State v. Burris
| Decision Date | 08 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. SC02-2193.,SC02-2193. |
| Citation | 875 So.2d 408 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Daniel BURRIS, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Petitioner.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent.
If an automobile is used in the course of committing a robbery, may the offender be deemed to have "carried" the automobile as a "firearm or other deadly weapon" under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001)? We have for review Burris v. State, 825 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), where the Fifth District Court of Appeal answered this question in the negative and certified conflict with Jackson v. State, 662 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Nation v. State, 668 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We approve the decision of the district court in Burris.
Daniel Burris drove by a woman who was walking in a Wal-Mart store parking lot. He reached out through the window of his pickup truck and grabbed her purse. The victim would not release the purse, and as Burris drove on, she was knocked off her feet and dragged along the pavement. After the strap broke, the victim lost her hold on the purse and Burris drove away with the purse, leaving the victim behind with cuts, scratches, and bruises. The State charged Burris with robbery with a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a). This section enhances the punishment for robbery from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony punishable by life where the offender, in the course of committing the robbery, "carried a firearm or other deadly weapon." Burris filed a motion to dismiss the charge because the information as filed alleged that Burris "used" rather than "carried" his truck as a deadly weapon. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Burris entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of robbery with a deadly weapon, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Fifth District held that an automobile could not be carried as a deadly weapon under the robbery statute. Burris, 825 So.2d at 1037. In the companion cases of Nation and Jackson, the First District Court of Appeal held that an automobile could be carried as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a) where the codefendants used the automobile to run down and incapacitate a pedestrian and then stole the victim's wallet. Nation, 668 So.2d at 285; Jackson, 662 So.2d at 1371.
The narrow issue before this Court is whether an automobile may be "carried" as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a) of the robbery statute so as to allow an enhanced conviction. This question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 n. 7 (Fla.2001). Our purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002). When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla.2002). Instead, the statute's plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. Id.
Section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2001), provides:
Id. (emphasis added). Under the express language of section 812.13(2)(a), the punishment for robbery is enhanced if the offender "carried a firearm or other deadly weapon" while committing the robbery. Thus, the critical question is whether or not an offender can "carry" an automobile while committing a robbery.
In Jackson and Nation, the First District confronted codefendants who made the same basic argument Burris made to the Fifth District. The appellants argued that because it is physically impossible for anyone to carry an automobile in the course of committing a robbery, the enhancement under section 812.13(2)(a) for carrying a "firearm or other deadly weapon" was inapplicable. In rejecting this argument, the First District read the verb "carry" as synonymous with "possess." It did so because it interpreted the legislative intent behind section 812.13(2)(a) as to deter the possession of deadly weapons by persons committing robberies. Specifically, the First District stated:
We agree with the trial court that the intended meaning of the word "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), must be sought by use of logic and common sense. The verb "carry" has many meanings. One of the principal meanings ascribed to it is "to wear, hold, or have around one," in the sense of possessing. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 319 (2d ed.1987) (unabridged). We are of the opinion that ascribing such a meaning to "carry," as used in section 812.13(2)(a), is perfectly consistent with the obvious intent behind the statutory provision. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981) (). It seems to us that the clear intent behind section 812.13(2)(a) is to deter the commission of robberies by persons possessing deadly weapons, and thereby to reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury to victims and bystanders. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 452 So.2d 927 (Fla.1984) ().
Jackson, 662 So.2d at 1371-72.
The First District also rejected the appellant's argument because it concluded that to rule otherwise would lead to "an absurd and unreasonable result." Id. at 1372. It did so by referencing cases where persons were convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon even though the weapon was never used, where the weapon was stolen in the course of the robbery, or where an accomplice carried a weapon notwithstanding lack of knowledge by the defendant that the accomplice had the weapon.
The Fifth District reached the opposite conclusion in Burris. It reasoned:
While there are, as Jackson observes, some definitions of the word "carry," that might encompass Burris's use of his automobile in this case, we are constrained by the rule of statutory construction that requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the Legislature. Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992). The word "carry" is ordinarily understood to mean "to hold or to have on one's person." See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 175 (10th ed.1993); American Heritage Dictionary 243 (2d ed.1982). There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the Legislature intended a more arcane or rarely used meaning of the word "carry." In common parlance, automobiles carry people—people do not carry automobiles. Using the ordinary meaning of the words in the statute, we conclude that Burris could not have carried the motor vehicle as required by the robbery statute.
Burris, 825 So.2d at 1037. Finding no sign of legislative intent to apply an unusual meaning of "carry" and also recognizing the legislatively prescribed rule of lenity in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the Fifth District concluded that Burris could not have carried the automobile as a deadly weapon under section 812.13(2)(a). The Fifth District did not expressly address whether its interpretation would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result.
We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth District. The word "carry" is not defined in the statute, nor is there any clear indication of legislative intent to construe "carry" differently from its commonly understood meaning. So, we must look to its common or "plain and ordinary" meaning. The relevant definitions (or senses), illustrations of uses, and synonyms used by English language dictionaries for "carry" all include the concept of holding, supporting, or bearing. In addition to the Merriam-Webster definition cited in Burris, the first definition and illustration of use for "carry" in the American Heritage Dictionary are "[t]o bear or convey from one place to another; transport: carry mail." American Heritage Dictionary 243 (2d ed.1982). And the first two definitions and illustrations of senses used in the dictionary cited by the First District in Jackson give this same sense. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 319 (2d ed.1987) (unabridged) defines "carry" as meaning:
See also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343 (1981) (unabridged). The concept of holding, supporting, or bearing is the fundamental sense of the verb "carry."
And, contrary to the First District's deduction, "possess" is not a synonym commonly ascribed to "carry" in the sense at issue. For example, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343 (1981) (unabridged) gives four synonyms of "carry" and provides an important description:
syn. BEAR, CONVEY, TRANSPORT, TRANSMIT: CARRY indicates moving to a location some...
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