Goodenow v. Litchfield

• Decision Date: 13 July 1882
• Parties: GOODENOW v. LITCHFIELD.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

59 Iowa 226

13 N.W. 86

GOODENOW

v.LITCHFIELD.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed July 13, 1882.

Appeal from Webster circuit court.

On rehearing.^a1

ADAMS, J., dissenting. Mr. Justice DAY concurring in the dissent.George Crane, for appellant.

Theo. Hawley and C. H. Gatch, for appellee.

SEEVERS, C. J.

1. On the petition of the plaintiff a rehearing was granted, to the end we might again examine the question determined in the foregoing opinion. Such question has been ably argued by counsel, and in relation thereto we desire to say:

Previous to bringing the action referred to in the foregoing opinion, and reported in 17 Wall. 153, the plaintiff's assignor paid certain taxes on the lands in controversy in that action. If it was held the plaintiff in said action could not recover the lands, then as alternative relief the plaintiff asked judgment for the taxes so paid. The object of this action, in part, is to recover the same taxes; that is, those paid before bringing the former action. The right to recover is placed, as we think, on precisely the same grounds in this as in the former action. The only allegation made now that was not made then, is that the taxes were paid in good faith, under the belief the homestead company owned the land, and was therefore legally bound to pay the taxes. But it is evident such good faith and belief must have existed when the payments were made, and, if material, such facts should have been alleged and established in the former action. The defence in such action was that said taxes had been voluntarily paid. This defence was sustained. The same defence is relied on now. As to the taxes paid before the commencement of the prior action, the adjudication therein must be regarded as an estoppel and bar to a recovery in this action. While counsel for the plaintiff does not concede the correctness of the foregoing, he earnestly contends such cannot be the rule as to the taxes paid subsequent to the former action. That question will now be considered.

2. The prior action was commenced in 1868, and was not determined by the supreme court of the United States until 1872. The plaintiff's assignor paid the taxes for the years 1868 to 1871, inclusive, and it is sought to recover the money so paid in this action. Counsel on both sides have cited a large number of cases as bearing upon the question as to what constitutes an adjudication which will estop the parties from again litigating the question determined in another action. There is no real conflict in the cases thus cited. The real difficulty is to ascertain whether this case is brought within the adjudicated cases, and the rules established as to what constitutes an estoppel when a prior judgment is pleaded in bar. Counsel for the plaintiff insist each payment of taxes for each year constitutes a separate and distinct transaction or cause of action, and therefore an adjudication as to the taxes paid in one year cannot estop or have any bearing upon the right to recover for taxes paid in a subsequent year. It is said a levy of taxes must be made for each year, and that as payments are made at different times, and may be predicated on different and distinct rights, therefore the right to recover for one payment can in no manner be affected by an adjudication made as to some other year and payment. This, we think, may ordinarily be so, and in City of Davenport v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co., cited in the foregoing opinion, it was said in argument that taxes for each year constitute separate causes of action. It is conceded in the foregoing opinion this was in conflict with the views therein expressed. Reflection has satisfied us this concession should not have been made, for the reason no such conflict in fact exists.

It is undoubtedly true that the taxes of each year ordinarily constitute separate and distinct rights or causes of action. But when an action is brought to recover taxes paid in one year, and an action is afterwards brought to recover for the taxes paid in a subsequent year, and the adjudication in the first is pleaded as a bar to the recovery in the second action, the question whether the estoppel is effectual will depend upon the issues in the two actions.

If the right to recover and defence thereto are based upon precisely the same grounds, why litigate again the question that has been determined? In such case the very right of the matter is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is not essential that the causes of action should be the same, but it is essential the right or title should be; that is, the issues in both actions and the matter on which the estoppel depends must be the same, or substantially so. The very matter or thing which it is sought to litigate must have been adjudicated in the prior action. In such case the bar or estoppel is complete. This rule will not, we think, be disputed. Therefore authorities are not required in its support; but see Merriam v. Whittemore, 5 Gray, 316. No point is made in this, nor was there in the prior action, that there was no assessment or levy of the taxes. Nor was there any question as to the payments made by the plaintiff's assignor in the former action, and there is none now as to the payments made for subsequent years. In fact, in the former action and in this, the right to recover is conceded, unless the payments were voluntary, and therefore no recovery could be had. This identical question was determined by the supreme court of the United States in the case cited in the foregoing opinion; that is, said court determined that the payments made by the plaintiff's assignor were voluntary, and therefore no recovery could be had. Now, it will be conceded such adjudication had reference only to the taxes paid prior to 1868, and that plaintiff's assignor could not have recovered in the action the taxes subsequently paid. But it conclusively appears, we think, that the subsequent payments were made under the same claim of right as those previously made. There is no difference in the circumstances under which the payments were made, as contemplated and adjudged by the supreme court of the United States. It was said by that court the right to recover was based on the ground the taxes were paid “in good faith and in ignorance of the law.” That is all that is claimed as to the subsequent taxes. The very right of the present litigation has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore it cannot be again litigated.

Many cases may be supposed which have more or less bearing on the case at bar. But as to all of them it can justly be said, if the right and title upon which the right to recover depends has been put in issue and been determined, the same right and title cannot be litigated again between the same parties in another action. But if the right and title has not been adjudicated, then no bar or estoppel is created. It may be supposed in this case the supreme court of the United States might have held the payments made were not voluntary, and a recovery could be had. Now, in an action between the same parties to recover taxes paid for subsequent years, the defendant could not have again litigated the question of voluntary payment, unless he could show the circumstances under which they were made were different from those under which the prior payments were made. So here, as has been...