Goodier v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 24 February 1933
• Docket Number: 24113.
• Citation: 19 P.2d 392,172 Wash. 60
• Parties: GOODIER v. HAMILTON et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

19 P.2d 392

172 Wash. 60

GOODIER v. HAMILTON et al.

No. 24113.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

February 24, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James B. Kinne, Judge.

Action by Joe Goodier against Steve H. Hamilton and another. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Philip Tworoger, of Seattle, for respondents.

MILLARD Justice.

It was the desire of Steve H. Hamilton, who owned an interest in an auto freight business operating between Wenatchee and Seattle, to enlarge the business and to secure a certificate of convenience and necessity from the state department of public works. He consulted two attorneys, one of whom is a specialist in the public utility field of law, but was unable to obtain the authorization he sought. Hamilton stated to Joe Goodier, an insurance agent who had sold Hamilton insurance on some of the trucks used in the Hamilton auto freight business, that he would pay to Goodier $1,000 if Goodier 'would take him to the party who would be able to secure that franchise for him.' Goodier introduced Hamilton to an attorney who applied to the department of public works for a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing Hamilton to haul freight by autotruck between Wenatchee and Seattle. The certificate was granted. On appeal to the superior court, the order of the department was affirmed. Hamilton refused to accede to Goodier's demand for payment to him of the promised one thousand dollars whereupon Goodier instituted this action to recover judgment therefor. The cause was tried to the court, which found 'That the defendant Steve H. Hamilton acquired an interest in a freight hauling line between Wenatchee and Seattle; that he desired to secure a certificate of necessity from the board of public works of the state of Washington that he had talked with two different attorneys and that he had not been able to secure their assistance in prosecuting an application for a franchise; that he was acquainted with the plaintiff who was and is an insurance agent in the city of Seattle and who had sold him insurance on some of the trucks that were being used in the freight hauling business. That he told the plaintiff that he would be willing to give $5,000 for a certificate of necessity and that if the plaintiff would take him to an attorney who could secure the franchise for him, that he, the defendant, would pay the plaintiff the sum of $1,000. That the plaintiff made inquiry and recommended an attorney in the city of Seattle to the defendant and took the defendant to the said attorney's office and introduced him. That this attorney duly presented the application for franchise to the board of public works of the state of Washington; that the application for certificate of necessity was granted and the matter was thereupon appealed by persons objecting to be granting of the franchise to the superior court of the state of Washington, for Thurston county, and the action of the board sustained.'

The court concluded that the contract was illegal and void, and entered judgment dismissing the action. Plaintiff has appealed.

The contract was contra bonos mores. The oral agreement of the parties was one of corrupt tendency. It tended clearly to destory the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, hence was void as against public policy.

'The term 'public policy,' * * * embraces all acts or contracts which tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel.' 6 R. C. L. 712, § 120.

The necessary inference to be drawn from the agreement is that the attorney with whom appellant was acquainted was one who would be employed by the respondent because of influence which such attorney or his friends had with those (members of a quasi judicial board) who were charged with the duty of deciding whether certificates of necessity should be granted; that is, appellant agreed to secure an attorney whose personal or political influence would influence the board of public works to favorably act upon respondent's application for authorization to operate an auto freight line between Wenatchee and Seattle. That is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the fact that the agreement provided for contingent compensation--payment of $1,000 only in the event the attorney selected by appellant succeeded in obtaining the certificate for respondent. The striking feature of the agreement was that the compensation to be received by the appellant was contingent upon his finding a lawyer who would achieve success where two other reputable attorneys had either failed or refused to act. Such contracts suggest the use of secret or sinister influence on public officers.

In determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy, the test is not merely what the parties actually did, or contemplated doing, in order to carry out the contract, or even the actual result of its performance, but, rather, whether the contract as made has a tendency to evil.

'In determining whether a given contract contravenes public policy, the test is not always nor necessarily what acts the parties performed or contemplated, in order to fulfill their agreement, or its actual result, but rather whether its tendency is evil.' Oliver v. Wilder, 27 Colo. App. 337, 149 P. 275, 277.

It does not appear, it is not even hinted, that the attorney...