Sheriff, Humboldt County v. Marcum
| Decision Date | 20 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 19701,19856,s. 19701 |
| Citation | 783 P.2d 1389,105 Nev. 824 |
| Parties | SHERIFF, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, Nevada, Appellant, v. Lawrence Carl MARCUM, Respondent. SHERIFF, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, Nevada, Appellant, v. Paul Knight HARBIN, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Appellant Sheriff of Humboldt County (State) asks this court to reverse the district court's decision granting respondents' (Harbin and Marcum) petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the district court's decision.
On May 29, 1987, Harbin and Marcum were arrested in Humboldt County and charged with various offenses. The grand jury indicted both men on all charges. The district court granted Harbin's and Marcum's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, among other reasons, the district attorney failed to give them reasonable notice of the grand jury proceedings in which they were indicted. The State appealed to this court and we dismissed the appeal.
On January 12, 1988, the district attorney informed Harbin's and Marcum's prior attorneys that he would ask the grand jury to indict their former clients the next day. Harbin's attorney requested more time and advised the district attorney that he could not reach his former client. Marcum was in prison at the time. No notice was personally given to either Harbin or Marcum before the grand jury hearing at which they were indicted for grand larceny and possession of burglary tools.
Harbin and Marcum filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that the district attorney had not given them reasonable notice of the grand jury proceedings at which they were indicted. The district court held that pursuant to NRS 172.095(1(d) and NRS 172.241 a target defendant has the right to testify before the grand jury. The court reasoned that since a target defendant has the right to testify before the grand jury, it follows that he has a right to be notified that the grand jury is about to indict him. Without such notice, the right to testify would be meaningless and the statute allowing it would be a nullity. Finally, the court held that five days notice to a target defendant is reasonable notice. Thus, the district court granted Harbin's and Marcum's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State now appeals that decision.
The State agrees that a target defendant has a right to testify before a grand jury indicts him, but maintains that this right is contingent upon his knowledge of the grand jury proceedings. Thus, the State contends that notice to a grand jury defendant is permissive, not mandatory. The State maintains that the legislative history of Senate Bill 103, which deals with grand jury hearings, supports its contentions.
We note that although both NRS 172.095(1)(d) 1 and NRS 172.241 2 give a defendant the right to testify before a grand jury, both statutes are silent regarding a defendant's right to have notice of the grand jury proceedings at which he may be indicted. Since these statutes could be interpreted differently by reasonable people, we conclude that they are ambiguous in regard to whether notice is mandatory or permissive. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, the court will construe it in line with legislative intent, reason and public policy. Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983).
We have investigated the legislative history of Senate Bill 103 and find no clear intent on the part of the legislature as to whether a target defendant must be given notice before a grand jury indicts him. Therefore, we will construe these statutes in line with reason and public policy.
NRS 172.095(1)(d) and NRS 172.241 clearly give a defendant the right to testify in front of a grand jury before he is indicted. This right would be meaningless if a defendant is not given notice that a grand jury will meet and consider returning an indictment against him. Without the right to notice, a defendant has only two ways of finding out an indictment against him is being considered....
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