Goodenow v. City Council of Maquoketa, Iowa, 96-1626

Decision Date21 January 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96-1626,96-1626
Citation574 N.W.2d 18
PartiesJ.E. GOODENOW, individually, and John E. Goodenow, IV, and Marla I. Koob, Trustees of the Goodenow Family Trust, Appellants, v. CITY COUNCIL OF MAQUOKETA, IOWA, Dennis Storlie, James Peterman, Darrell Rettig, N.J. (Jim) Rankin, Thomas Schueller, Weotha Hinz, Randy Reed and the City of Maquoketa, Iowa, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Steven J. Kahler and Pressley W. Henningsen of Schoenthaler, Roberg, Bartelt & Kahler, Maquoketa, for appellants.

Mike Kane, City Attorney, Maquoketa, for appellees.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

In this case, we must determine whether a city has authority to enact and enforce an ordinance requiring an abutting landowner to mow grass and weeds growing in a city-owned right-of-way. The district court concluded that a city has such authority and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant city, thereby dismissing plaintiff landowner's petition challenging such authority. We affirm.

I. Background facts and proceedings.

The Goodenow Family Trust ("Trust") is the owner of a farm that has been in the Goodenow family for more than one hundred years. Plaintiff J.E. Goodenow is the beneficiary of the Trust, and plaintiffs John E. Goodenow, IV, and Marla I. Koob, are its trustees. The Trust property consists of approximately 300 acres, 200 of which are located within the city limits of Maquoketa, Iowa, (the "City"). Much of the property that lies within the city limits runs adjacent to city streets, including East Summit Street, and therefore abuts city-owned right-of-ways and adjoining boulevards and ditches. These right-of-ways extend from the curb lines of the city streets, or if no curb exists, from the traveled portion of the street to the Trust property line. The city-owned right-of-ways at issue in this appeal are now defined by the Maquoketa City Code as "boulevard" property, that is, "property outside the property owner's lot and property lines and inside the curb lines upon the public streets, or in the absence of a curb from the traveled portion of the public street to the lot or property line." Maquoketa, Ia., Code § 6-20-1(A) (1995). The right-of-ways which abut the Trust property consist of steep, rolling ditches, that cannot be mowed with a push mower or riding lawn mower. In the past, the City has used a rotary mower and a sickle bar attached to a utility tractor, along with heavy duty weed eaters to mow the grass and weeds growing in the ditches.

Prior to 1994, the City mowed the ditches/boulevards that abut the Trust property and other city property. In 1994, however, the City decided to transfer mowing responsibilities to abutting property owners. Thereafter, the City sent numerous notices of abatement to Maquoketa property owners, including plaintiff J.E. Goodenow on behalf of the Trust, informing them of their duty to mow weeds growing in the city-owned ditches or pay the City for the cost to perform the work. The City later rescinded those notices.

In 1995, the City amended the city code and enacted title VI regarding "Physical Environment," chapter 20 "Maintaining Boulevard and Private Property."

On August 14, the City served J.E. Goodenow, on behalf of the Trust, with a notice to abate, advising that the high grass and weeds in the city-owned ditch and abutting Trust property constituted a nuisance in violation of the city code and ordering him to mow the ditch and alleviate the nuisance. On August 18, the City served Goodenow with a "Physical Environment Grass Abatement" notice under title VI, chapter 20 of the Maquoketa Code, ordering Goodenow to mow the "high grass/weeds" growing on the abutting City property. The City denied Goodenow's subsequent appeal in a letter dated September 11, and Goodenow further appealed.

On October 16, the city council held a hearing regarding Goodenow's appeal from the City's decision in the September 11 letter. The council voted to deny Goodenow relief from the Notice to Abatement and the Grass Abatement notice.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a petition, naming the city council and City as defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as City), and seeking a declaratory ruling that Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) (1995) and title VI, chapter 20 of the Maquoketa Code, as applied, effectuate a taking of their property for private use in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and in violation of article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution. Additionally, plaintiffs asserted that the city ordinance is an illegal usurpation by the city of powers reserved to the State of Iowa, and that the ordinance thus exceeds the city's home rule authority. In count IV, plaintiffs asserted that title III, chapter 2 of the Maquoketa Code has been illegally applied to them. Finally, plaintiffs sought a writ of certiorari, asserting that the city council acted illegally and in excess of its authority by enforcing the state statute and city ordinance.

After filing an answer, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a resistance supported by affidavits and exhibits. After a hearing, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City as to three counts of plaintiffs' petition. The court first held that Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) and Maquoketa Code section 6-20-2 constitute a valid exercise of police power. The court concluded that "[t]he enactments promote and protect public health, morals, safety, and welfare" and that the enactments were reasonably related to carrying out those purposes. The court therefore found that neither the statute nor the ordinance effected a taking of the plaintiffs' property without just compensation. Second, the court held that neither the statute nor the ordinance was arbitrary or unreasonable. Additionally, the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute and ordinance were vague or overbroad. Last, the court held that the ordinance is a valid exercise of the City's home rule authority.

The district court held a subsequent hearing on stipulated facts regarding the remainder of plaintiffs' petition. The court enlarged its prior ruling and denied plaintiffs' request for issuance of a writ of certiorari to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.

Plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs make several constitutional and other attacks on the validity of Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) and the Maquoketa city ordinance involved here.

II. Standard of review concerning summary judgment.

Our review of a grant or denial of summary judgment is at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 1995). Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1997). To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must examine the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c); Red Giant, 528 N.W.2d at 528. The record here consists of the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits. We review the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment; in this sense, we consider a motion for summary judgment as we would a motion for directed verdict. Smith v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Iowa 1996).

For purposes of defendant City's motion for summary judgment, the City agreed with the facts stated by plaintiffs. Thus, no disputed fact questions are involved here. Only questions of law remain for decision. See id.

III. Constitutional issues.

Plaintiffs Goodenow first contend that Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c) and title VI, chapter 20 of the Maquoketa Code, as applied to them, effectuate an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation and that the district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs also challenge the ordinance on grounds that it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and vague.

Statutes and ordinances are presumed constitutional. Wettach v. Iowa Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 524 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1994). The party challenging a statute or ordinance on vagueness grounds has the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional and must negate every reasonable basis upon which the ordinance may be sustained. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency v. City of Grimes, 495 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1993). "When the reasonableness of a city ordinance is questioned, the ordinance will be presumed reasonable, unless the contrary appears on the face of the ordinance or is established by proper evidence." Id. (citing Iowa City v. Glassman, 155 Iowa 671, 674, 136 N.W. 899, 901 (1912)).

Maquoketa Code section 6-20-2 provides:

All property owners shall maintain their property and the abutting boulevard according to the following standards:

A. In districts zoned R-1, R-2, R-3, B-1, or B-2, all grasses, weeds, vines and brush shall be cut or destroyed when said growth exceeds six (6) inches in height.

B. In areas zoned other than R-1, R-2, R-3, B-1 or B-2, all grasses, weeds, vines and brush shall be cut or destroyed when said growth exceeds ten (10) inches in height.

C. Keep the abutting boulevard free of holes, excavations, protrusions, or other obstacles which could cause injury to the public.

Section 6-20-1(A) defines "boulevard" as follows:

A. "Boulevard" means the property outside a property owner's lot and property lines and inside the curb lines upon the public streets, or in the absence of a curb from the traveled portion of the public street to the lot or property line.

The ordinance is patterned after Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(c), which provides in pertinent part:

2. A city shall keep all public grounds, streets, sidewalks, alleys,...

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