Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-0470., No. 03-0469
• Citation: 159 S.W.3d 615
• Parties: Jannete GONZALEZ, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Petitioner, v. RELIANT ENERGY, INC., Respondent, and Jannete Gonzalez, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Petitioner, v. Reliant Energy, Inc., Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

159 S.W.3d 615

Jannete GONZALEZ, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Petitioner, v. RELIANT ENERGY, INC., Respondent, and Jannete Gonzalez, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Petitioner, v. Reliant Energy, Inc., Respondent.

Nos. 03-0469, 03-0470.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 19, 2003.

Decided March 11, 2005.

Pamela Stanton Baron, Austin, Anthony F. Constant, Miguel Jose Chapa, Constant & Vela, Corpus Christi, Thomas C. Wright, Wright Brown & Close, LLP, Houston, for petitioner.

Macey Reasoner Stokes, David Michael Rodi, John Anaipakos, Stephen G. Tipps, Susanna Dokupil, Baker & Botts, L.L.P., Houston, for respondent.

Ben Taylor, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Dallas, for Zachry Construction Corporation and H.B. Zachry Company, Docket No. 03-0469.

Justice OWEN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Two interlocutory appeals in the same underlying case present the issue of whether section 15.007 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code places venue limitations on a statutory probate court's discretionary authority, pursuant to section 5B of the Texas Probate Code, to transfer to itself a wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage case in which a personal representative of an estate pending in that court is a party. The court of appeals held that under section 15.007, a statutory probate court cannot effectuate such a transfer unless venue in the county in which the probate court is located would be proper under section 15.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.¹ We affirm.

I

Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., lived with his wife Jannete and their children in Hidalgo County. Guadalupe Gonzalez was killed in an accident while working at a Reliant Energy power plant in Fort Bend County, near Houston. Jannete Gonzalez initiated an estate administration proceeding in statutory probate court in Hidalgo County and was appointed dependent administrator of her husband's estate. While the administration of the estate was pending, Gonzalez filed a wrongful death and survival action against Reliant in the Hidalgo County statutory probate court. Reliant moved to transfer venue of the wrongful death and survival case to a district court in Harris County, where its principal place of business is located.² The probate court denied the motion.

Meanwhile, Gonzalez filed an identical wrongful death and survival action in a Harris County district court and ten days later filed a motion in the Hidalgo County probate court asking that court to transfer the Harris County suit to Hidalgo County and consolidate the two actions, citing former section 5B of the Texas Probate Code. The version of section 5B that was in effect prior to the 2003 amendments³ applies to this suit,⁴ and it provided:

A judge of a statutory probate court, on the motion of a party to the action or on the motion of a person interested in an estate, may transfer to his court from a district, county, or statutory court a cause of action appertaining to or incident to an estate pending in the statutory probate court or a cause of action in which a personal representative of an estate pending in the statutory probate court is a party and may consolidate the transferred cause of action with the other proceedings in the statutory probate court relating to that estate.⁵

Back in Harris County, Reliant answered in the Harris County suit and applied for an anti-suit injunction, requesting that Gonzalez be enjoined from pursuing the wrongful death and survival action in Hidalgo County. Reliant argued that section 15.007 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code rendered venue of that suit improper in Hidalgo County and that the Harris County court had dominant jurisdiction over Gonzalez's wrongful death and survival claims even though they were first filed and remained pending in Hidalgo County. Section 15.007 provides:

Notwithstanding Sections 15.004, 15.005, and 15.031, to the extent that venue under this chapter for a suit by or against an executor, administrator, or guardian as such, for personal injury, death, or property damage conflicts with venue provisions under the Texas Probate Code, this chapter controls.⁶

Gonzalez countered by filing an amended motion to transfer in Hidalgo County, informing the probate court of the impending anti-suit injunction hearing in Harris County. The Hidalgo County probate court then advanced its hearing on the motion to transfer to itself the Harris County suit so that its hearing would occur before the Harris County anti-suit injunction hearing. Reliant responded by moving for and obtaining a temporary restraining order in the Harris County court requiring Gonzalez to contact the Hidalgo County court and reschedule the hearing on the motion to transfer for a date after the anti-suit injunction hearing.

In accordance with the Harris County district court's temporary restraining order, Gonzalez filed a request in the Hidalgo County probate court to reschedule the transfer hearing. The probate court denied that request, as well as Reliant's motion for a continuance, proceeded with its hearing, and granted Gonzalez's motion to transfer her suit out of the Harris County district court and into the Hidalgo County probate court. The Hidalgo County probate court also denied Reliant's motion to abate.

Subsequently, the hearing on Reliant's application for an anti-suit injunction went forward in the Harris County district court, and that court refused to grant injunctive relief. Reliant then initiated proceedings in two courts of appeals. It sought a writ of mandamus from the Thirteenth District Court of Appeals directing the Hidalgo County court to vacate its transfer order, and that request for relief was denied. Reliant also perfected an interlocutory appeal⁷ in the First District Court of Appeals from the Harris County district court's denial of temporary injunctive relief. One business day before the Hidalgo County wrongful death and survival case was set for trial, a divided court of appeals sitting en banc, held that the Harris County district court had abused its discretion in denying Reliant's request for an anti-suit injunction. The court of appeals remanded the case to the Harris County district court with instructions to enter a temporary injunction. In accordance with the court of appeals' directive, the Harris County district court enjoined Gonzalez "from engaging in proceedings with respect to the wrongful death suit" pending in the Hidalgo County probate court. Gonzalez filed a motion for rehearing of the court of appeals' decision and a separate interlocutory appeal of the district court's injunction.

The court of appeals, again sitting en banc and again divided, considered Gonzalez's motion for rehearing and her interlocutory appeal at the same time, though it denied her motion to consolidate.⁸ The court of appeals denied Gonzalez's motion for rehearing of its decision in Reliant's appeal from the denial of injunctive relief, withdrew that opinion, and dismissed the first (Reliant's) appeal.⁹ In the same opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting Reliant's application for an anti-suit injunction, which had been issued in compliance with the court of appeals' directive in the first interlocutory appeal.¹⁰ The court of appeals concluded that section 5A of the Probate Code gives the Hidalgo County statutory probate court concurrent jurisdiction with the Harris County district court over the wrongful death and survival suit at hand,¹¹ but held that section 5A does not "dispense with the requirement that proper venue must lie for a statutory probate court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction."¹² Similarly, the court of appeals held that section 5B of the Probate Code, which gives a statutory probate court discretionary authority to transfer to itself a cause of action in which a personal representative of an estate pending in that court is a party,¹³ does not dispense with the requirement that venue of the wrongful death and survival action must be proper in the probate court.¹⁴ The court rejected Gonzalez's argument that the Hidalgo County probate court had dominant jurisdiction over the case, holding "it is axiomatic that a court cannot have `dominant jurisdiction' if it does not have proper venue."¹⁵

Finally, the court of appeals concluded that venue was improper in Hidalgo County due to section 15.007 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states that "to the extent venue under this chapter for a suit by or against an executor, administrator, or guardian as such, for personal injury, death, or property damage conflicts with venue provisions under the Texas Probate Code, this chapter controls."¹⁶

Gonzalez filed two petitions for review in this Court. We have jurisdiction over these interlocutory appeals¹⁷ because there were dissents in the court of appeals and because the court of appeals' opinion expressly declined to follow and conflicts with the holding in In re Houston Northwest Partners, Ltd.¹⁸ We granted Gonzalez's petitions and the petition in Houston Northwest Partners and consolidated the cases for oral argument. The Houston Northwest Partners controversy has since settled.

We note that we also have had pending before us in a separate proceeding Reliant's petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Hidalgo County probate court to withdraw its transfer order. We conditionally grant that request for mandamus relief today in a separate opinion.¹⁹

II

It is undisputed that Gonzalez's estate administration proceeding was properly brought in the Hidalgo County statutory probate court. That court has jurisdiction over the proceeding pursuant to section 5 of the Texas Probate Code,²⁰ and venue is proper under section 6 of the Probate Code, which governs venue for the probate of wills and administration of estates.²¹ Gonzalez's husband was domiciled in Hidalgo...