Gonzalez v. U.S. Ctr. for Safesport, Civil Action No. 18-61190-Civ-Scola

• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida
• Citation: 374 F.Supp.3d 1284
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-61190-Civ-Scola
• Parties: Luis GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES CENTER FOR SAFESPORT and USA Taekwondo, Inc., Defendants.
• Decision Date: 18 March 2019

374 F.Supp.3d 1284

Luis GONZALEZ, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES CENTER FOR SAFESPORT and USA Taekwondo, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-61190-Civ-Scola

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed March 18, 2019

Andrew Edward Polenberg, Jon Polenberg, Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Anna D. Torres, Torres Law Group, West Palm Beach, FL, Gregory Andrew Gidus, Kevin P. McCoy, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tampa, FL, Erica Gomer, Jonathan Seth Robbins, Tamara Savin Malvin, Akerman Senterfitt & Eidson, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

Opinion Order Granting Motion for Remand

Robert N. Scola, Jr., United States District JudgeThis matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff Luis Gonzalez's ("Gonzalez") motion to remand, (the "Motion," ECF No. 12 ), which raises two related jurisdictional issues: (1) whether removal jurisdiction under the Ted Stevens Olympic Amateur Sports Act (the "Sports Act," 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501 et seq. ) extends to Defendants USA Taekwondo, Inc. ("USAT") and United States Center for SafeSport (the "Center"); and (2) whether the Safe Sports Authorization Act (the "SSAA," 36 U.S.C. §§ 220541 et seq. ) "completely" preempts, and thus supplies federal jurisdiction for, Gonzalez's state law declaratory judgment claim. The Defendants also claim diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

After carefully reviewing the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the Court answers both questions in the negative and finds the Defendants have not met their burden to establish diversity jurisdiction. Thus, the Court grants the Motion (ECF No. 12 ) and remands this case to the Florida state court.

1. Factual Background

USAT is the national governing body ("NGB") for taekwondo in the United States, as designated by the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC"). The Center is a non-profit corporation empowered by Congress to exercise jurisdiction over the USOC and its NGBs "with regard to safeguarding amateur athletes against abuse, including emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, in sports." Gonzalez is a taekwondo coach in Florida who runs a training academy for young athletes. Gonzalez was a member of the USAT.

This case arises from the Center's investigation of allegations that Gonzalez engaged in an improper romantic and sexual relationship with a young athlete he was coaching. That investigation culminated in a finding that Gonzalez violated the Center's code of conduct. Ultimately, the Center suspended Gonzalez from coaching for ten years and prohibited him from participating in any activity authorized by the USOC.

On May 2, 2018, Gonzalez filed suit in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, raising one count for declaratory relief under Florida law. The complaint requested a declaration that no arbitration agreement existed between Gonzalez and the Center, that Gonzalez was not bound by the Center's Code of Conduct, and that Gonzalez did not violate the Center's Code of Conduct.

The Center and USAT removed the case to this Court, (ECF Nos. 1, 12), and Gonzalez timely sought remand (ECF No. 16 ).

2. Remand Standard

Removal from state court to federal court is only appropriate if the action is within the original jurisdiction of the federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original jurisdiction exists when a civil action raises a federal question, or where the action is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

"The existence of federal jurisdiction is tested at the time of removal," Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg , 552 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2008), and "[t]he burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on the party invoking removal." Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 168 F.3d 405, 411-12 (11th Cir. 1999). "[A]ll doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court." Id. at 411 ; see also Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co. , 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[T]here is a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand.").

3. Analysis

A claim pled under state law "may be removed to federal court in only two circumstances—when Congress expressly so provides ... or when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete preemption." Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). Both circumstances are raised in this case.

The Defendants removed Gonzalez's Florida law claim for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 based on three separate and distinct jurisdictional bases: (1) the Sports Act's jurisdictional grant under 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9), (ECF No. 12 at pp. 3-4 ) (citing 36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)(2) ); (2) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguing that the SSAA "completely" preempts Gonzalez's state-law claim, (ECF No. 12 at pp. 2-3, 7-12 ); and (3) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, (ECF No. 12 at pp. 4-5, 13-15 ).

Gonzalez sought remand, contesting all three jurisdictional bases. (ECF No. 16.) The Court addresses each in turn.

A. Section 220505(b)(9) Does Not Permit Removal By the Center or USAT

The Defendants argue that 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9) creates subject matter and removal jurisdiction in this case. (ECF No. 12 at pp. 3-4, 12-13.) The Court disagrees.

Through the Sports Act, Congress granted removal jurisdiction over claims brought against the USOC that "solely relating to" its responsibilities under that statute. 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9). In full, section 220505(b)(9) provides that the "corporation may":

sue and be sued, except that any civil action brought in a State court against the corporation and solely relating to the corporation's responsibilities under this chapter shall be removed, at the request of the corporation, to the district court of the United States in the district in which the action was brought, and such district court shall have original jurisdiction over the action without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties involved, and except that neither this paragraph nor any other provision of this chapter shall create a private right of action under this chapter

Id. By its terms, that section is only applicable where a "civil action [is] brought in a State court against the corporation." Id. Even then, removal is only authorized upon "the request of the corporation." Id. "Corporation" is defined under the Sports Act to "mean[ ] the United States Olympic Committee." Id. § 220501(b)(6). Nonetheless, the Defendants submit that this statute permits NGBs, like USAT, and the Center to remove actions brought against those entities to federal court.

" ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’ " Gunn v. Minton , 568 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ). Because the authority "to set the limits of federal jurisdiction" lies with Congress under Art. III, federal courts must "carefully guard[ ]" against expanding their own jurisdiction through "judicial interpretation." Stoneridge Inv. Ps., LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta , 552 U.S. 148, 164-65, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (citation omitted). Thus, "removal statute[s] should be construed narrowly with doubt construed against removal." Diaz v. Sheppard , 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996).

In line with these principles, the Court declines to expand the Sports Act's jurisdictional grant to cover the Center and USAT. The "Center" and "national governing body" are defined terms under the Sports Act. 36 U.S.C. § 220501(b)(4) (" ‘Center’ means the United States Center for Safe Sport"); id. § 220501(b)(8) (" ‘national governing body’ means an amateur sports organization that is recognized by the corporation"). Neither term, however, is mentioned in section 220505(b)(9), and jurisdiction under that statute is limited to actions brought against and removed by the "corporation" (i.e. the USOC), which is not a party to the current action. Congress is presumed to have "said what it meant and meant what it said" in defining jurisdiction under the Sports Act, Lindley v. F.D.I.C. , 733 F.3d 1043, 1055 (11th Cir. 2013), and the Court "refrain[s] from reading [those defined terms] into the statute when Congress has left [them] out." Keene Corp. v. United States , 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 S.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993) ("Where Congress includes language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (citation and alterations omitted) ). To the extent Congress intended to permit removal by the Center or USAT—an intent this Court does not infer—such a jurisdictional grant is properly accomplished through legislative amendment, not judicial expansion.

Accordingly, section 220505(b)(9) is not a source of federal subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and the Defendants arguments to that end are rejected.

B. "Complete" Preemption is Not a Basis for Jurisdiction in This Case

Next, the Defendants submit that federal question jurisdiction exists in this case under the "complete preemption" doctrine. (ECF No. 12 at pp. 2-3, 7-12 ; ECF No. 17 at pp. 2-9.) Specifically, the Defendants argue that Gonzalez's state law declaratory judgment action "challenges the Center for SafeSport's eligibility decision," (ECF No. 17 at p. 2 ), and that "Congress plainly intended that the Center have exclusive authority to resolve amateur athletic eligibility disputes involving sexual misconduct" under the SSAA, (id. at p. 5). In support of remand, Gonzalez argues that his claim is not completely preempted by the SSAA, in part,...