Gonzalez v. State, 20180188
Decision Date | 21 February 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 20180188,20180188 |
Parties | Garron GONZALEZ, Petitioner and Appellant v. STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant.
Julie A. Lawyer, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellee.
[¶1] Garron Gonzalez appeals from an order summarily denying his application for post-conviction relief and an order denying his motion for reconsideration and to conduct discovery. Gonzalez argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his application for post-conviction relief, his motion for reconsideration and his motion for leave to conduct discovery. We reverse and remand, concluding the court erred by summarily denying his application sua sponte and the error was not rectified by the district court’s order on reconsideration.
[¶2] In 2004, Garron Gonzalez pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced. On February 27, 2018, after six prior applications for post-conviction relief, Gonzalez, acting pro se , filed his seventh application for post-conviction relief alleging the existence of newly discovered evidence. In his application, Gonzalez claimed newly discovered DNA analysis results were available at the time of the preliminary hearing on the gross sexual imposition charge even though the detective testifying said he had not received the results. Gonzalez also claimed the State withheld a related police report of gross sexual imposition filed by the sister of one of the State’s witnesses. Finally, Gonzalez claims the State withheld the results of the physical examination of the victim in the case, the results of which he claims would not have supported the accusations. Gonzalez argues that had he known about these three pieces of evidence, he would have elected to proceed to trial instead of pleading guilty. He attached no supporting affidavits or documentation to supplement his most recent application.
[¶3] On February 28, 2018, the State answered, raising the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, laches, misuse of process, and res judicata. Arguing misuse of process, the State noted Gonzalez’s application was barred because he failed to raise the claims in any of his six prior applications for post-conviction relief. The State did not move for summary disposition.
[¶4] On March 13, 2018, without a response from Gonzalez, the district court sua sponte summarily denied his application, finding his seventh application for post-conviction relief was barred as a misuse of process under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2).
[¶5] In its order denying Gonzalez’s application, the district court noted:
[¶6] Gonzalez applied for court-appointed counsel after the State’s answer, but was not appointed an attorney until March 26, 2018. After Gonzalez was appointed an attorney, he moved the district court to reconsider the denial of his application for post-conviction relief, arguing the results of the DNA analysis would have been material to the probable cause determination at the preliminary hearing and to his decision to change his plea. Gonzalez attached a facsimile of the allegedly withheld DNA analysis results and a portion of the transcript from the preliminary hearing as exhibits to his motion to reconsider. He requested the court hold a hearing on the application to address its merits. He also moved the court for leave to conduct discovery.
[¶7] The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, noting the motion was untimely, but basing its ruling on the substance of the motion, holding the allegedly newly discovered evidence would not have been material to the finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing. The court did not address whether the DNA analysis would have been material to Gonzalez’s decision to plead guilty. The court did not reach the remaining issues because the motion to reconsider was denied.
[¶8] Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature; thus, all rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings apply here. Johnson v. State , 2005 ND 188, ¶ 6, 705 N.W.2d 830 ; Ourada v. State , 2019 ND 10, ¶ 3, 921 N.W.2d 677. "An applicant has the burden of establishing grounds for post-conviction relief." Comes v. State , 2018 ND 54, ¶ 6, 907 N.W.2d 393 (quoting Chisholm v. State , 2014 ND 125, ¶ 8, 848 N.W.2d 703 ). That burden, however, has its limits: "A petitioner is not required to include, with an application for post-conviction relief, supporting evidentiary materials necessary to withstand a potential motion for summary dismissal." Overlie v. State , 2011 ND 191, ¶ 7, 804 N.W.2d 50 (citing N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-04 ; State v. Bender , 1998 ND 72, ¶ 19, 576 N.W.2d 210 ).
[¶9] "Chapter 29-32.1, N.D.C.C., governs postconviction relief proceedings and provides the district court the specific authority to dismiss sua sponte frivolous postconviction relief applications." State v. Holkesvig , 2015 ND 105, ¶ 9, 862 N.W.2d 531. The district court, "on its own motion , may enter a judgment denying a meritless application on any and all issues raised in the application before any response by the state." N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(1) (emphasis added). The court may also summarily deny a successive application for similar relief on behalf of the same applicant, or if the issues raised in the application have previously been decided by the appellate court in the same case. See Chisholm , 2014 ND 125, ¶¶ 8-12, 848 N.W.2d 703 ( ). Subsections (2) and (3) of N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09, provide additional grounds for summary disposition not relevant here.
[¶10] We have previously explained the relationship between summary dismissal in post-conviction relief settings and N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b) and N.D.R.Civ.P. 56 as follows:
Chase v. State , 2017 ND 192, ¶¶ 6-7, 899 N.W.2d 280 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Chisholm , 2014 ND 125, ¶ 16, 848 N.W.2d 703 ().
A
[¶11] On appeal, Gonzalez argues the district court erred by summarily denying his application for post-conviction relief. He claims the court denied his application prematurely because he had not yet received court-appointed counsel and also because there remained genuine issues of material fact concerning the allegedly newly discovered evidence. Gonzalez claims his application raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the date the newly discovered evidence was actually discovered, whether his failure to learn about the evidence at the time of trial was due to his own lack of diligence, whether the evidence is material to trial issues, and whether the weight and quality of the newly discovered evidence is dispositive. While we do not address each of Gonzalez’s contentions, we agree the court erred in sua sponte summarily denying his application because it did not allow Gonzalez notice and the opportunity to file an answer brief with supporting materials to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The court summarily denied Gonzalez’s application without a hearing for misuse of process, because he failed to raise his issue in prior petitions, relying on N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2). Section 29-32.1-12(2), N.D.C.C., provides:
[¶12] Although the order does not specify under what authority the court summarily denied the application, we conclude it must fall under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(1) since subsections (2) and (3) are irrelevant as neither party moved for dismissal (and nothing indicates the court mistakenly believed either actually did) and the application does not allege ineffective...
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