Goodheart v. Casey

• Decision Date: 03 March 1989
• Citation: 521 Pa. 316,555 A.2d 1210
• Parties: , 57 USLW 2551, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. 2122 Bernard J. GOODHEART, et al. v. The Honorable Robert P. CASEY, in his capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 1210

555 A.2d 1210

521 Pa. 316, 57 USLW 2551, 10

Employee Benefits Cas. 2122

Bernard J. GOODHEART, et al. v. The Honorable Robert P. CASEY, in his capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 3, 1989.

Reargument Granted May 9, 1989.

Susan J. Forney, John G. Knorr, III, for appellant.

Martin S. Kaufman, General Counsel, for Amicus The Pennsylvania Economy League & The Comm. Foundation.

Henry T. Reath, David K. Wanger, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Robert W. Munley, Archbald, Matthew A. Cartwright, for Amicus Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Marc J. Sonnenfeld, David W. Folts, Kristen M. Cuene, Philadelphia, for Amicus Philadelphia Bar Ass'n.

NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

NIX, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the State Employees' Retirement Board ("SERB") from an order of the Commonwealth Court granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. Appellees are six active judges of the courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth, who entered judicial service after March 1, 1974, and the Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges. The subject matter of this case concerns the constitutionality of the State Employees' Retirement Code of 1974, 71 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5956 ("1974 Code"), which reduced pension benefits for members of the Commonwealth judiciary taking office after March 1, 1974, and the 1983 amendment thereto, which increased the basic contribution without a corresponding increase in benefits.

I.

The Retirement Code of 1959 ("1959 Code") established a comprehensive retirement system for state employees, including judges. Participation in the system was mandatory, taking effect upon commencement of state service. Regular state employees were entitled to Class A membership which required them to contribute 5% of their gross salary to the system and entitled them to retirement benefits based on a calculation using their final average salaries, their years of service, and a multiplier of 2%. See former 71 P.S. §§ 1725-301(1)(a) and 1725-401(1)(a).

All Commonwealth judges were required to contribute to the fund at statutorily prescribed levels. Judges had an option, however, to elect Class E-1 coverage which permitted them to contribute a higher percentage of their salaries and receive proportionately higher benefits than allowed by Class A. Class E-1 required a contribution of 10% of their gross salaries over the first ten years of service and 7.5% over the second ten years. See former 71 P.S. § 1725-301(1)(e). Benefits under Class E-1 were calculated by multiplying the judge's first ten years on the bench by the judge's final average salary and then by a multiplier of 4%. Added to this figure was the product of the judge's additional years on the bench, final average salary, and a multiplier of 3%. See former 71 P.S. § 1725-401(1)(e).

Judges also had an option to participate in the system's Social Security Integration Plan ("SSI Plan"). The SSI Plan permitted judges to make an additional retirement fund contribution each year from earnings in excess of the Social Security wage base, and to receive additional corresponding benefits upon retirement. Social Security Integration benefits were calculated by multiplying the average of earnings in excess of the Social Security wage base by the number of years of SSI participation and then by 2%. The pension benefits of judges who assumed office prior to March 1, 1974, are calculated under the 1959 Code. Catania v. Commonwealth, 498 Pa. 684, 450 A.2d 1342 (1982).

The 1974 Code eliminated the option for judges to elect Class E-1 coverage and SSI participation. Additionally, the 1983 amendment to the 1974 Code increased the basic employee contribution from 5% to 6.25% of gross salary without a corresponding increase in the benefits level. Only judges assuming office after the effective date of the 1983 amendment are subject to the increased contribution rate. Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Facilities v. State System Higher Education, 505 Pa. 369, 479 A.2d 962 (1984).

II.

Article V, section 16(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

(a) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth.

Pa. Const. art. V, § 16(a).

A basic principle of our form of government is that the executive, the legislative and the judicial are independent, co-equal branches of government. Zemprelli v. Daniels, 496 Pa. 247, 436 A.2d 1165 (1981). The division of these governmental powers prevents the danger of tyranny which is inherent in the concentration of absolute power in a single body. Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981). Nevertheless, the crucial function of the separation of powers principle is not separation per se, but rather the "checking" power each branch has over the others. See The Federalist No. 51 (J. Madison). As we explained in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971):

A legislature has the power of life and death over all the Courts and over the entire judicial system. Unless the legislature can be compelled by the courts to provide money which is reasonably necessary for the proper functioning of the courts, our entire Judicial system could be extirpated, and the legislature could make a mockery of our form of government with its three co-equal branches--the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial.

Id. at 57, 274 A.2d at 199.

Moreover, as we discussed in Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), it is imperative that each branch cooperate with the others in order to insure the proper functioning of our government. In Leahey we stated:

Control of state finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional limitations. (Citations omitted.) The function of the judiciary to administer justice does not include the power to levy taxes in order to defray the necessary expenses in connection therewith. It is the legislature which must supply such funds. Under the division of governmental powers it frequently happens that the functions of one branch may overlap another. But the successful and efficient administration of government assumes that each branch will cooperate with the others....

Id. at 57, 66 A.2d 577. (Emphasis in original.)

Although the legislative branch of our government has the power and authority to set the salary scale for the judiciary, Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972), as a co-equal branch of our tripartite form of government, the "[j]udiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities...." Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. at 52, 274 A.2d at 197 (emphasis in original). Therefore it follows that this Court has the inherent power to ensure the proper functioning of the judiciary by ordering the executive branch of government to provide appropriate funding so that the people's right to an efficient and independent judiciary is upheld. Furthermore, as we declared in Glancey v. Casey, supra, the legislature is obligated to provide adequate compensation. There we explained:

[E]ven though the Constitution of 1968 simply mandates that judicial compensation shall be "fixed by law" unlike the much wiser and salutory mandates of the constitutions of 1790, 1838 and 1874, which provided that judges should "receive for their services an adequate compensation," it is the constitutional duty and obligation of the legislature in order to insure the independence of the judicial (as well as the executive) branch of government, to provide compensation adequate in amount and commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of the judges involved. To do any less violates the very framework of our constitutional form of government.

Glancey 447 Pa. at 86, 288 A.2d at 816.

There is no doubt that judges who assumed office after March 1, 1974, receive different retirement benefits than judges who assumed office prior to that date. Further, in this Commonwealth it is well-settled that retirement benefits are part of total compensation. Catania v. Commonwealth, State Employees' Retirement Board, 498 Pa. 684, 450 A.2d 1342 (1982); McKenna v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 495 Pa. 324, 433 A.2d 871 (1981). We must determine whether the reduction of retirement benefits coverage and the increase of the employee contribution rate under the 1974 Code and the 1983 amendment thereto unconstitutionally impair the independent functioning of the judiciary by providing less than adequate compensation. It is significant to note, however, that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional unless plainly in violation of the constitution. Commonwealth v. Buckley, 510 Pa. 326, 508 A.2d 281 (1986); James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984). To begin our analysis, we must consider the meaning of adequate. As the Commonwealth Court correctly stated:

"Adequate" means sufficient for a specific purpose. In this case, it necessarily means sufficient to provide judges with a level of remuneration proportionate to their learning, experience and elevated position they occupy in our modern society. Inherent in this definition is the increasingly costly obligations of judges to their spouses and families, to the rearing and education of their children and to the expectation of a decent, dignified life upon departure from the bench.

Goodheart v. Thornburgh, 118 Pa.Commw. 75, 545 A.2d 399, 401 (1988).

Implicit in the constitutional right for adequate compensation for the judiciary is the public's right to have a competent, independent...