Gonzalez-Pina v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 11 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1603.,04-1603.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
• Parties: Ernesto GONZÁLEZ-PIÑA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. José Guillermo RODRÍGUEZ, Mayor of the City of Mayagüez; City of Mayagüez, Defendants, Appellees.

407 F.3d 425

Ernesto GONZÁLEZ-PIÑA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. José Guillermo RODRÍGUEZ, Mayor of the City of Mayagüez; City of Mayagüez, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 04-1603.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard November 12, 2004.

Decided May 11, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Israel Roldán-González, on brief, for appellant.

Juan Rafael González-Muñoz, with whom González-Muñoz Law Offices, Glorianna S. Hita-Valiente, Carlos E. López-López and Llovet Zurinaga & López, PSC, were on brief, for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges, and CARTER,^* Senior District Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Ernesto González-Piña ("González") brought suit against the Municipality of Mayagüez and its Mayor, José Guillermo Rodríguez, (collectively "Defendants"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state laws, as a result of political discrimination. González alleged that after his earlier suit against Defendants and his subsequent reinstatement, Defendants have consistently denied his reclassification to a higher position and have given him no meaningful duties. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that some of González's allegations were barred by collateral estoppel and that the remaining facts, if credited, were insufficient to support a prima facie case of political discrimination. The court also denied González's subsequent motion for reconsideration on the basis of new evidence. González appeals both decisions, and after careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

On September 22, 1997, the parties settled González's initial political discrimination suit in open court. The parties failed to file written stipulations of their settlement agreement; thus, the court entered judgment with reference to the terms stipulated in open court.

The settlement agreement obliged the municipality to pay González $61,200 in back pay, including benefits, and to appoint him to a new career position with a salary "for which he qualifies which will never be less than $1,400 monthly." In turn, González agreed to retire upon completion of thirty years of service, which he estimated to be within two years of the settlement date. The Municipality subsequently appointed González to a new position as Executive Officer I with a $1,500 monthly salary.

On February 5, 1998, González petitioned for Defendants to be held in contempt for failing to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. González alleged, in relevant part, that Defendants refused to appoint him to the position and salary for which he qualified: Executive Officer VII.

A magistrate judge denied González's motion for contempt on August 20, 1998. In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge found that Defendants had substantially complied with the terms of the settlement agreement by appointing González to Executive Officer I. González did not object to the Report and Recommendation, which the district court adopted on September 10, 1998. González-Piña v. Rodríguez, No. 95-1527 (D.P.R. Sept. 11, 1998) ("González-Piña I"). No appeals were taken from that judgment.

González filed the instant case on August 2, 2001, alleging § 1983, due process, and state law violations. In a nutshell, Defendants allegedly (1) failed to appoint him to a position and salary commensurate with his qualifications, and (2) harassed and deprived him of duties and responsibilities. These actions, González alleged, were done in retaliation for his support of the Mayor's opponent during the 1994 primaries.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on April 25, 2003. Shortly thereafter, on May 12 and May 15, Defendants announced two new witnesses. González filed a motion opposing summary judgment on May 16, and Defendants replied on May 22. The parties deposed the new witnesses on July 23, 2003, but neither party raised the evidence gleaned from these depositions during the pendency of the summary judgment motion.

On August 7, 2003, the district court issued an Opinion and Order granting summary judgment for Defendants. First, the court found that res judicata did not bar González's claims to the extent that they were based on new conduct occurring after his return to work. However, González's claims regarding Defendants' failure to employ him at a higher position — in alleged violation of the settlement agreement — were held barred by collateral estoppel. This issue had been fully and finally litigated in González-Piña I, which determined that the Executive Officer I position, which had a salary greater than $1,400 per month, complied with the settlement agreement. Moreover, the court found that equity weighed in favor of collateral estoppel's application, as González failed to object to the magistrate judge's finding and the district court's adoption of that finding.

Second, the court held that González's remaining claims — harassment and lack of work — were not supported by sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination in violation of the First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. In so holding, the court found, inter alia, that (1) González admitted that he did not request duties or appraise the Human Resources Director or the Mayor of his lack of duties, (2) González failed to specify who made comments to him that he was viewed as a problematic employee and was not to have access to his employment information, and (3) González failed to link the Mayor to any of the alleged discriminatory practices. Since González failed to provide sufficient evidence for the court to infer that political discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in his treatment, the court granted summary judgment for Defendants.

On August 18, 2003, González filed a motion to reconsider, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(2), based on new evidence from the July 23, 2003 deposition of defense witnesses. A deposition witness, who temporarily served as González's supervisor, apparently stated that González told her that he had no assignments and had nothing to do in the office. The witness also indicated, in a somewhat confused exchange with counsel, that González had not been assigned tasks between 1999 and 2000, but was assigned tasks in 2000. The court denied the motion to reconsider on March 31, 2004.

González appeals, arguing that the district court erred in (1) applying res judicata and collateral estoppel, (2) determining that he failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, and (3) denying his motion to reconsider based on new evidence. We address these issues in turn.

II. Analysis

A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

González first argues that the district court erred in applying res judicata and collateral estoppel in dismissing his political discrimination claims. We disagree.

Res judicata is an issue of law over which this court exercises plenary review. Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 233 (1st Cir.2003). Under this doctrine, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating claims that were raised or could have been raised in that action." Breneman v. United States ex rel. F.A.A., 381 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Specifically, res judicata applies when the following exist: "(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier proceeding, (2) sufficient identicality between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and (3) sufficient identicality between the parties in the two actions." Id. This doctrine, also known as claim preclusion, serves the purpose of "reliev[ing] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserv[ing] judicial resources, and ... encourag[ing] reliance on adjudication." Id. (quoting Allen v McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)).

Here, the district court allegedly erred in applying res judicata because the instant allegations of political discrimination involve subsequent conduct, and thus lack "sufficient identicality of causes of action" with the earlier suit. Specifically, González argues that Defendants' post-reinstatement harassment and failure to assign work constitute "[s]ubsequent conduct, [that,] even if it is of the same nature as the conduct complained of in a prior lawsuit, may give rise to an entirely separate cause of action." Kilgoar v. Colbert County Bd. of Educ., 578 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir.1978) (internal quotation omitted). On this point, we agree, and apparently so did the district court, which found that "González's claim of political discrimination is not precluded on new conduct occurring after his return to the Municipality." González-Piña v. Rodríguez, 278 F.Supp.2d 195, 201 (D.P.R.2003). González simply misunderstood the district court's holding on res judicata, which was correct as a matter of law. See, e.g., Walsh v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL CIO, Local 799, 630 F.2d 864, 873 (1st Cir.1980) (recognizing that res judicata did not bar "subsequent conduct [that] was broader and more farreaching than the conduct which led to the original complaint").

Neither do we find fault in the court's collateral estoppel analysis. Collateral estoppel, like res judicata, is an issue of law which we review de novo. Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir.1999). To establish collateral estoppel, the following factors must be met:

(1) an identity of issues (that is, that the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that which was involved in the prior proceeding), (2) actuality of litigation (that is, that the point was actually litigated in the earlier proceeding), (3) finality of the earlier resolution (that is, that the issue was determined by a valid and binding final judgment or order), and (4) the centrality of the adjudication (that is, that the determination of the...