Gonzalez v. Williams

• Docket Number: 2:15-cv-00618-RFB-DJA
• Decision Date: 26 August 2023
• Parties: HECTOR MIGUEL GONZALEZ, Petitioner v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

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HECTOR MIGUEL GONZALEZ, Petitioner v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.

No. 2:15-cv-00618-RFB-DJA

United States District Court, D. Nevada

August 26, 2023

ORDER

RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by Hector Miguel Gonzalez, a Nevada prisoner. This case is before the Court for adjudication of the merits of Gonzalez's remaining grounds for relief. The Court denies Gonzalez's petition, denies a certificate of appealability, and directs the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.

I. BACKGROUND

Gonzalez's convictions are the result of events that occurred on January 21, 2009, in Clark County, Nevada. (ECF No. 14-7). In its order affirming Gonzalez's convictions, the Nevada Supreme Court described the crimes, as revealed by the evidence at Gonzalez's trial, as follows:

Hector Gonzalez broke into the house where his wife Ana Gonzalez lived, and attacked Ana and his sister-in-law Elsie Serpas with a knife. Hector stabbed Ana in the neck and Elsie in the hand. He threatened more violence if they called the police but later allowed Elsie to call 911, telling her to only ask for an ambulance, not the police. After Elsie called 911, Hector stayed at the scene until the police responded. At the time of the attack, Ana had an extended protective order against Hector.

(ECF No. 16-5).

On May 7, 2010, a jury convicted Gonzalez of count 2: burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon in violation of a court order; count 4: battery constituting domestic violence with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm while in violation of a court order; count 5: battery constituting domestic violence with the use of a deadly weapon in violation of a court order; count 6: coercion with the use of a deadly weapon in violation of a court order; and count 8: preventing or dissuading a victim or witness from reporting a crime, commencing a prosecution, or causing an arrest. (ECF No. 15-5.) The state district court sentenced Gonzalez as follows: count 2: 26 to 120 months, with a consecutive term of 12 to 60 months for the deadly weapon enhancement; count 4: 48 to 120 months, with a consecutive term of 12 to 60 months for the deadly weapon enhancement, concurrent with count 2; count 5: 24 to 72 months, with a consecutive term of 12 to 60 months for the deadly weapon enhancement, consecutive to count 4; count 6: 12 to 48 months, with a consecutive term of 12 to 48 months for the deadly weapon enhancement, concurrent with count 5; and count 8: 12 to 38 months, concurrent with count 5. (ECF No. 16-3). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Gonzalez's convictions on February 24, 2012. (ECF No. 16-5).

Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (post-conviction) in state district court. (ECF No. 16-7). Gonzalez's counsel filed a supplemental points and authorities in support of the petition. (ECF No. 16-9). An evidentiary hearing was held on Gonzalez's petition. (ECF No. 1613). The state district court denied the petition. (ECF No. 16-14.) The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Gonzalez's petition. (ECF No. 16-17.)

Gonzalez dispatched his federal habeas petition for filing on or about April 1, 2015. (ECF No. 10). Gonzalez's petition asserts that his federal constitutional rights were violated due to the following alleged violations:

1. The state district court failed to bifurcate the proceedings.

2. Double jeopardy and redundancy principles prohibit his multiple convictions arising from a single course of conduct.

3. The state district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence.

4. The State committed misconduct during closing argument.

5. The state district court erred by refusing to proffer a “reverse flight” instruction.

6. There was insufficient evidence to convict him.

7. There were cumulative errors.

8. His trial counsel was ineffective:

a. His trial counsel failed to do necessary investigations and to consult necessary experts.

b. His trial counsel failed to file numerous pretrial motions.

c. His trial counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment when the State violated Marcum.

d. His trial counsel failed to file a motion to bifurcate the sentence enhancement.

e. His trial counsel failed to file a motion in limine to exclude bad act evidence.

f. His trial counsel failed to file a motion challenging the voluntariness of his statement.

g. His trial counsel failed to file a motion for psychiatric examination of the victim.

9. His trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct.

10. There were cumulative errors.

Id. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Gonzalez's petition. (ECF No. 13). Gonzalez filed a response. (ECF No. 19). On March 31, 2017, this Court granted the Respondents' motion to dismiss in part: it found that Grounds 5 and 9 were unexhausted and Grounds 3 and 10 were dismissed. (ECF No. 20.). This court also granted Gonzalez's previous request for the appointment of counsel. Id. Gonzalez abandoned Grounds 5 and 9. (ECF No. 22). The Respondents filed an answer to Gonzalez's petition on August 22, 2017. (ECF No. 25). Gonzalez filed a reply on March 20, 2018. (ECF No. 32).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review generally applicable in habeas corpus cases under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”):

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000), and citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “The ‘unreasonable application' clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10) (internal citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has stated “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (describing the standard as a “difficult to meet” and “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ground 1

In Ground 1, Gonzalez claims that his federal constitutional rights were violated when the state district court failed to bifurcate the sentencing enhancement issue, or, alternatively, failed to give a limiting instruction. (ECF No. 10 at 3, 7.) Specifically, Gonzalez asserts that the admission of the extended protective order allowed the jury to infer that he engaged in prior criminal activities. Id. at 3-4. Gonzalez explains that the jurors should have been asked to return verdicts on the underlying charges before adjudicating the issue of whether he committed the offenses in violation of a court order. Id. at 5. In addition to allowing the jury to infer that he had a propensity towards violence, Gonzalez argues that the extended protective order also allowed the jury to infer that he had a drinking problem, as it mandated that when the children were in his care, no alcohol was to be consumed. (ECF No. 32 at 18). The Respondents argue that the protective order was not admitted to prove Gonzalez's character; rather, it was evidence that helped prove an element of the charged offenses. (ECF No. 25 at 7).

On Gonzalez's direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held:

Because Hector failed to request that the district court bifurcate the sentence enhancement for violation of a court order, he failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 63, 17 P.3d 397 403 (2001). We review unpreserved issues for plain error. Id. Under a plain error review, we will “consider whether error exists, if the error was plain or clear, and if the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” Calvin v. State, 122 Nev. 1178, 1184, 147 P.3d 1097, 1101 (2006). The defendant must show actual prejudice. Id.

Hector is

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