Gonzalez v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

• Citation: 981 F.Supp.2d 1219
• Decision Date: 31 October 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:12–cv–2549–T–23EAJ.
• Parties: Erasmo GONZALEZ and Maria Gonzalez, Plaintiffs, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

981 F.Supp.2d 1219

Erasmo GONZALEZ and Maria Gonzalez, Plaintiffs,

v.LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

Case No. 8:12–cv–2549–T–23EAJ.

United States District Court,

M.D. Florida,

Tampa Division.

Oct. 31, 2013.

Andrew Philip McDonald, Bob G. Freemon, David D. Barnhill, Gary Lee Miller, Ron A. Hobgood, Freemon & Miller, PA, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Jason M. Seitz, John Vincent Garaffa, Butler Pappas, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.

An error in a syllogism, otherwise a venerable tool of logic, can assume many forms. In some forms, the faulty syllogism offends the reader immediately, even before the reader identifies precisely the flaw in a premise, because the reader instantly recognizes the flaw in the conclusion. For example:

(1) Nothing is better than hot coffee on a cold morning.

(2) Lukewarm coffee is better than nothing on a cold morning. Therefore:

(3) Lukewarm coffee is better than hot coffee on a cold morning.

Why is this syllogism producing an obviously erroneous conclusion? Because the syllogism suffers from the “fallacy of equivocation,” by which a single term (“nothing” in this example), used in each premise, acquires from the different context in each premise a different meaning—and because a flawed premise yields a false conclusion. Although logical rigor in a syllogism demands that “nothing” mean the same thing in each premise in the syllogism, the first “nothing” means “no other coffee among all available coffee” or “no beverage among all morning beverages” or the like, but the second “nothing” means “having no coffee at all” or “having no morning beverage at all” or the like. The first contemplates all coffee, any other coffee; the second contemplates no coffee, the absence of coffee. Although this false syllogism appears superficially to permit a sound deduction about coffee, the conclusion is plainly erroneous. Important to remember is that in no sense is this flawed syllogism—this flawed premise and this flawed conclusion—“ambiguous.” Erroneous, certainly; confusing, perhaps; but ambiguous, never. On the contrary, the syllogism is unambiguously flawed, and the conclusion is unambiguously wrong.

This syllogism is similarly flawed:

(1) Every criminal action is illegal.

(2) A criminal trial is a criminal action.

Therefore:

(3) All criminal trials are illegal.

The conclusion is unambiguously wrong, also. Why? Because every criminal trial is a criminal action but not every criminal action is a criminal trial. Again, as always, using the same word or phrase (“criminal action”) in a different sense in each premisein a syllogism—succumbing to the fallacy of equivocation—results in an erroneous conclusion. “Criminal action” and “criminal trial” are not terms fully interchangeable without risk of a changed meaning and without risk of a flawed conclusion—without risk of an error. Not an ambiguity, but an error.

The dispute in this action turns ultimately on the validity of a syllogism:

(1) “Structural damage” means “any damage to the structure.”

(2) A building is a structure.

Therefore,

(3) “Structural damage” means “any damage to the building.”

An elaboration will follow, but note that every building is a structure but not every structure is a building. “Building” and “structure” are not terms fully interchangeable without risk of a changed meaning and without risk of a flawed conclusion—without risk of an error.

THE TEXTUAL CONTEXT

By cross-motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company dispute the extent of coverage under a clause in a property insurance contract that covers “structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity.” The plaintiffs insist that “structural damage to the building” means “any damage to the building,” a construction that depends on the truth of the proposition that all “building damage” is “structural damage.” Liberty Mutual counters that the modifier “structural” conveys a distinguishing meaning and, accordingly, meaningfully modifies the phrase “damage to the building” and that “structural damage to the building” means “damage to the structural integrity of the building.”

Both Section 627.706, Florida Statutes (2010), and the insurance policy, effective November 1, 2010, state:

Sinkhole Loss means structural damage to the building, including the foundation, caused by sinkhole activity. Contents coverage shall apply only if there is structural damage to the building caused by sinkhole activity.

Construing the words “structural damage,” several state circuit courts in central Florida (the venue for most sinkhole claims) have assessed the meaning of the term “structural damage” in isolation and not as part of the larger clause “structural damage to the building.” Specifically, each court has abruptly extracted the phrase “structural damage” from the governing context—“structural damage to the building”—and has considered the words “structural damage” in stark (and deceptive) isolation. Each court has assumed the phrase “structural damage” to mean “damage to the structure” and assumed further that, because a “building” is a “structure,” the phrase “damage to the structure” must mean “damage to the building,” including any minor or cosmetic damage to the building.¹ A representative example of equating “structural damage” and “building damage,” Bissell v. United Services Automobile Association, No. 51–2010–CA–008524 (Fla. 6th Cir.Ct. Apr. 20, 2011), held that “any damage to any part of [the] home, or other covered property, caused by the sinkhole constitutes ‘structural damage.’ This includes, but is not limited to, the floors, walls, windows, ceilings, stucco, roof, slab, etc.” Under Bissell and the other central Florida circuit court decisions, “structural damage to the building” means “any damage to the building.”

Also, several United States district courts have construed the words “structural damage.” ² Following the lead—at least, to a limited extent—of the state circuit courts, each federal court (so far) has examined the phrase “structural damage” withdrawn from the governing context—the clause “structural damage to the building.” Typical is the analysis of Ayres v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., No. 8:11–cv–0816–SCB–TGW, 2012 WL 1094321, *3 (M.D.Fla. Apr. 2, 2012), the first decision in the Middle District of Florida to expressly consider the issue and the decision adopted more or less perfunctorily (so far) by other district courts:

Plaintiffs argue that because “structural damage” is not defined within the insurance policy or within the sinkhole loss endorsement, the Court should define the phrase as “damage to the structure.” In support of this position, Plaintiffs cite several Florida state circuit court cases that have found that when “structural damage” was not defined within the insurance policy, the phrase must be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “damage to the structure.” See Austin v. USAA, 08–10190 (Fla. 13th Jud.Cir.Ct. Aug. 16, 2010); Cioffi v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., H–27–CA2010–1427 (Fla. 5th Jud.Cir.Ct. May 17, 2011); Bissell v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 51–2010–CA–008524 (Fla. 6th Jud. Cir. Ct. April 20, 2011); De La Fuente v. Homewise Preferred Ins. Co., 10–022488 (Fla. 13th Jud.Cir.Ct. May 23, 2011); Ramirez v. Homewise Preferred Ins. Co., 10–013685 (Fla. 13th Jud.Cir.Ct. Feb. 18, 2011); Jackson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 10–13586 (Fla. 13th Jud. Cir. Ct. June 5, 2011).

The basis for Defendant's opposition is unclear to this Court. If, as Defendant suggests, the phrase, “structural damage,” is clear and unambiguous, then Defendant should not have a problem with this Court recognizing the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase, as was recognized by other Florida courts. If Defendant does not agree that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase is “damage to the structure,” then Defendant is implicitly arguing that the phrase is ambiguous, because Plaintiffs' definition is a reasonable one. If the phrase is ambiguous, then the Court must resolve the ambiguity in favor of Plaintiffs.

...

[T]his Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the undefined phrase, “structural damage,” within the sinkhole loss endorsement means “damage to the structure.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs are granted summary judgment on this issue.

This interpretation of “structural damage” as “damage to the structure” merely restates the issue without resolving the issue, which is, “What is meant by ‘structure’ or ‘structural’ in the context of the pertinent statute and the applicable insurance contract—in the context of the phrase ‘structural damage to the building’?”

In the manner of Ayres, several of the federal decisions cite Bissell and the other central Florida circuit court decisions and reason that (1) because “structural damage” means “damage to the structure” and (2) because a “building” is a “structure,” therefore (3) “structural damage,” means “damage to the building.” By citing Bissell and the other central Florida circuit court decisions, the federal decisions appear to interpret “structural damage” to mean “any damage to the building.” The withdrawal of “structural damage” from the governing and defining context of “structural damage to the building” enables this misconstruction of both statute and contract.

If not otherwise defined, a common word carries the word's plain, ordinary, and obvious meaning. State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sestile, 821 So.2d 1244, 1245–46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). A common word—and “structure” or “structural” is a common word—often conveys many meanings, each meaning dependent on the context. Because a common word often conveys more than one “common” meaning, the context governs which common or plain meaning attaches to the word or phrase:

Many words have more than one ordinary meaning. The fact is that the more common the term (e.g., run ),...