Gonzalez v. Mathis

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Citation: 12 Cal.5th 29,493 P.3d 212,282 Cal.Rptr.3d 658
• Decision Date: 19 August 2021
• Docket Number: S247677
• Parties: Luis GONZALEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John R. MATHIS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

12 Cal.5th 29
493 P.3d 212
282 Cal.Rptr.3d 658

Luis GONZALEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
John R. MATHIS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S247677

Supreme Court of California.

August 19, 2021

Evan D. Marshall ; Law Offices of Wayne McClean, Wayne McClean, Woodland Hills; Panish Shea & Boyle, Brian J. Panish and Spencer R. Lucas, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Arbogast Law, David M. Arbogast ; The Bronson Firm and Steven M. Bronson, San Diego, for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Latham & Watkins, Marvin S. Putnam, Jessica Stebbins, Robert J. Ellison, Los Angeles, and Michael E. Bern for Defendants and Respondents.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for the Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

June Babiracki Barlow and Neil Kalin, Los Angeles, for California Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Newmeyer & Dillion, Alan H. Packer, Walnut Creek, and Jack R. Rubin for California Building Industry Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Edward L. Xanders, Los Angeles, and Eleanor S. Ruth for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

LeClairRyan and William A. Bogdan, San Francisco, for Associated General Contractors of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Horvitz & Levy, Stephen E. Norris, Burbank, and Joshua C. McDaniel for American Property Casualty Insurance Association and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

493 P.3d 215

282 Cal.Rptr.3d 661

12 Cal.5th 37

There is a strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety. (See generally Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721 ( Privette ); SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc . (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 601, 258 P.3d 737 ( SeaBright ).) This means that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries

12 Cal.5th 38

sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job. Commonly referred to as the Privette doctrine, the presumption originally stemmed from the following rationales: First, hirers usually have no right to control an independent contractor's work. ( Privette , at p. 693, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) Second, contractors can factor in "the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price." ( Ibid . ) Third, contractors are able to obtain workers’ compensation to cover any on-the-job injuries. ( Id. at pp. 698–700, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) Finally, contractors are typically hired for their expertise, which enables them to perform the contracted-for work safely and successfully. (See id. at p. 700, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721 ; Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, § 57, com. c, p. 402.)

We have nevertheless identified two limited circumstances in which the presumption is overcome. First, in Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081 ( Hooker ), we held that a hirer may be liable when it retains control over any part of the independent contractor's work and negligently exercises that retained control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the worker's injury. ( Id . at p. 202, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081.) Second, in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp . (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 495, 123 P.3d 931 ( Kinsman ), we held that a landowner who hires an independent contractor may be liable if the landowner knew, or should have known, of a concealed hazard on the property that the contractor did not know of and could not have reasonably discovered, and the landowner failed to warn the contractor of the hazard. ( Id. at p. 664, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 495, 123 P.3d 931.)

282 Cal.Rptr.3d 662

We granted review in this case to decide whether a landowner may also be liable for injuries to an independent contractor or its workers that result from a known hazard on the premises where there were no reasonable safety precautions it could have adopted to avoid or minimize the hazard. We conclude that permitting liability under such circumstances, thereby creating a broad third exception to the Privette doctrine, would be fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine. When a landowner hires an independent contractor to perform a task on the landowner's property, the landowner presumptively delegates to the contractor a duty to ensure the safety of its workers. This encompasses a duty to determine whether the work can be performed safely despite a known hazard on the worksite. As between a landowner and an independent contractor, the law assumes that the independent contractor is typically better positioned to determine whether and how open and obvious safety hazards on the worksite might be addressed in performing the work. Our case law makes clear that, where the hirer has effectively delegated its duties, there is no

493 P.3d 216

affirmative obligation on the hirer's part to independently assess workplace safety. Thus, unless a landowner retains control over any part of the contractor's work and negligently exercises that retained control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the injury ( Hooker , supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 202, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081 ), it will not be liable to an

12 Cal.5th 39

independent contractor or its workers for an injury resulting from a known hazard on the premises. Because the Court of Appeal held otherwise, we reverse the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

This case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment. We therefore "take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] ‘ "We review the trial court's decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained." ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. [Citation.]" ( Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123.)

Defendant John R. Mathis lives in a one-story house with a flat, sand-and-gravel roof. The roof contains a large skylight covering an indoor pool. Plaintiff Luis Gonzalez is a professional window washer who first started cleaning Mathis's skylight in the 1990s as an employee of Beverly Hills Window Cleaning. In the mid-2000s, Gonzalez started his own professional window washing company. Gonzalez advertised his business as specializing in hard to reach windows and skylights. His marketing materials stated that he "trains his employees to take extra care ... with their own safety when cleaning windows."

In or around 2007, Mathis began regularly hiring Gonzalez's company to clean the skylight. Gonzalez would climb a ladder affixed to the house to access the roof. Directly to the right of the top of the ladder, a three-foot-high parapet wall runs parallel to the skylight. Mathis constructed the parapet wall for the aesthetic purpose of obscuring air conditioning ducts and pipes from view. The path between the edge of the roof and the parapet wall is approximately 20 inches wide. Gonzalez would walk between the parapet wall and the edge of the roof and use a long, water-fed pole to clean the skylight. Gonzalez testified that he did not walk on the other side of the parapet wall — i.e., between the parapet wall and the skylight — because

282 Cal.Rptr.3d 663

air conditioning ducts, pipes, and other permanent fixtures made the space too tight for him to navigate.

On August 1, 2012, at the direction of Mathis's housekeeper, Gonzalez went up on to the roof to tell his employees to use less water while cleaning the skylight because water was leaking into the house. While Gonzalez was walking between the parapet wall and the edge of the roof on his way back to the ladder, he slipped and fell to the ground, sustaining serious injuries. Gonzalez did not have workers’ compensation insurance.

12 Cal.5th 40

Gonzalez contends that his accident was caused by the following dangerous conditions on Mathis's roof: (1) Mathis's lack of maintenance caused the roof to have a very slippery surface made up of "loose rocks, pebbles, and sand"; (2) the roof contained no tie-off points from which to attach a safety harness; (3) the roof's edge did not contain a guardrail or safety wall; and (4) the path between the...