Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 4-89-0191,4-89-0191
• Citation: 194 Ill.App.3d 819,551 N.E.2d 793,141 Ill.Dec. 606
• Parties: , 141 Ill.Dec. 606 Jose Isabel GONZALEZ, A., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRESTRESS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 793

551 N.E.2d 793

194 Ill.App.3d 819, 141 Ill.Dec. 606

Jose Isabel GONZALEZ, A., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRESTRESS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-89-0191.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Feb. 28, 1990.

Emmanuel F. Guyon, Streator, for plaintiff-appellant.

Julie Badel and Nancy Ginsberg Ross, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

Justice McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes to us on appeal from the circuit court of Livingston County. The plaintiff brought a retaliatory discharge action against his former employer, the defendant. The jury found the plaintiff was discharged for dishonesty related to a fraudulent workers' compensation claim. The plaintiff appeals, alleging the jury's verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence administrative and court decisions in the workers' compensation case, the court erred in instructing the jury, the court abused its discretion in not allowing jurors to question witnesses, and the court erred in requiring plaintiff to proceed first in questioning each panel of prospective jurors.

The plaintiff, Jose Gonzalez, was employed by the defendant Prestress Engineering Corporation in 1977 as a general laborer. On Sunday, June 7, 1981, a softball team composed of defendant's employees played a game against a church team. The plaintiff played second base and in the middle of an inning a ball was hit to him. The plaintiff's crew leader Bruce Fortner testified the ball bounced off the plaintiff's hand, he yelled something in Spanish, and his face reflected an expression of pain. The plaintiff walked off the field and did not play anymore that day. Fortner testified it was unusual for a player to walk off the field in the middle of an inning as the plaintiff did.

On Monday, June 8, 1981, the plaintiff was working on a setup crew at the defendant's place of business. He was using a portable hydraulic jack called a port-a-power to align one side of a steel form into which concrete would be poured. Between six and eight o'clock in the morning he reported to Fortner that he hurt his right little finger on the port-a-power. Fortner testified that he was working approximately 200 feet away from the plaintiff at the other end of the form. Fortner stated that he did not hear the plaintiff cry out.

Fortner accompanied the plaintiff to the office of the plant superintendent Dale Lanning. Lanning made arrangements for the plaintiff to be taken to the hospital for medical treatment and filled out an accident report, Illinois Industrial Commission form 45. The defendant initiated payment of temporary disability benefits to the plaintiff and also began paying his medical bills in accordance with the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) Sometime after the plaintiff reported his injury, Fortner informed Lanning the plaintiff had injured his finger at a softball game the day before he reported the injury at work. After consulting with the attorney who represented the company in workers' compensation cases, the defendant stopped all payments to the plaintiff. The last payment for medical benefits was made on August 27, 1981.

On August 3, 1981, the plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim with the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission) for the injury, which he claimed took place on June 8, 1981. The Commission's arbitrator heard the claim in August 1982 and found that the plaintiff's injury was not sustained in the course of his employment.

After receiving the decision, Lanning and Harding discussed the matter and decided to terminate the plaintiff's employment because he falsely reported the injury as work-related. Lanning gave the plaintiff a letter of termination on September 20, 1982.

The Commission affirmed the decision of the arbitrator. The Commission's decision was affirmed by the circuit court of La Salle County in an order filed on December 17, 1985, in case No. 85-MR-13. This was in turn affirmed by the Industrial Commission Division of the appellate court in a Rule 23 order dated August 13, 1986, in Gonzalez v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 1169, 110 Ill.Dec. 447, 511 N.E.2d 282 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

On October 4, 1982, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Livingston County, case No. 82-L-37, alleging the tort of retaliatory discharge. The circuit court ordered the case dismissed on March 21, 1983. A notice of appeal to this court was filed on April 19, 1983. This court affirmed the trial court's dismissal in a Rule 23 order, Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1983), 118 Ill.App.3d 1167, 83 Ill.Dec. 537, 470 N.E.2d 663 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court's decision in turn was appealed to the supreme court which overturned the decision in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. (1984), 105 Ill.2d 143, 85 Ill.Dec. 475, 473 N.E.2d 1280.

After receiving the mandate of the supreme court, a jury trial was commenced on September 20, 1988, in Livingston County in this cause for retaliatory discharge. The jury's decision for the defendant was filed on September 22, 1988. On March 3, 1989, the trial court denied the last of the plaintiff's post-trial motions. A notice of appeal was filed on March 7, 1989.

The plaintiff first argues the decision of the jury in this case is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if it is wholly unwarranted by the evidence or clearly the result of passion or prejudice. (Lebrecht v. Tuli (1985), 130 Ill.App.3d 457, 85 Ill.Dec. 517, 473 N.E.2d 1322.) In order to prove a retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he was an employee before the injury; (2) he exercised a right granted by the Act; and (3) he was discharged and the discharge was causally related to filing a claim under the Act. Lewis v. Zachary Confections Co. (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 311, 106 Ill.Dec. 296, 505 N.E.2d 1087.

On appeal, the plaintiff continues to maintain that he did nothing which would justify his discharge by the defendant. The Commission found the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were not related to his work. It is the position of the defendant that plaintiff was discharged for his dishonesty in filing a claim which he knew to be false, rather than for filing the claim itself.

The plaintiff contends that an adverse finding by the Commission should not become an opportunity for an employer to terminate an employee who files a claim, nor should such a finding be equated automatically with dishonesty. He argues that by upholding the circuit court we would encourage employers to take retaliatory action against any employee who files an unsuccessful claim with the Commission. Although an employer may discharge an employee for any reason or no reason, an employer cannot discharge an employee in violation of public policy. Pethan v. Peavey Co. (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 126, 135 Ill.Dec. 660, 544 N.E.2d 17.

"An employer in this State, who does not come within the classes enumerated by Section 3 of this Act, may elect to provide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sustained by any employee, arising out of and in the course of the employment according to the provisions of this Act * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 138.2.

The public policy of this State as set out in section 2 of the Act is to provide compensation for accidents which are in some way related to the employee's work. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 138.2.) We recognize there may be cases where the injured worker may not be able to establish or may not definitely know himself that his injury is work-related. That is not the case we are presented with here. Public policy demands the protection of workers who file legitimate claims which arise from work-related accidents. It cannot be held to protect those who file false claims. It must be kept in mind the plaintiff had his day in court, the jury returned a verdict for defendant, and judgment was entered thereon.

The evidence showed the circumstances were such that the jury could find that plaintiff could not have been mistaken about when or how he was injured. The second element of wrongful discharge requires the plaintiff show the causal relationship between the employee's activities and the discharge. The causality element will not exist where the basis for the discharge is valid and nonpretextual. (Pethan v. Peavey Co. (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 126, 135 Ill.Dec. 660, 544 N.E.2d 17.) Here the plaintiff tried to show the defendant's charge of dishonesty against him was merely pretextual by attempting to show an ongoing pattern of discharging employees who filed workers' compensation claims. Although the plaintiff was able to show that many of the workers who filed such claims were no longer employed by the defendant, he failed to show a connection between the filings and the termination of employment. Defendant was able to show that those workers no longer employed were mostly immigrant workers who had failed to respond to recall notices sent after regular seasonal layoffs. The jury could find the plaintiff failed to overcome the defendant's showing of a valid nonpretextual reason for his dismissal.

The plaintiff seems to suggest that because the defendant here initially treated the plaintiff's claim as bona fide, this constitutes an admission the claim was legitimate or somehow estops the defendant from later denying the claim. The fundamental purpose of the Act is to afford protection to employees by providing them with prompt and equitable compensation for their injuries. (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d...