correct. While an application for a writ of mandamus is a special proceeding (Jones v. Board of Police Commissioners, 141 Cal. 96, 74 P. 696) it is also to some extent a proceeding in equity. (Dedrick v. California Whaling Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 284, 288, 60 P.2d 551.) It has been described as an equitable interference supplementing the deficiencies of the common law (Wallace v. Board of Education, 63 Cal.App.2d 611, 147 P.2d 8), and the authorities have uniformly held that a court of equity will always find the means of enforcing its decrees against a delinquent defendant (Dedrick v. California Whaling Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 284, 60 P.2d 551, supra, and cases cited.) Here the court issued its peremptory writ ordering respondent restored to membership in the union and granting to him such money damages as he had suffered up to the time the writ was issued. It is apparent that the trial court anticipated there would be delay in compliance with its order, and that respondent might suffer further damage and injury before restoration to him of union privileges. Thus the purpose of the court's order retaining a continuing jurisdiction over the case was to do full and final justice between the parties, without the necessity of filing action. Where, as here, complete relief cannot be given because of the status of the proceedings, the court may cause the case to be continued and such orders made as the case may require. (See 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 356, p. 623.) Here the trial court very properly reserved its jurisdiction, and appellants are in no position to object that the trial court did not have authority to do final justice in the case.

Since we have determined that the trial court had authority to retain jurisdiction of the dispute between the parties, there is no merit in appellants' contention that respondent's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The decision in International Ass'n of Machinists, et al. v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 78 S.Ct. 923, supra, was announced May 26, 1958, and respondent made his motion in the trial court for additional damages less than one year later; hence none of the statutes of limitation which appellants urge upon us can have any application.

Appellants make two claims which require only brief notice. First they assert that the jury was improperly permitted to consider humiliation and mental suffering as an element of damage, and second that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear respondent's claim for damages because of federal pre-emption. Each of these contentions was a dominant issue in the prior proceeding before the United States Supreme Court, and that court relied upon the fact that the California court, under California law, could make an award of damages for physical pain and suffering because of appellants' conduct. International Ass'n of Machinists, et al. v. Gonzales, supra, 356 U.S. 617 at pages 620-621, 78 S.Ct. 923, at page 925, the court said: 'Although petitioners do not claim that the state court lacked jurisdiction to order respondent's reinstatement, they do contend that it was without power to fill out this remedy by an award of damages for loss of wages and suffering resulting from the breach of contract. No radiation of the Taft-Hartley Act requires us thus to mutilate the comprehensive relief of equity and reach such an incongruous adjustment of federal-state relations touching the regulation of labor. The National Labor Relations Board could not have given respondent the relief that California gave him...