Gonzalez v. U.S. Human Rights Network
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | CV-20-00757-PHX-DWL |
| Parties | Rosalee Gonzalez, Plaintiff, v. US Human Rights Network, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff/Counter-defendant Rosalee Gonzalez (“Dr Gonzalez”) and Defendant/Counterclaimant U.S. Human Rights Network (“USHRN”). For the following reasons, Dr. Gonzalez's motion is denied and USHRN's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if [a] movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' only if it might affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute is ‘genuine' only if a reasonable trier of fact could resolve the issue in the non-movant's favor.” Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inference[s] in the nonmoving party's favor.” Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment is improper where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts.” Fresno Motors, 771 F.3d at 1125.
A party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “If . . . [the] moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Id. There is no issue for trial unless enough evidence favors the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. At the same time, the evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Id. at 254. Thus, “the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.” Id. at 255.
“[W]hen parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, [e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits,” but the Court must consider all evidence submitted in support of both motions when separately reviewing the merits of each. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). For “the party with the burden of persuasion at trial” to succeed in obtaining summary judgment, it “must establish beyond controversy every essential element” of each claim on which summary judgment is sought. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003). The party without the burden of persuasion at trial is entitled to summary judgment where it establishes that the party with the burden of persuasion will be unable to prove at least one element of its claim in light of the undisputed facts. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. This distinction reflects that the burden is ultimately on the proponent of each claim to prove it. Id. ( ).
Before addressing the parties' summary judgment arguments and the facts bearing on those arguments, it is helpful to provide some basic background details that are undisputed.
Between February 2018 and December 2018, Dr. Gonzalez served as USHRN's acting executive director. This relationship was memorialized in a series of independent contractor agreements (“IC Agreements”). (Doc. 106-1 at 28-38.)
Much of the dispute in this case turns on the nature of Dr. Gonzalez's relationship with USHRN during 2019. Dr. Gonzalez contends that, in late December 2018, she received and accepted an oral offer to become USHRN's permanent executive director. Thus, Dr. Gonzalez contends that her work for USHRN in 2019 was in the capacity of an employee, not an independent contractor. USHRN, in contrast, contends that although it engaged in negotiations with Dr. Gonzalez about entering into an employment relationship, an agreement was never reached, and thus Dr. Gonzalez remained an independent contractor for purposes of her work in 2019.
Throughout 2019, Dr. Gonzalez periodically complained about USHRN's classification of her as an independent contractor and USHRN's corresponding failure to provide her with medical and other employee benefits. Eventually, in late 2019, USHRN terminated Dr. Gonzalez. As discussed below, another dispute turns on whether Dr. Gonzalez's complaints amounted to protected activity under Arizona's whistleblower statutes and whether USHRN's decision to terminate her was wrongful because it was motivated by those complaints.
Finally, a non-party USHRN employee who was terminated by Dr. Gonzalez in mid-2019 subsequently asserted tort claims against USHRN related to the termination. Yet another dispute turns on whether Dr. Gonzalez must indemnify USHRN for the alleged costs associated with defending and settling that former employee's claims.
With this background in mind, the Court now addresses the arguments raised in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, which are grouped together by issue.
In Count One of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Dr. Gonzalez asserts a claim for “Wrongful Termination-Retaliation” in violation of A.R.S. § 23- 1501(A)(3)(c)(ii), which is also known as the Arizona Employment Protection Act (“AEPA”), and/or under A.R.S. § 23-374. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 31-34.) Dr. Gonzalez alleges that USHRN terminated her “in retaliation for [her] whistleblowing and reporting that [USHRN] violated various Arizona laws when [USHRN] illegally misclassified [her] as an independent contractor and denying [her] benefits, including, but not limited to, earning and using earned sick leave, payment of employee taxes, provision of worker's compensation coverage, and payment of unemployment benefit contributions.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
USHRN contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Count One for four reasons. (Doc. 106 at 11-15.)[1] First, USHRN contends that Dr. Gonzalez did not engage in “protected activity” because (a) to the extent Count One arises under AEPA, that statute requires an employee to report that the employer was violating state law, but Dr. Gonzalez merely complained about “not receiving benefits” and did not tell anyone at USHRN that it was acting illegally under Arizona law; and (b) to the extent Count One arises under A.R.S. § 23-374, that statute only applies to retaliation for complaints related to sick time, but Dr. Gonzalez “was never denied sick pay and she never complained to USHRN regarding a sick pay law violation.” (Id. at 11-13.) Second, USHRN contends that Dr. Gonzalez cannot establish a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the termination decision because “the evidence shows that USHRN repeatedly offered to make [her] an employee” throughout 2019, only for her to reject those offers. (Id. at 1314.) Third, USHRN contends it had six legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Dr. Gonzalez: (1) her rejection of employment offers; (2) her mismanagement of subordinates; (3) her insubordination toward the USHRN board; (4) her failure to follow USHRN policies and the IC Agreements; (5) her alienation of key partner organizations; and (6) her failure to secure funding “for 2020 and beyond” and poor financial stewardship. (Id. at 4-6, 14.) Fourth, USHRN contends that Dr. Gonzalez cannot establish these legitimate reasons were pretextual. (Id. at 14-15.)
Dr Gonzalez opposes USHRN's motion with respect to Count One. (Doc. 116 at 7-12.) First, Dr. Gonzalez contends that she made multiple disclosures that qualify as protected activity under the relevant statutes, including a disclosure to a member of the USHRN executive board in which she expressly raised her “lack of reclassification” as an employee and “the outstanding illegal status of this...
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