Gonzalez v. Bowie
Decision Date | 06 November 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 3688.,3688. |
Parties | GONZALEZ et al. v. BOWIE et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
John J. Babe, of Washington, D.C. (A. Cecil Snyder, of San Juan, P.R., on the brief), for appellants.
E. T. Fiddler, of San Juan, P. R. (Daniel B. Leonard, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellees.
Before MAHONEY and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges, and HARTIGAN, District Judge.
This case is before us for a second time. The issues on this appeal will appear more clearly if the proceedings from the outset of this litigation are presented in chronological order.
The plaintiffs, trustees of an express trust, known collectively as Eastern Sugar Associates, brought suit in the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico, against three employees individually and as representatives of all of the employees engaged in transportation and milling operations as a class for a declaratory judgment that the defendant employees were exempt from the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. There can be no doubt that the status of the class of employees engaged in the transporting of the employers' sugar cane was in issue before the district court.
The district judge entered the following judgment:
It is clear that the district judge held that the employees engaged in transporting the employers' sugar cane were exempt from the provisions of the Act. The plaintiffs asked that all their employees be held exempt. The district judge held that the specific classes of employees mentioned in his judgment fell within the Act, the inference being that those not mentioned in his judgment were exempt from the Act. This is borne out by his conclusions of law and opinion. In his conclusions of law he says: . In his opinion he says: . Thus, the district judge held that the farmers engaged in transporting their own sugar cane are exempt from the Act because they are engaged in an agricultural operation, but once a delivery of the sugar cane to another party takes place, that is the end of the agricultural operation. The conclusion is, therefore, that the district judge held that those employees engaged in transporting the employers' sugar cane are exempt from the Act and those employees engaged in transporting the sugar cane of independent farmers are not exempt from the Act.
The plaintiff employers appealed from the original judgment of the district court. No appeal was taken by the defendant employees so that the judgment of the district court could not be changed by us either to enlarge the rights of the employees or lessen the rights of the employers under that judgment. Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U.S. 185, 57 S.Ct. 325, 81 L.Ed. 593;1 Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247, 250, 58 S.Ct. 159, 82 L.Ed. 231; Stepp v. McAdams, 9 Cir., 88 F.2d 925, 927. The question before us on the prior appeal was: Were the employees enumerated in the judgment of the district judge properly held to be entitled to the protection of the wage provisions of the Act? In the absence of a cross-appeal by the employees we were not free to consider whether those employees held to be beyond the protection of the Act were excluded properly. Consequently, the status of those employees engaged in the transportation of the employers' sugar cane was not before us.
On appeal, however, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, filed a brief as amicus curiae and requested us to affirm the judgment of the district court and to clarify that judgment in certain respects. The Administrator made the following requests:
We affirmed the judgment of the district court and granted the Administrator's request for clarification of it. 117 F. 2d 11. Although no objection to such clarification has ever been made by the employers, the propriety of granting the Administrator's requests might have been questioned in view of the absence of a cross-appeal by the employees. However, we felt our action in granting this request on the prior appeal was sound. We were not free to change the judgment so as to enlarge the rights of the employees or lessen the rights of the employers, but we were free to interpret the meaning of that judgment. Cf. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 140, 141, 60 S.Ct. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656. If we concluded that the judgment of the district court actually did include the groups of employees the Administrator wanted specifically mentioned, no violence would be done to the established rule with respect to the scope of appeal. That was simply a matter of form and not of substance. We granted the Administrator's request for we thought after examination of the opinion and judgment of the district judge that the employees whom the Administrator wanted specifically mentioned actually were within the scope of the language of the judgment.
The employees engaged in the transportation of molasses were clearly included by implication in the judgment, for the district judge held that those employees engaged in the transportation of raw sugar were within the Act. No argument could possibly be made for distinguishing employees engaged in the transportation of raw sugar and employees engaged in the transportation of molasses. Moreover, the employees engaged in the transportation of raw sugar in all probability comprised the same group which was engaged in the transportation of molasses.
With regard to those employees engaged in the transportation of sugar cane of independent farmers, the Administrator requested that paragraph 2(c) of the judgment:
"All employees engaged in transporting...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Waialua Agr. Co. v. Maneja
...for this case is the same as that of Calaf v. Gonzalez, 1 Cir., 127 F.2d 934; Bowie v. Gonzalez, 1 Cir., 117 F.2d 11; Gonzalez v. Bowie, 1 Cir., 123 F.2d 387, and the opinion of this Court in North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. National Labor Relations Board, 9 Cir., 109 F.2d 76. While i......
-
Figueroa v. Rivera
...rights thereunder. See Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191, 57 S.Ct. 325, 81 L.Ed. 593 (1937); Gonzalez v. Bowie, 123 F.2d 387, 389 (1st Cir.1941). Because the appellees did not prosecute a cross-appeal, the argument that they seek to advance is not properly before In......
-
United States v. Iriarte, 4285
...mandate and the opinion must be construed together in their entirety with particular reference to the issues considered. Gonzalez v. Bowie, 1 Cir., 123 F.2d 387, 391. We therefore turn to our former opinion in this In that opinion we did not in any way indicate or attempt to indicate the am......
-
Calaf v. Gonzalez
...only those engaged in planting, cultivating and harvesting of the sugar cane are exempt." It is true that we later said in Gonzales v. Bowie, 1 Cir., 123 F.2d 387, that the employees engaged in carrying sugar cane from their employers' farms to their employers' mills were not covered by our......