Gonzalez v. Bratton
| Decision Date | 13 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 96 Civ. 6330(VM).,No. 97 Civ. 2264(VM).,96 Civ. 6330(VM).,97 Civ. 2264(VM). |
| Citation | 147 F.Supp.2d 180 |
| Parties | Gloria E. GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. Police Commissioner William BRATTON, Police Commissioner Howard Safir, the New York City Police Department, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the City of New York, Joseph Powell, Anthony Kissik, Thomas Praskash, Marc Nell, Captain Witkowich, and Sergeant Burke, Defendants. Gloria E. Gonzalez, Plaintiff, v. Police Commissioner William Bratton, Police Commissioner Howard Safir, the New York City Police Department, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the City of New York, Patrolmens Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Jeffrey Mishula, Dr. Stanley Edelman, Mark Nell, Sergeant Burke, Captain Witkowich, Anthony Kissik, Thomas Praskash, and Captain Connolly, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
This case involves related actions brought by plaintiff Gloria Gonzalez ("Gonzalez") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws ("HRLs"). After a three week trial in late September and October 2000, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Gonzalez and against the City of New York on claims of retaliation and constructive discharge. The jury also found individual defendants Anthony Kissik ("Kissik") and Stanley Edelman ("Edelman") liable both for retaliation and constructive discharge under the HRLs and for common law intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, the jury found defendant Nicholas Witkowich ("Witkowich") liable for retaliation under the HRLs; unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; false imprisonment under state law; and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The jury awarded Gonzalez compensatory damages of $1,250,000.00 against the defendants collectively (the "City Defendants"). This amount comprised $200,000.00 for lost past earnings; $800,000.00 for lost future earnings; and $250,000.00 for emotional distress and related pain and suffering. Finally, the jury found that punitive damages, in amounts to be determined by the Court, were warranted against Witkowich, Kissik and Edelman.
City Defendants now move for alternative forms of relief: for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50, or a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; remittitur of damages; or a new trial on damages. For the reasons described below, the Court denies the motions. The Court also rules herein on the imposition of punitive damages against Kissik, Edelman and Witkowich and on Gonzalez's request for pretrial interest, attorney's fees and costs.
A judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. P. 50 may be granted only where the evidence produced at a trial demonstrates (1) such a complete absence of support for a verdict that a jury's factual findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture; or (2) such an overwhelming showing of facts favoring the movant that reasonable and fair-minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against that party. See Ryduchowski v. Port Auth., 203 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1276, 120 S.Ct. 2743, 147 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2000). In reviewing the motion, the Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury, but must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. See id.
The standard governing a motion for a new trial under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 59 involves more judicial discretion than does a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court may grant relief if it determines that the jury's verdict is seriously erroneous or against the weight of the evidence, such that its enforcement would constitute a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir.1998). Thus,
[u]nlike judgment as a matter of law, a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Moreover, a trial judge is free to weigh the evidence himself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. A court considering a Rule 59 motion for a new trial must bear in mind, however, that the court should only grant such a motion when the jury's verdict is "egregious." Accordingly, a court should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility.
DLC Mgt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted).
The background and material facts relevant to this case are set forth in the Court's earlier opinion granting in part and denying in part the motions for summary judgment brought by City Defendants in this matter. See Gonzalez v. Bratton, Nos. 96 Civ. 6330, 97 Civ. 2264, 2000 WL 1191558 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.22, 2000).1 For the purposes of the Rule 50 motion, the Court will review, in the light most favorable to Gonzalez as the party opposing the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the evidence placed by Gonzalez in the trial record.
Gonzalez's case was supported primarily by her testimony and that of Adam Alvarez ("Alvarez"), a former employee of the New York City Police Department's ("NYPD" or the "Department") Advocate's Office who had been given the charge of reviewing various disciplinary charges brought against Gonzalez that are at issue here. Kissik served as commander of the 50th Precinct where Gonzalez was assigned during times relevant to this case. According to Gonzalez's case theory and testimony --- as corroborated by Alvarez --- Kissik engaged in a purposeful campaign to oust Gonzalez from her employment at the NYPD. Gonzalez asserted that Kissik, motivated by a desire to remove Gonzalez from the NYPD, subjected her to particularly heavy-handed supervision. Kissik's purpose allegedly stemmed in part from a sexual harassment complaint Gonzalez had filed internally with the NYPD against John Powell ("Powell"),2 her former supervisor at the 45th Precinct, from which Gonzalez was transferred to the 50th Precinct.
Kissik allegedly ordered other officers working under him at the 50th Precinct to "ride her," which entailed vigilantly scrutinizing Gonzalez's actions and creating a disciplinary record against her by "writing her up" even for minor infractions of rules and perceived insubordination. See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 230-31; 1089; 1095-96. According to Gonzalez, not only did Kissik order other officers to give Gonzalez a hard time in general, but he also subjected her to continual and unusual shift changes and assignments and had her transferred in mid-1994 to the Bronx Court Section, a work location known to carry a stigma as being staffed by officers who had performance and disciplinary problems. Under Gonzalez's theory, as supported by Alvarez's testimony and related evidence, Kissik's actions towards her were not isolated, but formed part of a concerted effort by higher officials to rid the NYPD of troublesome officers, including Gonzalez, so marked on the Personnel Director's "hit list." See Tr. at 1097; 1100-01.
In August 1995, Sergeant Praskash, Gonzalez's immediate supervisor at the 50th Precinct, issued a disciplinary charge against Gonzalez allegedly acting pursuant to Kissik's orders to "ride her." The action claimed insubordination for an incident that commenced with Gonzalez expressing that she would not be able to perform an assignment that conflicted with another work-related court appointment. The resulting conflict with Praskash escalated to the point where Gonzalez was threatened with arrest if she did not turn over her gun and accept a suspension.
Although Kissik was not present when this incident occurred, Gonzalez indicated and the record supports a reasonable jury finding that the event was actually the culmination of the harassment campaign that Kissik had instituted the previous year in retaliation for Gonzalez's discrimination complaint against Powell, a campaign which had resumed immediately upon Gonzalez's return to the 50th Precinct from the Bronx Court Section in June 1995. In July 1995, Gonzalez filed a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the State Division of Human Rights alleging sexual discrimination based on the events she had experienced during her assignments at the 45th and 50th Precincts and the Bronx Court Section. This charge was amended and supplemented in September 1995.
According to Gonzalez's testimony, the treatment she suffered on account of Edelman, who was in charge of the NYPD's medical services, followed the same general pattern as Kissik's conduct towards her. In particular, Gonzalez claimed that Edelman also brought baseless disciplinary charges against her that caused her to be suspended without pay multiple times and created a misleading record to make her appear insubordinate. See Tr. at 298-337.
In the months between Gonzalez's filing of her EEOC complaint in July 1995 and her departure from the NYPD in April 1996, Edelman was responsible for several disciplinary charges against Gonzalez that resulted in repeated 30-day suspensions without pay based on allegations that Gonzalez contended were unmerited and retaliatory. These charges included failure to submit for a medical examination; failure to report for a medical appointment at a particular time Gonzalez stated was different from the time she previously had been told; and lying about her means of transportation to an appointment at the NYPD medical services facilities in Queens. See Tr. at 303; 321; 323-34.
Concerning Edelman's specific conduct, Gonzalez described several incidents where he ignored other doctors' reports regarding her medical condition; returned her to work when she felt...
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