Gonzales v. Ryan
Decision Date | 11 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM,CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM |
Parties | Ernest Valencia Gonzales, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Before the Court is Petitioner's First Amended Habeas Petition. (Doc. 28.) Petitioner filed a memorandum addressing the merits of his claims and requesting evidentiary development. (Doc. 214.) Respondents filed a response to the memorandum and Petitioner filed a reply. (Docs. 217, 220.) For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner is entitled to neither habeas relief nor evidentiary development.
In 1991, Petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, first-degree burglary, and theft. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death on the murder charge and to various prison terms for the other crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court summarized the facts of the crimes as follows:
State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 506, 892 P.2d 838, 842 (1995).
Petitioner was represented at trial by appointed counsel. Following a mistrial, Petitioner requested, and the Court granted, his motion to represent himself. Petitioner subsequently withdrew his pro per request and original trial counsel was reappointed to represent Petitioner during the second trial that led to his conviction.
Thereafter, Petitioner's counsel filed a motion for a new trial. (ROA 131.)1 In response, Petitioner filed a new motion to proceed pro per and a motion to strike counsel's motion for a new trial, both of which were granted. (Id. 134, 135; ROA-ME 68.) Petitioner also filed a supplemental motion for a new trial, which included numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (ROA 138.) The trial court held a three-day hearing, at which Petitioner's ineffective assistance allegations were considered and denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) and a supplemental petition. (ROA-PCR 441, 499, 500.) The trial court denied the petitions and denied a motion for rehearing. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the Arizona Supreme Court denied in October 1999. (See ROA-PCR 517).
On November 15, 1999, Petitioner commenced these proceedings by filing a pro forma petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) The Court appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office as counsel. (Doc. 8.) On December 27, 1999, the Court issued a case management order setting a deadline for the filing of an amended petition. (Doc.17.) The order required the amended petition to "include every known constitutional error or deprivation entitling Petitioner to habeas relief" and to provide a "Statement of Exhaustion" noting where each claim for relief was raised in state court. (Id. at 2.)
On July 17, 2000, Petitioner filed a 237-page amended petition raising 60 claims for relief. (Doc. 28.) He failed, however, to file the required Statement of Exhaustion. The Court directed Petitioner to comply with its case management order. (Doc. 34.) On September 14, 2000, Petitioner notified the Court that he had filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 35.) The Court denied Petitioner's request for a stay of the proceedings and for additional time to file the Statement of Exhaustion. (Doc. 40.)
On October 6, 2000, Petitioner filed the Statement of Exhaustion. (Doc. 42.) He simultaneously filed a notice of withdrawal of claims, voluntarily withdrawing 13 unexhausted habeas claims, including claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 43.) The notice indicated that Petitioner had initiated a PCR proceeding in state court to exhaust the withdrawn claims, but did not request a stay of the federal proceedings. (Id. at 2.) On October 16, 2000, the Ninth Circuit denied the mandamus petition as moot.
In February 2001, Petitioner requested that his PCR counsel be removed and that he be permitted to represent himself in his successive PCR proceeding. (Doc. 102-1 at 3-5.) The state court ordered a mental health examination to determine whether Petitioner was competent to waive counsel. (Id. at 6-7.) A court-appointed expert determined thatPetitioner was paranoid and delusional. (Id. at 10.) In August 2001, the state court found Petitioner incompetent to waive counsel and represent himself. (Id. at 26.)
In December 2001, on the day Petitioner's successive PCR petition was due, counsel filed a motion to hold the case in abeyance pending restoration of Petitioner's competency. (Doc. 102-1 at 30-36.) The motion asserted that Petitioner's inability to rationally communicate with counsel precluded counsel from developing a claim of incompetency at the time of trial and sentencing. (Id.) The state court denied the motion. (Id. at 45.)
In February 2002, state counsel filed a successive PCR petition asserting four claims, including claims that Petitioner had a right to be competent to assist counsel in a second PCR proceeding, that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine his current competency, and that he was incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing. (Doc. 108-1 at 3-24.) PCR counsel did not raise any of the claims withdrawn from the amended federal habeas petition. (Id.) The state court denied the petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review. (Id. at 40; Doc. 108-2 at 6.)
Following Petitioner's withdrawal of the 13 unexhausted claims in October 2000, the parties briefed the procedural status of Petitioner's remaining habeas claims. Briefing concluded in February 2001. (Doc. 59.) The procedural status of Petitioner's claims remained under advisement until September 2002, when the Court stayed Petitioner's sentencing-related claims pending exhaustion in state court of a claim based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). (Doc. 75.) Petitioner initiated another state PCR proceeding. The state court consolidated it withthe already-pending PCR petition. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in October 2003. (Doc. 81.) In July 2004, following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), this Court lifted the stay.
Over the next 18 months, while the matter was under advisement, Petitioner did not seek amendment to reincorporate the 13 withdrawn claims or to add the claims litigated in the second PCR petition.
On January 12, 2006, the Court entered its order regarding the procedural status of Petitioner's habeas claims. (Doc. 97.) The Court dismissed some of the claims on procedural grounds or as plainly meritless, and established a deadline for Petitioner to submit briefing on the merits of the remaining claims. (Id.)
On the eve of the deadline for filing his merits brief, Petitioner's counsel instead moved to stay this action pursuant to Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013), contending that Petitioner was incapable of rationally communicating with or assisting habeas counsel. (Doc. 102.)
After two years of litigation regarding Petitioner's competency, the Court entered an order on April 23, 2008, denying Petitioner's motions for a competency hearing and a stay of these proceedings.2 (Doc. 187.) The Court determined that Petitioner's remaining claims were record-based or involved purely legal issues and therefore would not benefitfrom Petitioner's ability to communicate rationally with counsel. (Id.) Petitioner filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit, which issued a stay on June...
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