Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 17 October 1966
• Docket Number: O,AFL-CIO,AFL-CI,No. 7882,7882
• Citation: 77 N.M. 61,419 P.2d 257,1966 NMSC 211
• Parties: Teodulo GONZALES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. OIL CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,and its Members, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,il, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local Union 3--658, Arthur Lopez, Walter C. Peterson, Dale F. Cross, Jack L. Smith, L. U. Marshall, William A. Hanley, and Marvin Sell, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 257

419 P.2d 257

77 N.M. 61

Teodulo GONZALES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. OIL CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO and its Members, et al., Defendants-Appellees Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union AFL-CIO, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local Union 3--658, Arthur Lopez, Walter C. Peterson, Dale F. Cross Jack L. Smith, L. U. Marshall, William A. Hanley, and Marvin Sell, Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

No. 7882.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Oct. 17, 1966.

Key & May, Byron Guse, Albuquerque, for appellants.

Kool & Kool, Albuquerque, Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy, Levy & Richards, Charles J. Morris, Dallas, Tex., for appellees.

OPINION

JOE W. WOOD, Judge, Court of Appeals.

A labor dispute resulted in a strike and picketing at the mines and mills of Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corporation in Valencia County, New Mexico. The sixty-six plaintiffs are alleged to be employees of the corporation. The union defendants are the international and local 3--658 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union. Each of the eight individual defendants is alleged to be either a union representative, officer or member. ¹ The amended complaint seeks damages as a result of alleged acts of defendants committed in connection with the labor dispute.

Concluding that it did not have jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint on the ground 'that the subject matter * * * has been pre-empted by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, a federal statute, * * *' Plaintiffs' appeal requires a determination of (1) the claims asserted and (2) New Mexico jurisdiction over these claims.

Defendants' cross-appeal under § 21--2--1(17)(2), N.M.S.A.1953, raises issues of (1) res judicata, (2) the applicability of § 59--13--2, N.M.S.A.1953, and (3) the sufficiency of pleadings alleging agency and a class action.

Three claims for relief are asserted. They are: (1) that from July 24, 1961, to September 9, 1961, defendants wilfully and maliciously prevented each of the plaintiffs from going to or engaging in their employment; this alleges a common law tort; Crawford v. Taylor, 58 N.M. 340, 270 P.2d 978; (2) that five of the plaintiffs were imprisoned in the union hall on August 11, 1961; this is a sufficient allegation of false imprisonment; Sanchez v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 57 N.M. 512, 260 P.2d 703; and (3) that defendants prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing their employment and interfered with their use of the public roads, contrary to §§ 59--13--1 and 59--13--2, N.M.S.A.1953. This alleges a statutory violation and is sufficient under § 21--1--1(9)(h), N.M.S.A.1953.

The parties raise no question as to whether the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 141) is applicable to the labor dispute out of which these claims arise. The issue of federal pre-emption having been presented on the basis that federal labor law is applicable, the issue will be answered on that basis.

Numerous cases deal with the question of pre-emption, that is, whether federal labor law so occupies the field that state courts are prevented from asserting jurisdiction. The following cases are of particular interest: United Construction Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 78 S.Ct. 206, 2 L.Ed.2d 151; International Union, etc. v Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030; San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775; Local 20, Teamsters, etc. Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 12 L.Ed.2d 280; and Price v. United Mine Workers, 336 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1964).

These cases instruct us to this effect: (1) the nature of the defendants' conduct must be examined in determining whether state jurisdiction has been pre-empted and (2) when defendants' conduct is marked by violence, threats of violence or imminent threats to public order, the states have jurisdiction to grant compensation for the consequences of that conduct.

Each of the three claims alleges violence and threats of violence on the part of defendants.

The main thrust of defendants' claim of federal pre-emption is against the claim of a statutory violation. While the complaint alleges violation of §§ 59--13--1 and 59--13--2, N.M.S.A.1953, the wording of the complaint indicates that the only portion of the statute involved is § 59--13--2(B), N.M.S.A.1953. It reads:

'It shall be unlawful in connection with any labor dispute for any person individually or in concert with others to hinder or prevent by mass picketing, violence or threats of violence, force, coercion, or intimidation of any king, the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free or uninterrupted use of any public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports or other ways of travel or conveyance.'

The attack on this statute is three-fold. First, it is asserted that the jurisdiction remaining to the states is jurisdiction over common law torts as opposed to jurisdiction over statutory violations, relying on United Construction Workers, etc. v. Laburnum Construction Corp., supra; International Union, etc. v. Russell, supra; and San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, supra.

The cases do not support this contention. While Laburnum and Russell held that states had jurisdiction over common law actions, there was no issue as to jurisdiction over statutory violations. In the Garmon case the application of the California statute was denied, not because it was a statute, but because activities regulated by the statute had been pre-empted.

The proposed distinction between a common law tort and a statutory violation is without merit. The conduct involved is the basis for jurisdiction. As stated in Garmon:

'* * * (J)udicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted. * * *'

Second, it is asserted that § 59--13--2(B), N.M.S.A.1953, applies to both violent and non-violent conduct. Because it does not distinguish between types of conduct, and because state jurisdiction is limited to violent conduct, defendants contend that New Mexico does not have jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation of the statute. They point out that the statute would afford relief for 'coercion or intimidation of any kind' and would apply to coercion or intimidation consisting of non-threatening speech or peaceful picketing.

Yougdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., supra, held that the Arkansas court had 'entered the pre-empted domain of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as it enjoined peaceful picketing * * *.' In the Garmon case a damage award based on a California statute was reversed. The award was based on peaceful union activity. State jurisdiction over the peaceful activity had been pre-empted by the federal labor law.

New Mexico courts cannot give effect to those portions of the statute authorizing damages for peaceful activities in connection with a labor dispute where federal labor law is applicable. Its jurisdiction over such activities is pre-empted by the federal labor law.

Section 59--13--2, N.M.S.A.1953, was enacted by Laws 1959, Chapter 26. Section 4 of the act provides that if any portion of the act is 'invalid or inoperative by virtue of Federal pre-emption' the remainder of the act is not affected. Applying the severability provision, the claim of statutory violation based on violence or threats of violence is a claim over which the trial court has jurisdiction.

Third, it is asserted that §§ 59--13--1 and 59--13--2, N.M.S.A.1953, cannot be enforced by New Mexico courts because they conflict with the federal statute. They say this conflict is shown by comparing our statute with §§ 7 and 8 of the federal statute (29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158). Defendants would apply the following language from the Garmon decision:

'* * * When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.'

Defendants contend the portion of the New Mexico statute relating to violence or threats of violence cannot be given effect by our courts because such is 'arguably subject' to the federal act. They assert that New Mexico courts have no jurisdiction because our statute poses a potential conflict with the federal statute.

Garmon held that California could not enforce its statute authorizing an award of damages on the basis of certain peaceful union activities because the statute raised a potential conflict with federal labor law. The 'arguably subject' theory was applied to the facts of that case--the peaceful union activity. In so holding, Garmon expressly recognized the jurisdiction of state courts to award damages for conduct marked by violence and threats to public order, and stated:

'* * * State jurisdiction * * * in these situations * * * is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.'

The 'arguably subject' theory is not a basis for ousting New Mexico courts of jurisdiction over violations of our statute based on violence or threats of violence.

Each of the three claims being based on violence or threats of violence, the federal labor law did not pre-empt the jurisdiction of the New Mexico court. The trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint on this ground.

Defendants' cross-appeal asserts that the trial court correctly dismissed the amended complaint even if New Mexico jurisdiction has not been pre-empted.

The first contention on the cross-appeal is that plaintiffs' suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Defendants invoke the...