Gonzalez v. Toews
Decision Date | 29 August 2003 |
Docket Number | No. H024649.,H024649. |
Citation | 111 Cal.App.4th 977,4 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Gregorio M. GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, v. Jeff M. TOEWS et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Respondents. |
Law Office of Eric F. Hartman, Eric F. Hartman, San Jose, for Plaintiff/Appellant Gregorio M. Gonzalez.
Adleson, Hess & Kelly, Phillip M. Adleson, Duane W. Shewaga, Campbell, for Defendants/Respondents Jeff M. Toews, Loren Toews.
Plaintiff Gregorio M. Gonzalez sued defendants Jeff M. Toews and Loren Toews to set aside a sheriff's sale of real property and for related causes of action. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to the third amended complaint and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to their quiet title cross-complaint on the basis of Code of Civil Procedure section 701.680 ( ).1 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in several respects. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
In 1990, Golden State Mortgage Company obtained a judgment against plaintiff. In October 1997, the Santa Clara County Sheriff levied execution upon plaintiff's 22-acre parcel of real property in Milpitas to enforce the judgment. Plaintiff then petitioned for bankruptcy. In his bankruptcy papers, plaintiff declared under penalty of perjury that his residence was on Alum Rock Avenue in San Jose and his Milpitas property was "unimproved land." In April 1999, the bankruptcy court dismissed plaintiff's case. In July 1999, the sheriff sold the Milpitas property to defendants. In October 1999, plaintiff filed this action. The complaint essentially alleges that the sheriff's sale was void because the parcel could only be sold via court order because it contained a dwelling.
In December 1999, defendants filed an unlawful detainer action against plaintiff to evict him from the Milpitas property. Before trial, the court ruled that evidence whether the property constituted a dwelling was inadmissible. However, during trial, plaintiff introduced evidence indicating that the property was a dwelling. A jury returned a special verdict as follows: "The July 12, 1999 CCP § 1161a(b)(1) execution sale was not in compliance with the mandatory notice requirement of CCP § 701.540."2 From this, the court concluded that judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiff. On defendants' motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court acknowledged that it had tried the wrong issue.3 It pointed out that the section 701.540 issue was irrelevant because section 701.560 provides that "Failure to give notice of sale as required by this article does not invalidate the sale." It opined that what should have been tried was whether the execution sale was absolute under section 701.680 or void as sold without a court order for dwellings under section 704.740. But it denied defendants' motions after concluding that plaintiff's evidence established that the Milpitas property constituted a dwelling. According to the court, The appellate department of the superior court affirmed the resulting judgment for plaintiff.4
(Imperial Bank v. Pim Electric, Inc. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 540, 546, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 432.)
Division 2, chapter 3, article 1 of the EJL provides that "Except as otherwise provided by statute, this chapter governs enforcement of a money judgment by a writ of execution." (§ 699.010.) Chapter 3, article 6 deals with the general authority of the levying officer to sell property after levy. Section 701.680 is within article 6. Subdivision (a) of the statute states: "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), a sale of property pursuant to this article is absolute and may not be set aside for any reason." Paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) provides that "If the sale was improper because of irregularities in the proceedings, because the property sold was not subject to execution, or for any other reason," the judgment debtor or a successor in interest may bring an action to set aside the sale within 90 days from the sale date "if the purchaser at the sale is the judgment creditor." Paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) states:
Division 2, chapter 4 of the EJL provides for exemptions to enforcement of a money judgment. Chapter 4, article 4 deals with the homestead exemption. Section 704.740 is within article 4. It states: "the interest of a natural person in a dwelling may not be sold under this division to enforce a money judgment except pursuant to a court order for sale obtained under this article and the dwelling exemption shall be determined under this article."
Plaintiff essentially argues (in several different ways) that section 704.740 trumps section 701.680. He focuses upon the literal language, "a dwelling may not be sold ... except pursuant to a court order," and concludes, without citation of authority, that a dwelling sold without court order is void and subject to being set aside. Plaintiff's analysis is erroneous.
(Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.)
It is immediately apparent from an examination of the statutory scheme and words used that (1) division 2, chapter 3, of the EJL is all-encompassing-it deals with procedures for enforcement of judgments by writ without exception and (2) section 701.680 is crystal clear-it states that execution sales are absolute and may not be set aside "for any reason" unless the judgment creditor was the purchaser. It is also apparent that (1) division 2, chapter 4 of the EJL pertains to exemptions rather than procedures for enforcement, (2) the purpose of section 704.740 is to provide "the exclusive procedure for determining real property dwelling exemptions" (18 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) p. 101), and (3) division 2, chapter 4 of the EJL does not have independent procedures for enforcement of judgments by writ against dwellings akin to division 2, chapter 3 other than the limited directive set forth in section 704.740. As such, section 704.740 does not trump or negate section 701.680. It is a companion provision that applies in addition to section 701.680 when a dwelling is to be sold.
Given that there is no specified consequence in section 704.740 for failure to obtain a court order, the transgression can only be considered an "irregularity" governed by the all-encompassing remedies in division 2, chapter 3 which permit a damages remedy against the judgment creditor or sheriff but forbid setting aside a sale to third-party purchasers.
Plaintiff next argues that the sheriff's sale was void due to the operation of res judicata principles. He relies on the unlawful detainer court's judgment and, more specifically, that court's reasoning when it denied defendants' post-trial motions to the effect that plaintiff's evidence proved that the Milpitas property was a dwelling. There is no merit to this point.
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