Parrish v. Sollecito

• Decision Date: 03 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01 Civ. 5420.,01 Civ. 5420.
• Citation: 280 F.Supp.2d 145
• Parties: Donna PARRISH, Plaintiff, v. Louis SOLLECITO, Individually, James Gallagher, Individually, Mount Kisco Import Cars, Ltd. d/b/a Mount Kisco Honda, and Westchester Import Cars, Ltd, d/b/a/ Acura of Bedford Hills, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

280 F.Supp.2d 145

Donna PARRISH, Plaintiff, v. Louis SOLLECITO, Individually, James Gallagher, Individually, Mount Kisco Import Cars, Ltd. d/b/a Mount Kisco Honda, and Westchester Import Cars, Ltd, d/b/a/ Acura of Bedford Hills, Defendants.

No. 01 Civ. 5420.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 3, 2003.

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Jonathan Lovett, Lovett & Gould, White Plains, NY, for Donna Parrish.

Martin Gringer, P.C., Garden City, NY, for Louis Sollecito, Mt. Kisco Import Car, Mount Kisco Import Cars, Ltd., Westchester Import C. Westchester Import Cars Ltd.

Joshua Adam Marcus, Frankin & Gringer, P.C., Garden City, NY, for James Gallagher, Westchester Import C. Westchester Import Cars, Ltd.

DECISION AND ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Donna Parrish ("Parrish") brought this action alleging sexual discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law § 296.¹ Defendants comprise Parrish's former employers and supervisor, whose alleged misconduct gave rise to this action. On April 11, 2003, after a trial in this matter, the jury returned a verdict of liability against defendants Louis Sollecito ("Sollecito"), James Gallagher ("Gallagher") and Acura of Bedford Hills ("Acura") (collectively, "Defendants") on Parrish's retaliation claim, but found for Defendants, as well as for defendant Mount Kisco Honda ("Honda"), on Parrish's hostile work environment sexual harassment claim. The jury awarded Parrish $15,000 in compensatory damages for lost back-pay and $500,000 in punitive damages. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict on May 20, 2003.

By its Decision and Order, dated April 15, 2003, the Court denied Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), with regard to Parrish's retaliation claim and damages. An order was thereafter entered on April 22, 2003 ("April Order"), directing the parties to address the issue of whether the punitive damages awarded by the jury in this case are excessive under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and, in particular, the recent Supreme Court decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).

At the close of Parrish's case-in-chief, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), on various issues, including punitive damages, arguing that Parrish had not presented sufficient evidence to warrant a jury award of punitive damages. The Court reserved judgment on this issue, as well as on the other issues raised by Defendants for determination as a matter of law, and indicated that it would render its decision after the completion of the jury trial. In support of their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a), Defendants now submit a memorandum of law with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to satisfy the legal requirements for an award of punitive damages. Also with regard to punitive damages, Defendants move in the alternative for judgment as a matter of law precluding such an award pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). In the event that their motion for judgment as a matter of law with regard to punitive damages is denied, Defendants request, in the alternative, a new trial and/or remittitur of the punitive damages awarded pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Within this motion, Defendants address the April Order, and in opposition to Defendants' motion, Parrish also addresses the Court's April Order. Parrish applies for an award of attorney's fees and costs, to which Defendants object, in part, on various grounds.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial is DENIED, Defendants' motion for a reduction in punitive damages is GRANTED and Parrish's application for attorney's fees is GRANTED in part.

I. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for judgment as a matter of law at any time before the case has been submitted to the jury. See Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir.1999). A motion filed pursuant to Rule 50(a) may be granted if a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the non-moving party's claim or defense is absent from the record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a); Wimmer, 176 F.3d at 134; Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332, 340 (2d Cir.1993); Sanders v. The City of New York, 200 F.Supp.2d 404, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In assessing the merits of a Rule 50(a) motion, courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Wimmer, 176 F.3d at 134; Piesco, 12 F.3d at 340; Sanders, 200 F.Supp.2d at 406.

Similarly, judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Fed.R.Civ.P., should be entered only when "there is `such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or [where there is] such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [the movant].'" Logan v. Bennington College Corp., 72 F.3d 1017, 1021 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Concerned Area Residents for Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1994)). Moreover, in a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), a trial court "must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and grant that party every reasonable inference that the jury might have drawn in its favor." Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir.1993). A jury verdict is not to be set aside unless "the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable triers of fact could have reached." Id. at 14 (quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970)).

B. JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Defendants argue that Parrish has failed, as a matter of law, to satisfy the burden for demonstrating the requisite malice or reckless indifference necessary to support a punitive damages award in this case. Alternately, Defendants argue that they have established a good faith effort to enforce a discrimination policy, thereby legally barring an award of punitive damages. As Defendants first made this argument at the close of Parrish's case-in-chief, they request judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), or alternately pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(b).

Punitive damages are available under Title VII in cases in which "the employer has `engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.'" Zimmermann v. Assoc. First Cap. Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-530, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D)). In Kolstad, the Supreme Court held that the statutory terms "malice" and "reckless" in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a refer to an actor's state of mind. 527 U.S. at 535, 119 S.Ct. 2118. In other words, punitive damages are available to victims of employment discrimination when the employer knowingly violates federal law: "[A]n employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages." Id. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118.

The Supreme Court specifically noted that the cases in which punitive damages are available are only a subset of the cases in which unlawful discrimination can be found, reciting instances in which punitive damages could not be sustained: (1) where an employer is unaware of the federal prohibition; or (2) where an employer discriminates with the belief that its discrimination is lawful, i.e., where the discrimination claim is based on a novel theory of liability or the employer reasonably believes that its alleged discriminatory conduct fell within an exception to liability. Id. at 536-537, 119 S.Ct. 2118. Moreover, although egregious or outrageous conduct is evidence of the subjective intent to violate federal law, such conduct is not necessary for a finding of intentional discrimination warranting punitive damages. Id. at 538, 119 S.Ct. 2118.

Direct evidence that an employer acted with knowledge that the discrimination found by a jury violated federal law is not necessary to prove the requisite state of mind of the employer to justify an award of punitive damages. Rather, the Second Circuit has found that general training in equal opportunity protocol and hiring practices is sufficient to infer awareness of Title VII requirements. See Zimmermann, 251 F.3d at 385. Similarly, district courts in this Circuit have held that some familiarity with sexual harassment policies is sufficient to infer knowledge of the federal laws against discrimination. See Kuper v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 99 Civ. 1190, 2003 WL 359462, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.18, 2003) (testimony concerning knowledge that the ADA prohibited disability discrimination and receipt of ADA training were sufficient to justify jury award of punitive damages); Lamberson v. Six West Retail Acquisition, No. 98 Civ. 8053, 2002 WL 59424, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.16, 2002) (knowledge that it was discrimination to punish an employee for complaining of sexual harassment was sufficient to attribute requisite knowledge of Title VII to employer for purposes of allowing punitive damages); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Yellow Freight...