MRC44, LLC v. City of Miami
| Decision Date | 21 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:21-cv-21695-KMM |
| Citation | 561 F.Supp.3d 1288 |
| Parties | MRC44, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Derick Roberson Vollrath, Jeffrey Adam Neiman, Marcus Neiman & Rashbaum LLP, Richard Arthur Beauchamp, Benjamin Patrick Bean, Panza Maurer & Maynard, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Victoria Mendez, Christopher Allan Green, Miami City Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiff MRC44, LLC ("Plaintiff MRC44") and Plaintiff 60 NE 11th, LLC's "(Plaintiff 60 NE") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Motion for Remand to State Court. ("Mot.") (ECF No. 10). Defendant City of Miami ("City") filed a response, ("Resp.") (ECF No. 11), and Plaintiffs filed a reply ("Reply") (ECF No. 12). The Motion is now ripe for review.
This case arises from a dispute over the zoning of medical marijuana dispensaries within the City of Miami. See generally Am. Compl.
Plaintiff MRC44 and Plaintiff 60 NE each own parcels of land located within the City of Miami ("the Properties"). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–6. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state that they seek to open medical marijuana treatment facilities ("dispensaries") on each of the Properties. Id. at 1. However, Plaintiffs have not been able to do so because the City has "taken the position that a Certificate of Use is required for Plaintiffs to operate [a dispensary]" and the City "refuses to issue one because it contends that Plaintiffs’ business plans violate federal law." Am. Compl. at 1. The City's refusal comes even though the "City has passed no ordinance either (a) banning [d]ispensaries entirely or (b) specifying the criteria for the location of, and other permitting requirements for, [d]ispensaries located within its boundaries." Id. ¶ 18. The City's counsel has informed the Court that the City has no plans to pass a formal ordinance prohibiting the operation of medical marijuana dispensaries in the City of Miami. H'rg Tr. at 4:4–5:19. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek "a judicial declaration that Plaintiffs may lawfully operate a [d]ispensary within the City of Miami[,] without obtaining a Certificate of Use from the City," pursuant Fla. Stat. § 86.011(2). Id. at 4.
On April 21, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint seeking declaratory relief in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. See generally (Compl.) (ECF No. 1-1). On May 3, 2021, the City removed the above-captioned case to federal court. Not. of Removal (ECF No. 1) at 1. In the Notice of Removal, the City asserts that this Court has jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief "necessarily draws into question the interpretation or application of federal law under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, [ 21 U.S.C. § 801 ], which criminalizes the activities alleged in the [C]omplaint." Id. Thus, the City seeks to avail itself of this Court's jurisdiction over federal questions.
Now, Plaintiffs have filed the instant Motion to Remand, which argues that this case presents no federal question and should, therefore, be remanded for further proceedings in state court. See Mot. at 3.
The statute governing removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, permits a defendant to remove a case brought in state court to federal court if the federal court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. § 1441. The removing party bears the burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002). A district court is required to " ‘strictly construe the right to remove’ and apply a general ‘presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand.’ " Scimone v. Carnival Corp. , 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Federal-question jurisdiction exists when an action "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." § 1331. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule.’ " Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that "the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court." Id. at 398–99, 107 S.Ct. 2425.
In this case, however, there are two relevant exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule under which a federal court can exercise jurisdiction, even in circumstances where a federal question does not appear on the face of the complaint. First, under the "complete-preemption doctrine," a case can be removed to federal court where a federal statute "wholly displaces the state-law cause of action." Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila , 542 U.S. 200, 207, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (quoting Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003)). Second, jurisdiction can exist under the "substantial federal question doctrine," which "captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues[.]" Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. , 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005).
Plaintiffs argue that this case should be remanded to state court because their claim for declaratory relief does not implicate a federal question. Mot. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that no jurisdiction exists under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule because Plaintiffs’ claim only seeks to determine Plaintiffs’ rights "under [§] 381.96, Florida Statutes, and [the City's Charter.]" Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that even if Plaintiffs’ claim did implicate federal law, the Court should abstain from ruling on this issue because matters of state law could potentially make it unnecessary for the Court to reach a federal constitutional issue. Id. at 4. Relatedly, Plaintiffs also believe the Court should abstain from adjudicating this case because "matters of land use and planning are primarily of local concern." Id.
In response, the City argues that this Court has federal-question jurisdiction under the complete-preemption doctrine because Plaintiffs’ complaint raises issues of federal law. Resp. at 3 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ).2 In support of this theory, the City points to the language of the CSA, which states that the CSA does not operate to preempt state law unless there is a "positive conflict" between the state law and the CSA such that "the two cannot consistently stand together." Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 903 ). The City argues that the Court should not abstain from hearing this case because it implicates questions of federal law. Resp. at 3.3 Lastly, the City contends that the denial of a Certificate of Use based on federal law "presents a substantial federal question." Resp. at 5–6.
In reply, Plaintiffs contend that the Controlled Substance Act does not preempt the relevant portions of the Florida Constitution or Fla. Stat. § 381.986. Reply at 2. Plaintiffs point to several cases in which courts have found that state-level legalization of marijuana does not prohibit the federal government from enforcing the CSA or otherwise authorize violations of the CSA. Id. at 2–3 (). Plaintiffs also note that Florida's Constitutional Amendment which legalized medical marijuana explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section requires the violation of federal law or purports to give immunity of federal law." Id. at 3 (citing Fla. Const. art. X, § 29 (c)(5)). Lastly, Plaintiffs point out that the City has not identified how exactly the issuance of a Certificate of Use would violate the CSA. Id.
To begin, the Amended Complaint brings no claim arising "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." § 1331. Therefore, this Court would only have jurisdiction under one of the narrow exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Caterpillar Inc. , 482 U.S. at 392, 398–99, 107 S.Ct. 2425. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that no exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule applies in this case and the Court is, therefore, without jurisdiction.
The City believes that, although a federal question does not appear on the face of the Complaint, jurisdiction exists under the Supreme Court's complete-preemption doctrine. Resp. at 3 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ). Plaintiffs did not address this issue at great length in their Reply, other than to argue that other courts have found that the CSA does not preempt state-level legalization of medical marijuana. Reply at 3–4.
The Parties appear to misunderstand the difference between "complete-preemption" and "ordinary-preemption." U.S. District Judge Robert N. Scola illuminated the distinction between these terms in Gonzalez v. United States Ctr. for SafeSport , which bears quoting at length:
To continue reading
Request your trial