Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1939.,14–1939.
• Citation: 807 F.3d 619
• Parties: Freddie L. GOODE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CENTRAL VIRGINIA LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC., Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

807 F.3d 619

Freddie L. GOODE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CENTRAL VIRGINIA LEGAL AID SOCIETY, INC., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14–1939.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Sept. 15, 2015.

Decided: Dec. 9, 2015.

ARGUED:Barbara Allyn Queen, Lawrence & Associates, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Christy E. Kiely, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Ryan A. Glasgow, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Warren David Harless, E. Ford Stephens, Christian & Barton L.L.P., richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appeal dismissed and case remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge DAVIS wrote the opinion, in which Judge WYNN and Judge DIAZ concurred.

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:

Freddie Lee Goode was a Senior Managing Attorney for Central Virginia Legal Aid Society ("CVLAS") until CVLAS's Board of Directors eliminated Goode's position in March 2013. Goode brought suit against CVLAS, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and age. CVLAS filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that Goode had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, and Goode timely appealed. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the order of dismissal was not a final and appealable order, and we therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions.

I.

A.

Goode, an African–American male, was 72 years old when CVLAS terminated his employment in March 2013. He had worked at CVLAS's Richmond office for 25 years. He had begun working for the organization as an unpaid volunteer in August 1988 and had held many paid positions with CVLAS since that time. As one of CVLAS's two Senior Managing Attorneys in 2013, Goode was responsible for "representing clients in civil matters; drafting legal documents; and advising clients on their legal rights and remedies, generally. [Goode also] ... coordinat[ed] the activities of the Social Security, elder law and public benefits units[ ] and supervis[ed] the pro bono hotline." J.A. 8.¹ Goode reported to Executive Director Stephen Dickinson, a white male.

Goode alleged in his complaint that CVLAS's Board of Directors had met on March 11, 2013, to discuss a loss of government funding and the corresponding need to reorganize attorney positions within the organization's three offices. When the Board discussed Goode's position, someone in the meeting allegedly commented that, due to Goode's receipt of veteran and other benefits, "he would not be impacted as much as others by the restructuring." J.A. 9. Goode averred that, "[a]s a result of the restructuring, five African American employees, including Goode, were let go." J.A. 10. Each terminated employee was over the age of 40, and Goode was the oldest of CVLAS's nine attorneys at the time and the oldest CVLAS employee overall. Goode's termination was effective on March 31, 2013.

According to Goode, "CVLAS claim[ed] that it eliminated Goode's position because representation for Social Security ... cases at the litigation stage was a service available through the private bar ... and ... the office was going to concentrate more on family law cases." J.A. 11. Goode challenged this rationale in his complaint, asserting that the availability of private counsel to assist with Social Security matters was "not the case across the board" and that "there remained a substantial need for this client service" at CVLAS. Id.

In seeking to challenge CVLAS's purported justification for his termination as pretextual, Goode also described in his complaint the experiences of two other CVLAS employees who had retained their employment despite the restructuring. Specifically, he discussed Christianne Queiroz,² "a much younger, non African American (Latin[a] ) female," and Martin Wegbreit, CVLAS's other Senior Managing Attorney, who is white. J.A. 9, 11. Goode alleged that Queiroz was an "attorney" but otherwise provided no information regarding her position or duties at CVLAS. J.A. 12. Goode further alleged that CVLAS had allowed Queiroz to assume part-time status while continuing to earn the same salary as she had previously.

As to Wegbreit, Goode averred that he "is substantially younger," "has a higher salary," and "was a similarly-situated employee to Goode in terms of workload and responsibility within CVLAS." J.A. 9. As the other Senior Managing Attorney, Wegbreit was in charge of litigation services. Goode contended that CVLAS "used a budget shortfall as an excuse to terminate Goode while maintaining higher salaries and favorable terms for Wegbreit and Quieroz [sic]." J.A. 12.

Goode further challenged the proposition that CVLAS had terminated him for financial reasons by explaining that, after learning of the Board's decision, Goode had proposed some cost-saving measures that CVLAS could have implemented to keep him on staff, but his supervisor was not amenable to these suggestions. In rejecting one proposal, Dickinson stated that he could not institute a 10% pay cut for employees earning over $65,000 per year because he had already promised raises to all employees and because two of the attorneys whose salaries would be reduced by such a plan were single mothers. Although Dickinson told Goode "that he could continue with CVLAS in a position supervising the volunteer lawyer pro bono hotline," Goode "felt that Dickinson did not have any intention to keep him at CVLAS." J.A. 10.

B.

Goode brought suit against CVLAS on April 17, 2014, asserting claims for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17 (2012), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 –34 (2012). He stated in his complaint that he "believe[d] that CVLAS's financial considerations and their budget cuts were pretext for race, sex, and age discrimination."³ J.A. 11.

On July 15, 2014, CVLAS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court determined that Goode had failed either to present direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Accordingly, the court stated that "Goode fail[ed] to allege sufficient facts supporting his claim that his termination was the result of unlawful discrimination." Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, No. 3:14cv281–HEH, 2014 WL 3945870, at *6 (E.D.Va. Aug. 12, 2014). The court granted CVLAS's motion and dismissed the case without prejudice on August 12, 2014, concluding that "Goode has failed to state a claim for unlawful discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the ADEA." Id. at *7.

Goode filed a timely notice of appeal on September 8, 2014. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Goode to amend his complaint. Because we conclude that we do not have appellate jurisdiction over this case, we do not reach the merits of the district court's legal conclusions.

II.

A.

This Court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders,⁴ 28 U.S.C. § 1292 ; Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). An order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not an appealable final order under § 1291 if "the plaintiff could save his action by merely amending his complaint." Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (4th Cir.1993). In Domino Sugar, this Court held that if "the grounds of the dismissal make clear that no amendment could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case, the order dismissing the complaint is final in fact" and therefore appealable. Id. at 1066 (quoting Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 463 (7th Cir.1988) ); see Young v. Nickols, 413 F.3d 416, 418 (4th Cir.2005). Likewise, "a plaintiff may not appeal the dismissal of his complaint without prejudice unless the grounds for dismissal clearly indicate that ‘no amendment [in the complaint] could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case.’ " Domino Sugar, 10 F.3d at 1067 (alteration in original) (quoting Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 463 ).

We have interpreted Domino Sugar to "require[ ] [an appellate panel] to examine the appealability of a dismissal without prejudice based on the specific facts of the case in order to guard against piecemeal litigation and repetitive appeals." Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir.2005) ; see Domino Sugar, 10 F.3d at 1066–67 ("[A]n appellate court may evaluate the particular grounds for dismissal in each case to determine whether the plaintiff could save his action by merely amending his complaint."). In reaching these case-specific determinations, "[w]hat makes [dismissals without prejudice] final or nonfinal is not the speculative possibility of a new lawsuit, but that they ‘end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ " GO Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir.2007) (quoting MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc.,

27 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir.1994) ).

Notwithstanding this emphasis on the need for case-by-case determinations, courts considering this issue have established some guidelines. For instance, an appellate panel may consider whether the district court expressly dismissed the "action ... in its entirety" or merely dismissed the complaint, as courts have generally considered the former, but not the latter, appealable. Chao, 415 F.3d at 345 ; see also Zayed v. United States, 368...