Gonzalez v. Texas Employers Insurance Association

• Decision Date: 11 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 18313,18313
• Citation: 509 S.W.2d 423
• Parties: Eva Flores GONZALEZ, as next friend of Rosa Gonzalez, a minor, Appellant, v. TEXAS EMPLOYERS INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 423

509 S.W.2d 423

Eva Flores GONZALEZ, as next friend of Rosa Gonzalez, a minor, Appellant, v. TEXAS EMPLOYERS INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Appellee.

No. 18313.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Dallas.

April 11, 1974.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1974.

Edwin J. Lamberty, Jr., Patterson & Lamberty, Inc., Dallas, for appellant.

Edward E. Crowell, Jr., Gardere, Porter & DeHay, Dallas, for appellee.

GUITTARD, Justice.

Our questions are (1) whether an interpleading stakeholder, who admits liability and offers to pay money into court but does not actually do so, is protected against further liability by payment of the money to one of the claimants under a judgment which has since been reversed, and (2) whether a recognized illegitimate child is entitled to the death benefits provided for a child of a deceased employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act by virtue of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that the stakeholder's liability is not discharged by such payment and that a recognized illegitimate child is entitled to the same benefits as any other child. Accordingly, we reverse a summary judgment for the defendant stakeholder and remand with instructions to grant the motion for summary judgment presented on behalf of the alleged illegitimate child.

The present appeal is a sequel to our decision in Flores Gonzalez v. Viuda de Gonzalez, 466 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which was a suit for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The claimants in that suit were the mother of the deceased employee, his alleged common-law wife, and his daughter by the alleged common-law wife, all of whom made claim against Texas Employers Insurance Association. The Association filed a counterclaim and interpleader against all the claimants, alleging that it was willing to pay full death benefits but could not determine to which of the conflicting claimants benefits should be paid without subjecting itself to multiple recoveries. It alleged that the full amount payable was tendered into court and prayed that the court make a proper determination and direct the disposition of the funds, but it did not actually pay the money to the clerk.

On September 9, 1970, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment of the deceased employee's mother and rendered judgment in her favor against the Association for the full amount of benefits on the ground that as a matter of law no common-law marriage existed and the employee's daughter was illegitimate. The alleged common-law wife perfected an appeal on behalf of herself and her daughter, but filed no supersedeas bond. On October 29, 1970, the Association paid the full amount of the judgment to the employee's mother and obtained a release from her. The alleged common-law wife proceeded with the appeal and this court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the ground that a fact issue existed with respect to common-law marriage .

After the case was returned to the trial court the employee's mother, who had received the money, nonsuited her claim. The alleged common-law widow also nonsuited her individual claim and disclaimed any right to the benefits on her own behalf, but she continued to prosecute the suit as next friend for her daughter, on whose behalf she claimed the entire benefits as the only statutory beneficiary. The Association then filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that payment of the benefits under the former judgment discharged it as a matter of law from any further liability. The trial court granted this motion and rendered judgment that the next friend take nothing on behalf of her daughter . She appeals, contending in her single point of error that the trial court erred because the daughter was entitled to the benefits as a matter of law.

The Association seeks to uphold the summary judgment in its favor on the theory that in absence of any objection to its pleading admitting liability and offering to pay the money into court, that pleading was equivalent to actual payment of the money and its later payment in compliance with the judgment effected a full discharge of its liability. In support of the contention that the offer is equivalent to payment, the Association cites Williams v. Wright, 20 Tex. 500, 503 (1857), which we do not consider controlling. The question there was whether interpleader relief could be granted to a defendant who had not actually brought the money into court, and the supreme court held that this matter could not be raised by motion to strike the answer or by a general demurrer which did not specify the particular objection. The opinion cannot properly be interpreted to hold that in the absence of such an objection the offer afforded the interpleading party all the protection he would have had by actual payment. The opinion is consistent with the view that in absence of objection the action may proceed, but that no discharge of liability occurs until the money is actually paid.

Likewise, in Royal Neighbors of America v. Fletcher, 230 S.W. 476 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1921, no writ), the interpleading defendant, who admitted liability and offered to pay the money into court, was held to have 'placed itself in the attitude of a mere stakeholder,' and thus to have no standing to appeal, but no question was presented concerning discharge of its liability.

The Association points out that it was in the position of a stakeholder with no right to appeal and no right to supersede the judgment by giving a bond under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 364(a), but that the appellant on the former appeal did have the right to supersede, as held in Burch v. Johnson, 445 S.W.2d 631 (Tex .Civ.App.--El Paso 1969, no writ) and Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 78 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1935, no writ). Consequently, the Association argues, the duty rested on the appellant as next friend for the minor claimant rather than on the Association to protect the fund pending appeal by a supersedeas bond, and that in view of her failure to do so the minor cannot now complain if payment of the money in accordance with the judgment leaves her only a claim against the party who received the money. This argument might be persuasive if the Association had paid the money into court to abide the result of the litigation and the clerk had paid it out under the court's order, as was the case in Zachary v. Overton, 157 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.). It does not reach the question of whether the liability of the interpleading party is discharged without payment into court. In Zachary, and all the other cases cited by the Association in which the stakeholder's liability was held to be discharged, the stakeholder protected itself against multiple liability by paying the money into court in the usual manner of an interpleading party. Forest Park Lanes, Ltd. v. Keith, 441 S.W.2d 920, 940 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1969, no writ); Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston 1966, no writ); Royal Palms Corp. v. A. Minella Plumbing Supplies, Inc., 355 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston 1962, no writ).

The crucial question is whether payment to a party under a judgment pending appeal is equivalent to payment into court. We hold that it is not, and, more particularly, that payment to one party under a judgment does not discharge liability to a different party that may be established after reversal of that judgment. A judgment is not final so long as an appeal is pending,...